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Résumé
Dans certaines circonstances, des actions de groupes sont plus performantes que
des actions individuelles. Dans ces situations, il est préférable de former des coalitions.
Ces coalitions peuvent être disjointes ou imbriquées. La littérature économique met
un fort accent sur la modélisation des accords où les coalitions d’agents économiques
sont des ensembles disjoints. Cependant on observe dans la vie de tous les jours que les
coalitions politiques, environnementales, de libre-échange et d’assurance informelles
sont la plupart du temps imbriquées. Aussi, devient-il impératif de comprendre le
fonctionnement économique des coalitions imbriquées. Ma thèse développe un cadre
d’analyse qui permet de comprendre la formation et la performance des coalitions
même si elles sont imbriquées.
Dans le premier chapitre je développe un jeu de négociation qui permet la forma-
tion de coalitions imbriquées. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre et je développe
un algorithme pour calculer les allocations d’équilibre pour les jeux symétriques. Je
montre que toute structure de réseau peut se décomposer de manière unique en une
structure de coalitions imbriquées. Sous certaines conditions, je montre que cette
structure correspond à une structure d’équilibre d’un jeu sous-jacent.
Dans le deuxième chapitre j’introduis une nouvelle notion de noyau dans le cas où
les coalitions imbriquées sont permises. Je montre que cette notion de noyau est une
généralisation naturelle de la notion de noyau de structure de coalitions. Je vais plus
loin en introduisant des agents plus raffinés. J’obtiens alors le noyau de structure de
coalitions imbriquées que je montre être un affinement de la première notion.
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Dans la suite de la thèse, j’applique les théories développées dans les deux premiers
chapitres à des cas concrets.
Le troisième chapitre est une application de la relation biunivoque établie dans
le premier chapitre entre la formation des coalitions et la formation de réseaux. Je
propose une modélisation réaliste et effective des assurances informelles. J’introduis
ainsi dans la littérature économique sur les assurances informelles, quatre innovations
majeures : une fusion entre l’approche par les groupes et l’approche par les réseaux
sociaux, la possibilité d’avoir des organisations imbriquées d’assurance informelle,
un schéma de punition endogène et enfin les externalités. Je caractérise les accords
d’assurances informelles stables et j’isole les conditions qui poussent les agents à
dévier. Il est admis dans la littérature que seuls les individus ayant un revenu élevé
peuvent se permettre de violer les accords d’assurances informelles. Je donne ici les
conditions dans lesquelles cette hypothèse tient. Cependant, je montre aussi qu’il est
possible de violer cette hypothèse sous d’autres conditions réalistes. Finalement je
dérive des résultats de statiques comparées sous deux normes de partage différents.
Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle
où les groupes homogènes sont construits sur la base de relations de confiance pré-
existantes. Ces groupes sont imbriqués et représentent des ensembles de partage de
risque. Cette approche est plus générale que les approches traditionnelles de groupe
ou de réseau. Je caractérise les accords stables sans faire d’hypothèses sur le taux
d’escompte. J’identifie les caractéristiques des réseaux stables qui correspondent aux
taux d’escomptes les plus faibles. Bien que l’objectif des assurances informelles soit
de lisser la consommation, je montre que des effets externes liés notamment à la va-
lorisation des liens interpersonnels renforcent la stabilité. Je développe un algorithme
à pas finis qui égalise la consommation pour tous les individus liés. Le fait que le
nombre de pas soit fini (contrairement aux algorithmes à pas infinis existants) fait
que mon algorithme peut inspirer de manière réaliste des politiques économiques. En-
fin, je donne des résultats de statique comparée pour certaines valeurs exogènes du
viii
modèle.
Mots-clés : coalitions imbriquées, réseaux, jeux de fonctions de couverture, négo-
ciation, noyau, stabilité assurance informelle, normes de partage.
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Abstract
When groups can perform a task more efficiently than single individuals, a desi-
rable behavior is to form coalitions. Coalitions can be disjoint or overlapping. But,
almost all the economics literature on coalition formation is mostly restricted to mo-
dels where coalitions are disjoint. However, in politics, environmental issues, customs
unions, informal insurance, and many other economic, social, and political interac-
tions, we observe overlapping coalitions. How can we understand agreements involving
overlapping coalitions ? How can we study their efficiency if there is no theory to mo-
del them? My thesis solves these questions by developing a framework on coalition
formation that accommodates overlapping coalitions.
In the first chapter, following a non-cooperative approach, I develop a bargaining
game to model the formation of overlapping coalitions. I show the existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium and I provide an algorithm that generates equilibrium
outcomes for symmetric games. I establish an overlapping coalition’s representation
for each network and I show that, under some conditions, they are equilibrium out-
comes.
The core is the most popular solution concept in cooperative game. In the second
chapter, following a cooperative approach, I develop a new concept of core that accom-
modates overlapping coalitions, and coincides with the recursive core when coalitions
do not intersect. First, I extend naively the residual game to only embody overlap-
ping coalitions, and I obtain a range of allocations between the optimistic and the
pessimistic core. Secondly, I provide a consistent notion of residual game and I show
xthat the overlapping coalition structure core not only stands as a generalization of
the coalition structure core, but also induces a refinement of the extended recursive
core.
As I build a theoretical framework for overlapping coalition formation, I provide
applications in the remainder of the thesis.
In the third chapter, I model informal insurance arrangements as a collection
of overlapping trust coalitions. The model is based on empirical facts. I enrich the
theoretical modeling of informal insurance arrangements by introducing four key fea-
tures : the merging of the group approach and the network approach, the possibility
for informal insurance organizations to overlap, the endogenous punishment scheme,
and externalities. I characterize self enforcing stable informal insurance arrangements
and I derive conditions under which deviation occurs. While it is always assumed in
the literature that only wealthy individuals may deviate. I formally isolate conditions
under which this assumption holds. Furthermore, I show that if these conditions does
not hold, this assumption is violated. Finally, I provide static comparative results for
consumption under two distinct sharing norms.
Finally in the fourth chapter, I investigate multilateral informal insurance orga-
nizations built on networks of trust relationships. The model is based on empirical
findings and nests the traditional approaches which use bilateral links or groups. I
characterize self enforcing stable informal insurance organizations without imposing
extreme discounting. I show that density and clustering characterize networks that
match the lowest discounting for stability. While insurance is formally arranged to
smooth consumption, I show that external effects such as social privileges tend to
reinforce the stability of such arrangement. I use my stability results to derive com-
parative statics for exogenous parameters of the model. Finally, I develop a procedure
in finite steps that equates consumption for all linked individuals. Contrary to the
existing procedures in infinite steps, my procedure is more realistic and useful to po-
licy makers.
xi
Keywords : overlapping coalitions, networks, cover function games, bargaining,
core, stability, informal insurance, sharing norms
Table des matières
Dédicace iii
Remerciements iv
Résumé vi
Abstract ix
Table des matières xiv
Liste des figures xv
Liste des tableaux xvi
Introduction générale 1
1 Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Cover functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 The cover function bargaining game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.3 Timing of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.4 Existence of equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
xii
xiii
1.4 Symmetric cover function games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Symmetric cover function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.2 The algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Overlapping coalition structures and networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.1 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.2 Link with covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Games with overlapping coalitions and their cores 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 Some definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.1 Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.2 Residual game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.3 Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Extended recursive core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.1 Optimistic, pessimistic core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.2 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 The overlapping coalition structure core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.1 Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.2 Optimistic, pessimistic core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.3 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Informal insurance : an approach by overlapping coalitions 62
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Networks and transfer norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.1 Endowment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.2 Network based group formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.3 Multilateral norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
xiv
3.2.4 Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2.5 Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.6 Enforcement constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Endogenous stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.1 Characterization of endogenous stability . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3.2 Endogenous stability and sharing norms . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4 Informal insurance organizations 88
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.1 Endowment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.2 Risk sharing groups based on networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 Multilateral sharing rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.4 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.5 Enforcement constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.1 Characteristics of stable IIOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.2 Non-extreme values of the discount factor . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.4.1 Comparative static properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4.2 Numerical simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.5 Example of full risk sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.6 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Conclusion générale 131
Bibliographie 133
xv
Table des figures
1.1 5-person networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 An example of a 7-person trust relationship network . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 An example of a 3-person network with realized incomes . . . . . . . 70
4.1 Examples of 8-person networks : (1) Simple tree, (2) Circle, (3) Two-
neighbors, (4) Complete, (5) Bridge, (6) Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2 Stability and external effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3 Weak-stability and exogenous parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4 Strong-stability and exogenous parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5 An example of a 5-person network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
xvi
Liste des tableaux
1.1 3-person cover function game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Number of distinct players in a cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 A symmetric cover function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 The algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 A cover of g : γg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1 Weak stability, network characteristics, and discount factor . . . . . . 109
4.2 Strong stability, network characteristics, and discount factor . . . . . 110
1Introduction générale
Depuis les années 90, on observe une prolifération des zones de libre-échange à
travers les cinq continents. L’Organisation Mondiale du Commence en a recensé 150
en 2012. Il s’agit de groupements de pays qui s’entendent pour éliminer les droits
de douane et autres restrictions à l’importation. Vu d’un point de vue économique,
il s’agit de coalitions formées par des pays qui s’entendent pour améliorer leurs ren-
dements commerciaux. On observe également des coalitions dans diverses situations
économiques : accords environnementaux, groupes d’assurances informelles, groupes
de recherche, groupes humanitaires, groupes de fourniture de biens publics etc. Ces
coalitions peuvent être des ensembles disjoints ou bien souvent des ensembles imbri-
qués.
La majeure partie de la littérature économique consacrée à la formation des coali-
tions, se focalise sur les coalitions disjointes. Cependant, force est de constater que
les théories développées dans ce cas ne s’appliquent généralement pas aux coalitions
imbriquées. De surcroît, la présence accrue de coalitions imbriquées dans les regrou-
pements économiques poussent des chercheurs (Ray, 2007) à plaider pour l’urgence
de leur prise en compte dans la théorie économique. Ma thèse se propose donc d’éta-
blir un cadre d’analyse qui s’applique à toutes les formes de coalitions, aussi bien
disjointes qu’imbriquées. Pour ce faire, la thèse se subdivise en quatre chapitres. Les
deux premiers chapitres proposent des éléments de réponse aux questions liées à la
formation même des coalitions imbriquées. Il s’agit de comprendre par quels proces-
sus ces genres de coalitions voient le jour. Forts de ces éléments de réponses, les deux
2derniers chapitres s’attaquent aux assurances informelles (qui sont souvent des coali-
tions imbriquées) en tentant de les analyser à la lumière des réponses préalablement
apportées.
Dans le premier chapitre, je me pose la question suivante : peut-on par un jeu dy-
namique de formation de coalitions aboutir à un équilibre où les coalitions qui se
forment sont imbriquées ? Pour y répondre, je propose un jeu de négociation où des
propositions de formation de coalitions et de partage de surplus réalisés sont faites par
étapes. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre parfait en sous-jeux. Une fois cette
étape franchie, la question la plus important est de savoir s’il est possible de calcu-
ler concrètement cet équilibre et sous quelles conditions cela est possible. Je propose
donc une procédure qui permet, sous certaines conditions de régularité, de calculer
cet équilibre. Cette procédure se limite toutefois aux jeux symétriques : cas où le
nom des individus n’est pas important mais seul la structure des groupes auxquels ils
appartiennent compte. Dans la suite j’établis un lien biunivoque entre les coalitions
imbriquées et les réseaux interrelationnels. Ce lien me permet de caractériser tous les
réseaux interrelationnels par des coalitions imbriquées et inversement de dégager les
formes de coalitions imbriquées qui peuvent être caractérisés par des réseaux. Partant
de là, je montre que pour la plupart des réseaux (excepté les cercles où chaque agent
a deux liens et tous les agents sont liés), il existe un jeu dynamique qui admet ce
réseau comme émanant d’un équilibre parfait en sous-jeux (du jeu que je propose).
Dans le second chapitre, toujours dans le souci de proposer un processus rationnel
aboutissant à la formation de coalitions imbriquées, je propose une approche alterna-
tive. Il s’agit d’une approche qui s’inscrit dans la tradition des jeux de coopération,
où des agents peuvent refuser la coopération proposée et former leur propre coopé-
ration, tant que cette déviation leur permet d’améliorer leurs gains. Je m’intéresse
notamment à une structure particulière de distribution de gains : le noyau. Il s’agit
des distributions qui ne peuvent être dominées : on ne peut pas faire strictement
mieux pour les agents. Il s’agit donc de regarder comment cette notion de noyau
3peut être étendue à un cas où la formation de coalitions imbriquées est possible. Je
propose des extensions du noyau récursif préalablement proposé dans la littérature
mais qui ne s’applique qu’aux coalitions disjoints. Je montre qu’une extension naïve
(qui s’ouvre aux coalitions imbriquées tout en conservant la modélisation existante
de la réaction suite à une déviation) peut aboutir à une structure de noyau pour les
coalitions imbriquées. Cette structure présente cependant beaucoup de limites et ne
modélise pas toutes les formes possibles de coalitions imbriquées. Dans la suite du
chapitre, je propose une approche beaucoup plus adaptée aux coalitions imbriquées
en insistant sur le rôle des agents qui sont membres de plusieurs coalitions. La notion
de noyau ainsi obtenue présente une structure beaucoup plus fine que la première et
semble mieux adaptée aux coalitions imbriquées.
Dans le troisième chapitre, j’utilise le lien établi entre les réseaux interrelationnels
et les coalitions imbriquées pour expliquer dans un premier temps la structure im-
briquées des assurances informelles. Il s’agit d’une structure organisationnelle où des
groupes d’agents économiques, face à l’indisponibilité de crédit ou d’assurance, s’as-
socient de manière non formellement réglementée pour se faire réciproquement des
transferts dans le souci de lisser leur consommation. Ce chapitre vise essentiellement
à caractériser les déterminants de la stabilité de ces groupes de transfert. Par stabilité
j’entends la non-possibilité de défection par certains agents. Pour soutenir cette non-
défection, souvent dans le secteur formel, il y a le système judicaire ou les agences
de recouvrement. Mais dans les économies agraires où ces structures formelles font
défaut, les groupes d’assurances développent des techniques d’autodiscipline. Souvent
ces techniques sont supposées exogènes dans la littérature. Je propose une procédure
d’autodiscipline endogène où les agents n’obéissent pas à une règle préétablie pour
sanctionner ceux qui font défection, mais agissent plutôt de manière à maximiser leur
bien-être. En outre, j’introduis des externalités (les actions au sein d’un groupe in-
fluencent les gains des autres agents, incluant même les non-membres de ce groupe),
largement documentées dans la littérature empirique, dans la construction du modèle.
4En explorant deux règles de partage, je caractérise les groupes de transfert stables.
J’isole ensuite les conditions qui favorisent les défections et j’identifie le rôle des ex-
ternalités dans la stabilité. Enfin, je dérive des résultats de statique comparative pour
les paramètres qui influencent les défections.
Le dernier chapitre est également consacré aux groupes d’assurance informelle. Je
reviens sur les deux procédures d’autodiscipline exogènes les plus répandues dans la
littérature. L’intérêt est que toute procédure d’autodiscipline qui se manifeste par la
rupture des liens, peut se placer entre ces deux extrêmes. Je propose une structure or-
ganisationnelle des assurances informelles, construite à la lumière des faits empiriques
et je m’intéresse à leur stabilité. Dans un premier temps, je caractérise les groupes de
transfert stables en n’imposant aucune restriction sur le facteur d’escompte (il faut
noter que souvent dans la littérature on impose des facteurs d’escompte extrêmes, ce
qui facilite les calculs). Je donne les bornes inférieure et supérieure des groupes de
transfert stables émanant de réseaux interrelationnels. Je dégage ensuite les struc-
tures de réseaux qui sont le plus susceptibles d’aboutir à des groupes de transfert
stables. J’identifie une série de paramètres qui contribuent à la stabilité et je produis
des résultats de statique comparative sur ces paramètres. Je fais des simulations pour
tenter de comparer les contributions de ces paramètres à la stabilité. A la fin je pro-
pose une procédure à pas finis (il existe une procédure dans la littérature mais à pas
infinis), qui permet d’obtenir le meilleur lissage de consommation, qui est adaptée
aux coalitions imbriquées.
Chapitre 1
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining
and networks
1.1 Introduction
There are many situations where a group of agents can perform a task more ef-
ficiently than a single agent. A desirable behavior in this case is the formation of
coalitions : “alliances among individuals or groups which differ in goals” (Gamson,
1961). When a coalition is formed, its members define rules to follow together. The-
refore, forming a coalition can be viewed as writing an agreement together in order
to reach some common objectives.
In politics, environmental issues, provision of public goods, customs unions, and
many other situations, people write agreements. The literature on coalition formation,
both applied and theoretical, is very rich. However, this literature is mostly restricted
to models where each agent can be a member of no more than one coalition. That
is, coalitions cannot overlap. Yet real life shows us the contrary. There are several
situations where an agent can be signatory to an agreement to form a coalition S
and at the same time, also be signatory to another agreement to form a coalition S ′
which differs from S. We observe such behavior in many economic, social and political
6situations.
In international trade, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) involve overlapping coa-
litions of countries. The number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) is growing
rapidly all over the world. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), it
is estimated that more than half of world trade is now conducted under such agree-
ments. Among the best known RTAs are the European Union (EU), the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and so on. Many countries are
signatories to more than one of these RTAs. Israel, for example, has an FTA with
both the United States and the EU. Norway is signatory to the EFTA and has an
FTA with the EU and the Baltic states.
Credit markets in developing countries are not perfect. A person with low income
has limited access to credit. Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are
an alternative to formal credit. A ROSCA is “an association of men and women
who meet at regular intervals, for instance, once a month, and distribute a lump
sum of money to one of its members" (van den Brink and Chavas, 1997). Such credit
institutions are a widespread phenomenon in developing economies around the world 1.
In these economies, most people are members of multiple ROSCAs at the time (van
den Brink and Chavas, 1997) : one at work, one at the family level, one at the village
level and so on.
Environmental agreements also involve overlapping coalitions of countries. For
example, the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on clean development and climate, is
an international agreement on development and transfer of technology in order to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions. The signatories to APP are Australia, Canada, China,
India, Japan, South Korea and the United States of America (USA). Though, unlike
1. The ROSCA is known as “tontine" in Francophone West Africa, “Dashi" among the Nupe in
Nigeria, “Isusu" among the Ibo and Yoruba, and as “Susu" in Ghana. It is called “Ekub" in Ethiopia.
In Tanzania, it is called “Upatu," and it is known as “Chilemba" in many other parts of East Africa.
In other parts of the world, the ROSCA is called “Arisan" (Indonesia), “Pia Huey" (Thailand), “Ko"
(Japan), “Ho" (Vietnam), “Kye" (Korea), and “Hui" (central China). See van den Brink and Chavas
(1997) for more details.
7other APP signatory countries, the USA has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol : imposi-
tion of mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions. But, the USA and Canada are
signatories of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) :
cutting of emissions of four pollutants (sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile or-
ganic compounds and ammonia) by setting country-by-country emission ceilings to
be achieved by the year 2010.
Many other examples can be found in everyday economic behavior. This empha-
sizes the fact that agreements involving overlapping coalitions are present in a wide
variety of economic and social interactions. Yet, the existing literature on coalition
formation pays a little attention to overlapping coalitions. The aim of this chapter
is to develop a theoretical model that will be useful for the analysis of overlapping
coalitions.
As suggested Ray (2007) :
[If the formation of coalition S leaves the worth of all other coalitions unchanged, in-
cluding the worth of those groups that intersect with S, one can go ahead and simply
treat each of these as separate bargaining problems. That would be the end of the
story. But of course, matters are generally more complicated. The worth of a formed
coalition do affect those of another, and they do so in two fundamental ways.
First (law, custom, information) the formation of one coalition may negate the for-
mation of some other coalitions [...]
Second the formation of S can affect what a coalition T can achieve. Example free
trade agreements within S does not preclude another for T ; but payoffs will surely be
affected.]
This reflection raises some questions :
– How can we extend existing models of coalition formation to accommodate
overlapping coalitions ?
– What procedure should a group of agents use to coordinate their actions ?
– What is the process that leads to the formation of overlapping coalitions ?
8– How should the worth of a coalition be divided among its members ?
We provide answers to some of these questions, but more remains to be done.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we mention the different steps that
have been taken so far in the game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation. In
Section 1.3, we build a “bargaining cover function game” that allows the formation of
overlapping coalitions and we show existence of equilibria. In Section 1.4, we focus on
symmetric cover function games and we provide an algorithm to compute equilibrium
outcomes in this case. Finally, in Section 1.5 we establish a one-to-one link between
social network structures and overlapping coalition structures.
1.2 Related literature
Myerson (1980) introduced the idea of overlapping coalitions in the economics
literature. He used the terminology of “conference structure.” He was interested in
allocation rules as mappings from conference structures to payoff vectors. The ex-
pression overlapping coalition has been well known in other disciplines like computer
science and robotics 2. The problems addressed there, however, are different from those
of economic interest. Ray (2007) pointed out the lack of attention paid to overlapping
coalitions in game theory. He concluded by stating the necessity of a way to model
overlapping coalitions in game theory.
In the game theoretical approach to modeling coalition formation, if a coalition
forms, it generally means that its members agree to behave cooperatively. But if there
is more than one coalition, agents across coalitions behave non-cooperatively. This mix
of cooperation and non-cooperation leads to two approaches in the literature : the
blocking approach and the bargaining approach. If attention is focused on cooperation,
then coalitions are treated as the fundamental behavioral units and the blocking
approach is taken. On the other hand, if attention is focused on non-cooperation,
2. See Kraus et al. 1998, Hu et al. 2007, and Dang 2006 for more details.
9then individuals are treated as the fundamental behavioral units and the bargaining
approach is taken. Following the blocking approach, some papers have provided game
theoretical models that take overlapping coalitions into account (Albizuri et al. 2006,
Chalkiadakis et al. 2008, 2010). This chapter differs from these in that we follow the
bargaining approach. To our knowledge, it is the first to provide a bargaining game
that accommodates overlapping coalitions. In that sense, this chapter is a contribution
to the literature on coalition formation and more generally on bargaining theory 3.
As this chapter follows the bargaining approach, we expose a quick overview of
some models of bargaining with discounting. Rubinstein (1982) is one of the first to
use the extensive-form model of bargaining. The model is of a bilateral bargaining
process. But, when Binmore et al. (1985) tested bilateral bargaining of this kind
on subjects, they concluded that subjects behave fairer in real life than the theory
predicts. Subjects chose equal division as an obvious and acceptable compromise.
Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Okada (1996) generalized the bilateral bargaining by
Rubinstein (1982) to multilateral bargaining. These two papers differ in the way the
proposer is selected in the bargaining process. Based on Chatterjee et al. (1993), Ray
and Vohra (1999) take into account externalities across coalitions. When a coalition
forms, the actions of other coalitions can affect the worth of the formed coalition. In
most of these papers, once the bargaining game is introduced, an equilibrium notion
is explored and the equilibrium coalition structures are characterized.
In all of these papers, however, coalitions are not allowed to overlap. Therefore,
it is interesting to take a step forward by exploring the area of overlapping coalitions
as suggested Ray (2007).
1.3 The Model
The model here is an extension of the one developed by Ray and Vohra (1999)
to a setting where coalitions are not necessarily disjoint sets. For this purpose, we
3. Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006) is a good overview of the recent literature in this area.
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introduce the cover function (bargaining) game. We adopt, to the extent possible, the
same notations as in Ray and Vohra (1999).
1.3.1 Cover functions
Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of all players. A coalition S is a non-empty
subset of N . Two distinct coalitions S and S ′ are said to be overlapping if S ∩S ′ 6= ∅.
A cover γ of N is a collection of coalitions such that
γ ≡ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} and
m⋃
k=1
Sk = N.
Let Γ denote the set of all covers of N . An embedded coalition 4 is a pair (S, γ) such
that S ∈ γ and γ ∈ Γ. The set of embedded coalitions is denoted by Σ and defined
by Σ = {(S, γ) | S ∈ γ, γ ∈ Γ}.
A partition pi of N is either {N} or a cover with Sj ∩ Sk = ∅ for j 6= k. Let Π denote
the set of all partitions of N . One can easily see that Π ⊂ Γ. In the remainder, we
will use the expression overlapping coalition structure to address an element of Γ
whenever we want to emphasize on its structure. We denote for simplicity a coalition
S ≡ {i, j, k, ...} by S = ijk... .
Definition 1. A cover function v : Σ→ < is such that for all (S, γ) ∈ Σ, v(S, γ) ≥ 0
.
From this definition, existing notions of partition function and characteristic func-
tion can be obtained.
Definition 2.
(a) If Γ is restricted to Π, then v is a partition function.
(b) If in addition to (a), v is such that for all distinct pairs γ, γ′ ∈ Π and for all
S ∈ γ ∩ γ′, v(S, γ) = v(S, γ′), then v is a characteristic function.
4. We borrow this definition from Macho-Stadler et al. (2007).
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Hence, partition functions and characteristic functions are special cases of cover func-
tions.
1.3.2 The cover function bargaining game
For each coalition S, there is an initial proposer ρp(S) in S and an order of
respondents ρr(S) which is a permutation of S \ ρp(S). A protocol on N is given by
the set ρ ≡ {(ρp(S), ρr(S))}∅6=S⊆N . A cover function (bargaining) game is given by a
triple (N, v, ρ) where N is a set of players, v is a cover function, and ρ is a protocol
on N .
The game proceeds in stages. At each stage, a proposer is selected. She proposes a
coalition including her and a distribution of the conditional coalitional worth to the
other members of that coalition. Due to externalities, the actual coalitional worth is
not known until the end of the game. Therefore, a proposer proposes a distribution
that is conditional on the remaining coalitions that form. The respondents, the other
members of the coalition to whom a proposal is made, either accept or reject this pro-
posal in the order specified by the protocol. If all the respondents accept the proposal,
the coalition forms. The bargaining process consists of a succession of proposals and
responses. The current state of the game consists of the proposals that have already
been made, the corresponding responses, the coalitions that have already formed, and
the ones that can form. We provide below a formal definition of a proposal.
At each stage of the game, the set of proposers consists of the players who do not
belong to any formed coalition. The set of respondents, however, is the whole set of
players N . In order to permit overlapping coalitions, we allow a member of a coalition
that has already formed (during the bargaining process) to continue participating in
the game, but only as respondent. For example, consider a set of countries. Suppose
one country takes the first step to form an RTA with some of the others. Once this
RTA is formed, another country (which does not belong to the RTA that has already
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formed) may initiate the formation of another RTA. He can decide to extend the new
proposal to some countries that belong to the already formed RTA. If the new RTA
is formed, then we see overlapping RTAs.
At any stage of the game where a coalition S is proposed, let Γ(S) ≡ {γ ∈ Γ | S ∈ γ}
be the set of coalition structures compatible with S. Consider a stage of the game such
that a collection of coalitions λ ≡ (S1, . . . , SL) has already formed and a coalition S is
proposed. Let Γ(λ, S) denote the set of coalition structures that are compatible with
λ and S.
Formally, Γ(λ, S) ≡ {γ ∈ Γ(S) | γ ∈ Γ(Sl) for all l = 1, . . . , L}.
Definition 3. A proposal is a pair (S, y), where y ≡ (y(γ))γ∈Γ(λ,S) such that for all
γ ∈ Γ(λ, S), y(γ) is a vector of size |S| and ∑i∈S yi(γ) = v(S, γ).
Remark 1.
A proposal (S, y) is such that S is a non-empty subset of N and each y(γ) = (yi(γ))i∈S
is a distribution of v(S, γ) among the members of coalition S conditional on the
formation of γ.
In the above definition, yi(γ) is the payoff proposed to i contingent on the formation
of the cover γ ∈ Γ(λ, S).
An outcome of the game consists of the collection of all coalitions that form during
the bargaining process if the game ends. A strategy of a player is a complete plan of
action that specifies the choices to be made at each time she makes a decision. This
plan of action is contingent on the history of the game. A stationary strategy of a
player is to either make a proposal (possibly probabilistic) or to respond to a proposal
(possibly probabilistic), conditional only on the current state of the game. A subgame
stationary perfect equilibrium is a collection of stationary strategies such that there
is no history at which a player benefits by deviating from her prescribed strategy.
We make the behavioral assumption that if a player is indifferent between making non-
acceptable proposals such that the game continues forever and making an acceptable
proposal such that the game ends, she chooses to make the acceptable proposal. The
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idea behind this assumption is that no individual is ill-intentioned to act as to reduce
others worth without gaining any.
1.3.3 Timing of the game
At each stage k = 1, 2, · · · of the game, let Pk be the set of possible proposers.
The game starts with P1 ≡ N . The timing of the game is as follows.
At stage k :
(i) The protocol ρ designates i = ρp(Pk) as the initial proposer. Player i chooses
a coalition S ⊆ N to which she belongs and makes a proposal to the other
members of S.
(ii) The players in S \ {i} respond sequentially according to the protocol ρr(S).
If all of them accept the proposal, then coalition S forms. The game moves to
stage k + 1 with Pk+1 ≡ Pk \ S. In this case, the game continues with a new
proposal made by player ρp(Pk+1).
(iii) In case of rejection at stage k, the game moves to stage k + 1 but the next
proposer is not designated by the protocol. Instead, she is the first rejector that
belongs to Pk. 5 After a rejection, a lapse of one unit of time occurs. 6 This
imposes a geometric cost on all players, and is captured by a common discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1). After the next proposal is made, the game continues exactly
as described in (ii).
(iv) If, during the bargaining process, a player j makes a proposal that is rejected
only by players in N \ Pk, then j remains the next proposer. 7
5. It can be the case that the first rejector, according to the protocol, is a player who already
belongs to a formed coalition. In this case, the next proposer is the following rejector according to
the protocol. If this player also belongs to a formed coalition, then the next proposer shifts to the
following player and so forth.
6. The bargaining process can occur during a meeting. So in case of rejection, the lapse of time
captures the additional renegotiation costs. The literature on discounting often explain this lapse of
time as a cost of reorganizing another meeting or another discussion panel. But if the proposal is
accepted, there is no additional cost and therefore there is no lapse of time.
7. Step (iv) in the timing of the game captures the fact that making an unacceptable proposal
to an individual who belongs to an already formed coalition is strategically unnecessary. On an
equilibrium path an unacceptable proposal is made strategically to force the rejector (who belongs
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(v) The game ends if Pk+1 = ∅. At this time an overlapping coalition structure
forms. Each coalition is now required to allocate its worth among its members
according to the proposal they have accepted.
Remark 2.
– If the bargaining process continues forever, all players receive zero due to dis-
counting.
– At each stage of the game, while only members of Pk may propose, any member
of N may be a respondent.
– Step (iv) is useful for the description of all possible situations. But, due to
discounting, this never happens on an equilibrium path when the game ends.
Proposition 1. An outcome of a cover function (bargaining) game is in Γ.
Proof.
The proof is straightforward because the game ends if and only if it reaches a stage
k such that Pk+1 = ∅. 
Notice that at any stage of the game, a proposal can be made to the whole set
of players, including those players who have already formed a coalition. Therefore,
coalitions may overlap in an outcome.
Example 1.
Consider a small village of three households 1, 2, and 3. Suppose that in this village,
1 and 3 are enemies and 2 is a household of very skilled (or wealthy) persons. So
everybody wants to sign an agreement with 2. If 1 and 3 are in the same group,
their relationship will negatively affect the performance of the group. If households
are allowed to bargain and form groups strategically in order to perform some tasks,
what is the structure that will arise ?
To model this situation, let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players. The game is given by
to Pk) to make the next proposal. It worth noting that Ray and Vohra (1999) provide an example
of equilibrium with rejection in the equilibrium path.
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Table 1.1.
Protocol Covers Cover function
ρp(N) = 1 γ1 = {N} v(N, γ1) = 4
ρp(12) = 1 γ2 = {1, 2, 3} v(i, γ2) = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3
ρp(13) = 1 γ3 = {12, 23} v(12, γ3) = v(23, γ3) = 3
ρp(23) = 2 γk4 = {ij, k} v(ij, γk4 ) = v(k, γk4 ) = 1 (*)
ρr(N) = 2→ 3 v(S, γ) = 0 for any other (S, γ) ∈ Σ
(*) i, j, k are such that {i, j, k} = N
v(S, γ) = 0 for any other (S, γ) ∈ Σ.
Table 1.1 – 3-person cover function game
Suppose that the distribution of coalitional worth is fixed exogenously to be equal
division. 8 One possible equilibrium action sequence in the cover function bargaining
game is :
(i) Player 1 makes the proposal (12, y) to player 2 , with y = (y(γ))γ∈Γ(12), where
y({12, 3}) = (1/2, 1/2)
y({12, 13}) = (0, 0)
y({12, 23}) = (3/2, 3/2).
(ii) Player 2 accepts the proposal and then the coalition 12 forms.
(iii) Player 3 makes a proposal (23, y′) to player 2 , with y′ = y({12, 23}) =
(3/2, 3/2).
(iv) Player 2 accepts the proposal and the game ends.
It turns out that the cover γ3 forms in equilibrium. This equilibrium coalition structure
is an overlapping coalition structure. This is not possible in the partition function
framework.
If we were to restrict ourselves to the partition framework, since v(S, γ) ≥ 0, we
would have v(12, γ3) = v(23, γ3) = 0. Obviously, the grand coalition would form in
8. Equal division is a mild requirement imposed here for simplicity as by Ray and Vohra, 1999. In
real life people chose equal division (Binmore et al., 1985) as an obvious compromise. Equal division
is also obtained when δ tends to unity (Ray and Vohra, 1999).
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equilibrium. It is interesting that with γ3, one can easily construct a division of the
equilibrium coalitional worths, such that all the players are better off compared to all
possible payoffs that they get in the partition function case. Thus, allowing the forma-
tion of overlapping coalitions can lead to Pareto improvements. This example shows
that, apart from the descriptive aspect, a framework that accommodates overlapping
coalitions is normatively interesting.
1.3.4 Existence of equilibrium
As in Ray and Vohra (1999), our notion of equilibrium allows for three kinds of
mixing : the choices of a coalition to propose, a distribution of the coalitional worth,
and a response. Ray and Vohra (1999) prove the theorem below for the partition
function case. We show that it remains true for the cover function case. The steps
of the proof remain the same. However, the generalization is far from being obvious.
Furthermore, unlike the partition case, our proof is by induction on the size of the
set of proposers.
Theorem 1. There exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium where the only
source of mixing is the choice of a coalition by each proposer.
Proof.
Notice that for a new coalition to form during the bargaining process, it needs a new
proposal to be made. This requires at least one player to be a proposer. Furthermore,
there can not be a new coalition formed only by players belonging to already formed
coalitions. Thus for the existence of an equilibrium, it is sufficient to focus on the set
of proposers.
Without loss of generality, the proof is by induction on only the size of the set of
proposers. We proceed with a sequence of four lemmas. Before that, we need some
additional notation.
If a coalition S forms, let {−S, v|−S, ρ|−S} denote the new game, where proposals can
only be made by players in −S ≡ N \ S with :
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v|−S ≡
{
v(T, γ)T∈γ\{S}
}
γ∈Γ(S) , and
ρ|−S ≡
{
(ρp(T ′), ρr(T ))
}
∅6=T ′⊆N\S; T∈γ\{S},γ∈Γ(S).
Similarly define {−λ, v|−λ, ρ|−λ} as the new game obtained after a collection of coa-
litions
λ ≡ (S1, . . . , SL) has formed. Let M ≡ Max(S,γ)∈Σ
{
v(S, γ)
}
. Obviously, M exists
because N is a finite set. For all γ ∈ Γ, the number of coalitions in γ is at most n (the
total number of players). 9 At the beginning of the game, the number of proposers
is n. However, this number decreases during the bargaining process. Thus, an indi-
vidual’s payoff can not exceed nM . In addition to that, due to the assumption that
v({i}, γ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , the equilibrium payoff for each player lies in X ≡ [0, nM ].
If at stage k of the game Pk = {i}, i ∈ N will propose a coalition T . If T 6= {i}
and she knows that at least one player will reject the proposal, i can not do better
than staying alone and proposing T = {i}. 10 Otherwise, she proposes a coalition
T 6= {i} such that no player will reject this proposal and she gains at least the same
as her payoff if she proposes {i}. And the game ends. Thus her best strategy is either
making an acceptable proposal (if she can get more than what she gains by staying
alone), or staying alone (if not).
Assume that an equilibrium exists for each cover function bargaining game with
less than n proposers.
Now consider the overall game with n proposers at the beginning. Suppose that a
coalition S has formed. 11 The resulting game is {−S, v|−S, ρ|−S} with n− |S| propo-
sers. By assumption, an equilibrium exists for this game. Fix one equilibrium strategy
for any player in this subgame. Now we are going to describe equilibrium strategies
9. The number of coalitions in γ lies between 1 (if γ = {N}) and n (if all the coalitions in γ are
singleton sets). This is due to the fact that for a coalition to be formed, we need at least one player
from the set of proposers Pk
10. Notice that according to Step (iv) in the timing of the game, if i’s proposal T is such that
T 6= {i} and it is rejected, then i makes the next proposal. Since Pk = {i}, all the players in T \ {i}
are already members of a formed coalition. Because of the discounting following a rejection and the
behavioral assumption that we made, i can not make an unacceptable proposal.
11. As far as the game is not degenerated, ie. there exists (S, γ) ∈ Σ such that v(S, γ) > 0, at least
the coalition S will form at equilibrium.
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after S had formed. 12
For this purpose, we have to generate :
(i) A probability distribution βS over the set Λ(S) ≡ {λ = γ \ {S}, γ ∈ Γ(S)}.
Each λ ∈ Λ(S) is a collection of coalitions such that {S} ∪ λ ∈ Γ(S).
(ii) A set U ≡
{(
ul(T )
)
l∈T , T ∈ λ
}
of equilibrium payoff vectors (in X) for all
the players in the coalitions to be formed after S has formed.
At the beginning of the game, let i ≡ ρp(N). 13 Let Ni ≡ {S ⊆ N, i ∈ S} de-
note the set of all coalitions containing i. Let Ai ≡
{Ni × {j}, j ∈ N \ {i}},
∆i ≡ { Probability distribution over Ai}, and ∆ ≡
∏
k∈N ∆k. Player i ∈ N can make
acceptable proposals to players in S ∈ Ni and unacceptable proposals to j ∈ N\{i}. 14
A typical element αi ∈ ∆i stands for i’s probabilistic choice concerning the coalition to
form or the other player to whom an unacceptable proposal is made. Thus, αi(S) de-
notes the probability with which i chooses to make an acceptable proposal to S ∈ Ni
, and αi
({j}) denotes the probability with which i chooses to make an unacceptable
proposal to j ∈ N \ {i}. Let xSk denote the expected equilibrium payoff that k ∈ N
receives in the game, coming from the formation of a coalition S that she belongs
to, if i is the first proposer. Notice that ex-post, if S is not in the equilibrium cover,
then xSk = 0. Thus, the expected equilibrium payoffs xk that k receives in the game,
if i is the first proposer, is the sum of what she receives from each coalition that she
belongs to. Formally, xk =
∑
S∈Nk x
S
k .
Fix α ∈ ∆ and x ≡ (xk)k∈N ∈ Xn. Player i ∈ N has two options : making an
acceptable proposal to a coalition S ∈ Ni or making an unacceptable proposal to
j 6= i.
Lemma 1. If i makes an acceptable proposal to S, then her optimal expected payoff
is
12. Notice that the protocol was suppose not to depend on the process that leads to the formation
of a coalition S.
13. Player i is the first proposer of the game.
14. We can assume without loss of generally that i ∈ N make unacceptable proposals only to
singleton sets of players. The point is that for a proposal to be rejected, it needs only one player to
reject it.
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gi(S, x) ≡
∑
λ∈Λ(S) β
S(λ)v(S, γ)− δ∑j∈S;j 6=i xj, where γ = {S} ∪ λ.
Proof.
To alleviate the notation in the proof, we write (S, λ) instead of {S} ∪ λ.
Player i names a coalition S ∈ Ni and makes an acceptable proposal y(S, γ) condi-
tional on γ ∈ Γ(S). To do so, she solves the following program :
MaxyE
{
yi
(
S, (S, λ)
)} ≡ ∑
λ∈Λ(S)
βS(λ)yi
(
S, (S, λ)
)
(1.1)
Subject to : ∑
λ∈Λ(S)
βS(λ)yj
(
S, (S, λ)
) ≥ δxj for all j ∈ S, j 6= i (1.2)
∑
k∈S
yk
(
S, (S, λ)
) ≤ v(S, (S, λ)) (1.3)
(1) : i ∈ N maximizes her payoff expecting that the cover γ = (S, λ) will form with
probability βS(λ).
(2) : j ∈ S \ {i} accepts the offer. 15
(3) : The aggregate payoff of all players in S can not be greater than the coalitional
worth.
It is straightforward to see that (1.2) and (1.3) will bind at equilibrium.
Thus, at equilibrium :
∑
λ∈Λ(S)
βS(λ)yj
(
S, (S, λ)
)
= δxj for all j ∈ S, j 6= i (1.4)
∑
j∈S
yj
(
S, (S, λ)
)
= v
(
S, (S, λ)
)
(1.5)
Sum (1.4) over j and add
∑
λ∈Λ(S) β
S(λ)yi
(
S, (S, λ)
)
. Let gi(S, x) denote the maxi-
mum value of the program. From (1.5), gi(S, x) =
∑
λ∈Λ(S) β
S(λ)v
(
S, (S, λ)
)−δ∑j∈S;j 6=i xj.

15. Because she is better off than what she could gain if she rejects the proposal and becomes the
next proposer.
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In the previous lemma, gi is a continuous function of x (projections and sum) and
is independent of λ.
The player i = ρp(N) will choose a coalition S in Ni and make an acceptable proposal
to players in S if this coalition induces the highest gi(S, x) to her.
We have fixed (x, α) ∈ Xn ×∆. For each k ∈ N , let vki (x, α) denote i’s expected
payoff received if k proposes at this stage. If k’s proposal is accepted, let Bki denote
i’s expected payoff. Otherwise, if k’s proposal is rejected by j 16, then a new proposal
is made by j. Notice that j ≡ j if at this stage j is in the set of proposers, otherwise,
j ≡ k. 17 Thus,
vki (x, α) = B
k
i + δ
∑
j 6=k
αk
({j})vji (x, α). (1.6)
Lemma 2. For each k ∈ N , vki (x, α) is a continuous function of (x, α).
Proof.
For each k ∈ N , vki (x, α) is defined by
vki (x, α) = B
k
i + δ
∑
j 6=k
αk
({j})vji (x, α) (1.7)
Remind that i is the first proposer. Thus,
Bii ≡
∑
S∈Ni
αi(S)gi(S, x) , and for j 6= i , Bji ≡ δ
∑
T∈Nj , i∈T
xTi αj(T )+
∑
T∈Nj , i 6∈T
αj(T )ui(T )
(1.8)
(1.7) : With probability αi(S), i chooses a coalition S and makes an acceptable
proposal to its members.
(1.8) : Player i’s proposal is rejected by j 6= i who becomes the next proposer and
makes an acceptable proposal to T . For the first expression, i belongs to the coalition
T proposed by j. For the second expression, i does not belong to the coalition T
16. Player k makes an unacceptable proposal to j with probability αk
({j}).
17. This situation occurs according to Step (iv) in the timing of the game.
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proposed by j.
For each k ∈ N , the value vki (x, α) depends on i’s best payoff gi , and on the vector
α.
The set of equations defining the value can be defined as
Vi ≡ (vki )k∈N , and Bi ≡ (Bki )k∈N
Let C denote the n× n matrix with 1’s on the diagonals and −δαk
({j}) as the kjth
off-diagonal element. Thus, Bi = CVi.
In each row, the sum of the off-diagonal elements lies in (−1; 0] and C is nonsingular.
Thus, Vi = C−1Bi by (1.6). We conclude that for each k ∈ N , vki is continuous in x
and α. Player i’s expected payoff is a continuous function of x and α, whether her
proposal is accepted or not. 
For each (x, α) ∈ Xn ×∆ and a fixed i ∈ N , define vi(x, α, ·) on ∆i by
vi(x, α, α
′
i) ≡
∑
S∈Ni
α′i(S)gi(S, x) + δ
∑
j 6=i
α′i
({j})vji (x, α)
and maximize this function with respect to α′i ∈ ∆i. Let φ1i (x, α) ≡Maxα′i∈∆i
{
vi(x, α, α
′
i)
}
,
φ2i (x, α) ≡ Argmaxα′i∈∆i
{
vi(x, α, α
′
i)
}
, and Φ ≡∏i φ1i ∏i φ2i .
Lemma 3. Φ is a mapping on Xn ×∆ and it admits a fixed point (x, α).
Proof.
According to the maximum theorem and the facts that vi(x, α, α′i) is continuous, and
φ1i (x, α) is a continuous function, φ2i (x, α) is a convex-valued upper hemicontinuous
correspondence. This result holds for all i in N and (x, α) in Xn ×∆ because i and
(x, α) where chosen arbitrarily. Thus,
∏
i φ
1
i maps Xn × ∆ on Xn. Therefore, the
correspondence Φ : Xn ×∆→ Xn ×∆ admits a fixed point (x, α) according to Ka-
kutani’s fixed point theorem. 
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Lemma 4. The fixed point of Φ induces an equilibrium.
Proof.
Let σ denote the strategy profile such that at the stage k of the game :
(i) When Pk = N , an arbitrary i ∈ N , as a proposer, makes proposals according
to α :
- To every coalition S ∈ Ni such that αi(S) > 0, she proposes y(S, γ) which
solves the maximization problem addressed in the equations (1) – (3).
- To every j 6= i such that αi
({j}) > 0, she offers, for every possible cover
containing the coalition {i, j} , less than δx{i,j}j .
(ii) Suppose that Pk = N , i ∈ N is a respondent to a proposal y(S, γ), and every
respondent j to follow i is offered an expected payoff of at least δxj, i.e.∑
λ∈Λ(S) β
S(λ)yj
(
S, (S, λ)
) ≥ δxj for all respondents j that follow i. Then i
accepts the proposal if and only if
∑
λ∈Λ(S) β
S(λ)yi
(
S, (S, λ)
) ≥ δxi.
(iii) Suppose that Pk = N , and i ∈ N is the first respondent. From (ii), if there is
exactly one respondent to follow i, say j ∈ N , such that j is offered an expected
value less than δxj, then j will reject the proposal. Player i’s decision will now
depend on the present value of the payoff resulting from j rejecting the offer
and this will lead to a new proposal as in (i). This value is precisely δvji (x, α).
Player i accepts the proposal if and only if δvji (x, α) ≥ δxi. Notice that this
inequality might hold even though we know from the construction of vji and the
fact that (x, α) is a fixed point, that δvji (x, α) ≤ xi.
Now consider a proposal made to respondents {1, ..., r} in that order. Suppose
we have computed the decisions of all respondents i+1, ..., r. Player i’s decision
is then obtained by considering the decision of the next responder to reject the
proposal, say j. Player i accepts the proposal if and only if δvji (x, α) ≥ δxi . In
this way we obtain a complete description of the actions of all respondents of a
proposal.
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(iv) Suppose that Pk ⊂ N . It must be the case that some collection of coalitions
λ = (S1, . . . , SL) has already formed. The strategies of the remaining players are
defined according to the preselected equilibrium of the game {−λ, v|−λ, ρ|−λ}.
We show that a strategy profile σ satisfying (i)-(iv) is a stationary equilibrium.
Consider σ and deviations that a single i ∈ N can contemplate.
By construction xi = vi(x, α, αi) = Max
{
vi(x, α, ·)
}
. Thus, it is not possible for i,
as a proposer, to receive a higher payoff than xi by making a one-shot deviation from
αi.
This implies that no other strategy can yield i a higher payoff than xi. The action
prescribed in (i) achieves xi and therefore cannot be improved upon. Suppose that
i is a respondent and all respondents to follow i are offered at least δxj, which, by
hypothesis, they will accept. By deviating, i gets a present value of δxi. Clearly then,
the action prescribed in (ii) cannot be improved upon. Suppose i is a respondent who
is followed by a respondent j who, based on σ, will reject the proposal. Accepting
the proposal yields δvji (x, α) to i ∈ N while rejecting it yields at most δxi. Thus,
the action described in (iii) cannot be improved upon. A similar argument applies to
the description in (iii) of i’s actions in the other cases when i is a responder. Finally,
notice that when some players have left the game, i can not do better than the actions
in (iv). Thus, σ is a stationary equilibrium. 
This Lemma ends the induction. The strategy profile σ is then a stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium where the only source of mixing is in the choice of a coalition
by each proposer. 
Remark 3.
The steps of this proof are exactly the same as in the partition function case (Ray
and Vohra 1999). Nevertheless, there are two fundamental differences. First, unlike
the partition case, the induction is on the number of potential proposers during the
bargaining process. In the cover case, at every stage of the game, the number of
possible responders is fixed at n. This is quite different from what happens in the
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partition case. Secondly, unlike the partition case, a player can be a responder to
acceptable proposals more than once. These features have been taken into account
in this proof through the new element xSj denoting the maximum payoff that j ∈ N
can obtain from the formation of the coalition S if i ∈ N is the first proposer in the
game.
1.4 Symmetric cover function games
In this section, we provide an algorithm to compute an equilibrium coalition struc-
ture for symmetric cover function games.
Symmetric partition function (Ray and Vohra, 1999)
Let N be a set of n players, and pi a partition of N . If pi = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} with
|Si| = si, then the numerical coalition structure of pi is n(pi) ≡ (s1, s2, . . . , sm). Notice
that
∑m
i=1 si = n. A partition function v is symmetric if for a given partition pi and a
coalition Si ∈ pi, v(Si, pi) = v(si,n(pi)). Thus, the numerical coalition structure repre-
sents the equivalence class of symmetric coalitions (in consideration of the symmetric
partition function).
As the coalition formation game has both cooperation (within coalitions) and non-
cooperation (across coalition) aspects, the definition of a symmetric cover function
game is not straightforward. A player may belong to more than one coalitions. How
will this player behave ? Will she behave non-cooperatively against the other members
of a coalition that she belongs to ? The answer is not trivial. That is one of the reasons
why we favor the bargaining approach. As side payments are allowed, one can think
that being a member of multiple coalitions will have an effect on the bargaining power
of these coalitions and that will affect in either direction (reduce or increase) the worth
of the concerned coalitions. This can induce a specific effect on the division of the
worth in those particular coalitions. We do not address this problem here but one
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should keep it in mind.
1.4.1 Symmetric cover function
Let γ ≡ {S1, . . . , Sm} ∈ Γ. Let n(γ) ≡ (s1, ..., sm) denote the numerical coalition
structure of γ. Contrary to the partition case,
∑m
i=1 si ≥ n and if there exists at least
one overlapping player, 18
∑m
i=1 si > n. Thus, the numerical structure used in the
partition case is not sufficient to characterize an overlapping coalition structure.
For each Si ∈ γ, count the number of overlapping players and identify the number
of distinct coalitions that these players belong to. Formally, let o(Si) ≡
{
(o1, c1), . . . , (ol, cl)
}
denote a set of pairs of integers. For each pair, the first integer accounts for the num-
ber of overlapping players, and the second one for the number of distinct coalitions
that these overlapping players belong to. The set o(Si) stands for, o1 players belong
to c1 coalitions, o2 players belong to c2 coalitions,..., ol players belong to cl coalitions.
For further simplicity, we will rank these pairs by using the lexicographical order.
This collection of pairs is denoted the overlapping status of Si. Similarly, define the
overlapping status of any collection of coalitions λ that we will denote by abuse of
notation o(λ).
Once n(λ) ≡ (s1, ..., sm) and o(λ) ≡
{
(o1, c1), . . . , (ol, cl)
}
are defined, let
K(λ) ≡∑mi=1 si −∑lj=1(cj − 1)oj.
Proposition 2.
For all γ ∈ Γ, K(γ) = n.
Proof.
The proof is straightforward. Notice that we may have multiple counts of players in
the sum of the sizes of coalitions in γ (because some players may belong to more than
one coalition). Therefore, to obtain the exact number of players, we need to subtract
this multiple counts so that each player is counted only once. 
18. The set γ is not necessarily a partition.
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Example 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. In Table 1.2 we verify Proposition 2 for some
covers.
γ n(γ) o(γ)
∑
si
∑
(cj − 1)oj K(γ)
{12345} (5) {(0, 0)} 5 0 5
{123, 345} (3, 3) {(1, 2)} 6 1 5
{123, 134, 345} (3, 3, 3) {(1, 3); (2, 2)} 9 4 5
{123, 124, 125} (3, 3, 3) {(2, 3)} 9 4 5
Table 1.2 – Number of distinct players in a cover
Definition 4. Let γ ≡ {S1, . . . , Sm} ∈ Γ and si = |Si| for all Si ∈ γ. The represen-
tative coalition structure of γ is denoted r(γ) and defined by r(γ) ≡ {{si;o(Si)}, i =
1, 2, . . . ,m
}
.
A cover function is symmetric if the worth of a coalition in a given cover depends
only on the size and the overlapping status of each coalition in that cover.
Definition 5. A cover function v is symmetric if for each embedded coalitions (S, γ) ∈
Σ, v(Si, γ) = v
({
si;o(Si)
}
, r(γ)
)
.
Remark 4.
– By definition, the representative coalition structure represents the equivalence
class of symmetric coalitions (in consideration of the symmetric cover function).
Therefore, for all Si ∈ γ, v(Si, γ) can be written as v
({
si;o(Si)
}
, r(γ)
)
. 19
– If γ is a partition, then for all Si ∈ γ, o(Si) =
{
(0; 0)
}
. In this case the re-
presentative coalition structure is isomorphic to the numerical structure. Thus,
the numerical coalition structure is a particular case of representative coalition
structures.
19. We need this notation for further use in the algorithm.
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To illustrate the symmetric cover function, let γ = {12, 34, 45} ∈ Γ. Let v be
a symmetric cover function on γ. Thus, v(34, γ) = v(45, γ). The equality does not
necessary hold for the coalition 12 even if it is also of size 2, because o(12) 6= o(34).
A symmetric cover function (bargaining) game is a cover function (bargaining) game
such that the value function is a symmetric cover function.
1.4.2 The algorithm
In this section we extend the algorithm by Ray and Vohra (1999) to symmetric
cover functions. Even if the steps are alike, there are three fundamental differences.
First, the representation of the equivalence class of symmetric coalitions is completely
different. Secondly, the induction is made on the number of distinct players. Thirdly,
there is a difference between the optimal size “t" of a new coalition to form, and
the number “t′" of “new" players in this coalition. A new player is one who does
not belong to an already formed coalition. The algorithm is based on the backward
induction and computes at each stage the optimal size and overlapping status of the
next coalition to form.
Consider an n-person symmetric cover function (bargaining) game. Let γ ∈ Γ and
let λ ⊆ γ denote a collection of coalitions. The sets o(·), r(λ), and the integer K(λ)
are defined as in the previous section. Notice that K(∅) = 0. By abuse of notation,
we will use the previous notations without their arguments (in case of no confusion) .
Let F ≡ {r | K(r) < n}. In the algorithm we construct a mapping t : F → N∗. This
t(·) will characterize the optimal size of the next coalition to form and it will induce
an integer t′ ≤ t that will characterize the number of new players in this coalition.
Remember that at the stage k of the game, only a player in Pk can make a new
proposal. Starting from ∅, we apply t(·) repeatedly and we can generate a particular
set r∗.
Step 1 Let r ∈ F such that K(r) = n − 1. Let t(r) denote the largest 20 integer
20. In the case where we have more than one coalition, choose the largest coalition that achieves
the desired outcome. One can also choose the one in which there is no overlapping player or in
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in {1, . . . , n} that maximizes the expression v
(
{t;o},r•{t;o}
)
t
where r • {t;o} is
the representative coalition structure obtained by concatenating r with {t;o}.
Obviously, we have t′(r) ≡ 1. 21 Let c(r) ≡ r • {t;o}. Obviously, K(c(r))=n.
Step 2 Recursively, suppose that we have defined t(r) and t′(r) for all r ∈ F such
that
K(r) = j + 1, . . . , n− 1, for some j ≥ 0. Suppose moreover that K(r) + t′(r) ≤
n for any such r. Suppose that we have defined recursively the sets c(r) by
successive concatenations such that K
(
c(r)
)
= n.
Step 3 For any r such that K(r) = j, let t(r) denote the largest 22 integer in
{1, . . . , n} that maximizes the expression v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
t
.
Step 4 For any such r, let t′(r) ≡ K(c(r • {t;o}))−K(c(r)).
Step 5 Complete this recursive definition so that t and t′ are now defined on all
r ∈ F . Define a representative coalition structure of the entire set of players N
by r∗, such that r∗ ≡ c(∅).
Example 3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. The following table, Table 1.3, summarizes a sym-
metric cover function where v(r) denotes the collection of the values v
({t;o}, r).
Similarly to the previous example, one can easily see that r∗(γ) ≡ {{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}}
is the equilibrium representative coalition structure. The first person to propose will
chose one player and make an acceptable proposal to this player. The remaining player
will make an acceptable proposal to one player in the previously formed coalition.
For simplicity, we use Table 1.4 to compute the predictions of the algorithm for this
symmetric cover function game.
contrary the one in which there are more overlapping players. It depends on the context. What is
important here is to have a rule to choose one t in order to compute a unique equilibrium.
21. With K(r)=n-1, Pk=1.
22. Depending on the context.
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γ r(γ) v(r)
{123} {3; (0, 0)} 4
{1, 2, 3} {{1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} (1, 1, 1)
{12, 23} {{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}} (3, 3)
{ij, k} (*) {{2; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} (1, 1)
{23, 13} {{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}} (3, 3)
{12, 13} {{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}} (3, 3)
0 for any other r
(*) i, j, k are such that {i, j, k} = N .
Table 1.3 – A symmetric cover function
K(r) r c
(
r • {t;o}) v({t;o},r)
t
t t′
2
{{1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} {{1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} • {1; (0, 0)} 1
2
{{1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} {{1; (0, 0)}, {1; (0, 0)}} • {2; (1, 2)} 0
2
{{2; (0, 0)}} {{2; (0, 0)}} • {1; (0, 0)} 1
2
{{2; (0, 0)}} {{2; (0, 0)}} • {2; (1, 2)} 1.5 2 1
1
{{1; (0, 0)}} {{1; (0, 0)}} • {2; (0, 0)} 0.5 2 2
0 ∅ {{1; (0, 0)}} • {2; (0, 0)} 1
0 ∅ {{2; (0, 0)}} • {2; (1, 2)} 1.5 2 2
0 ∅ {{3; (0, 0)}} 1.33
r∗ =
{{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}}
Table 1.4 – The algorithm
In Table 1.4, we implement the algorithm (backward induction) for Example 3 below.
According to the first series of rows, if |Pk| = 1, then the optimal coalition structure
is formed by one coalition of size 2 and the following optimal coalition to form is of
size 2 and contains 1 overlapping player.
According to the second series of rows, if |Pk| = 1, then the optimal coalition structure
is formed by one coalition of size 1 and the following optimal coalition to form is of
size 2 and contains no overlapping player.
Now consider the overall game. According to the third series of rows, the first optimal
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coalition to form is of size 2 and contains no overlapping player. Furthermore, from
the first series of row we obtain that the following optimal coalition to form is of size
2 and contains 1 overlapping player.
Thus, the algorithm yields the optimal representative coalition structure which is
r∗ =
{{2; (1, 2)}, {2; (1, 2)}} as predicted.
At this point, one can ask if the prediction of the algorithm is specific to the
example. Does the algorithm apply for every symmetric cover function game ?
The justification to this algorithm comes from Theorem 3.1 in Ray and Vohra (1999).
This theorem can also be extended to the cover case.
In the bargaining process, if a collection of coalitions λ have formed, denote r(λ)
the corresponding representative coalition structure and define a(r(λ)) as
a(r(λ)) ≡ v
({
t
(
r(λ)
)
;o
}
, r(γ)
)
t
, with γ ≡ c(r • {t(r(λ));o}).
Regularity condition :
For all r such that K(r) < n− 1, there exists a couple {s;o} (where s is an integer,
and o a collection of couples of integers) such that K
(
r • {s;o}) = n − K(r) and
v
({s;o}, r(r • {s;o} • r’)) > 0 for all r′ such that K(r(r • {s;o} • r’)) = n.
This condition implies that for all r such that K(r) < n− 1, a(r) > 0.
Theorem 2. Under the regularity condition, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for
all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), any equilibrium in which an acceptable proposal is made with positive
probability at any stage must be of the following form. At a stage in which a collection
of coalitions λ has formed, and r ≡ r(λ) belongs to F , the next coalition that forms
is of size t(r), its overlapping status is o, and the payoff to a proposer is
a(r, δ) =
v
({
t
(
r(λ)
)
;o
}
, r(γ)
)
1 + δ
(
t(r)− 1) , γ ≡ c(r • {t(r(λ));o})
The representative coalition structure corresponding to any such equilibrium is r∗.
Proof.
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The following lemma establishes the existence of δ∗.
Lemma 5. There exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) , and all r ∈ F , there
is a unique integer t(r) in the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, a unique overlapping status o that
maximizes
v
({
t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δ(t−1) , and a unique corresponding t
′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−K(r)}.
Proof.
At the stage k of the game, if Pk = 1, then K(r) = n− 1 and trivially, t′(r) = 1. This
means that only one remaining player will make a proposal. She can decide to be on
her own or to form the largest coalition that provides him the best average payoff.
Therefore, the couple {t;o}, where t(r) is the size of the next coalition to form and
o its overlapping status, is the unique maximizer of
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
t
.
We prove later that this couple is also the only one maximizer of
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δ(t−1) . (*)
Fix some r ∈ F such that K(r) < n − 1 and consider the sequence {δq} in (0, 1)
such that δq → 1. Let µ(r, δq) ≡ Argmax{t;o}
{
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δq(t−1)
}
. By the maximum
theorem, this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. Since the set of maximizers is
finite, there exists δn such that µ(r, δq) ⊆ µ(r, 1) for all δq ≥ δn.
Since F is finite, there exists δ∗ such that for all r ∈ F , µ(r, δq) ⊆ µ(r, 1) for all
δq ≥ δ∗. And µ(r, 1) = Argmax{t;o}
{
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
t
}
. This means that if δ ≥ δ∗,
then for all r, if {t;o}∗ maximizes v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δ(t−1) , then {t;o}∗ ∈ µ(r, δ), and
v
(
{t;o}∗,c
(
r•{t;o}∗
))
t∗ =
v
(
{t(r);o},c
(
r•{t(r);o}
))
t(r) ≡ a(r).
It remains to show that if δ ≥ δ∗, then µ(r, δ), contains only one such {t;o}∗, and that
t∗ is the largest possible, that maximizes the average worth. Thus, µ(r, δ) = {t(r);o}.
Obviously, for K(r) = n− 1, {t(r);o} is unique and ∅ 6= µ(r, δ) ⊆ µ(r, 1). Thus,(*) is
straightforward.
For K(r) < n − 1 , suppose by contradiction that this is not the case. Then there
exists δ ≥ δ∗ and {t;o}∗ such that t∗ < t(r). For t∗ < t(r), 1−δ
t(r) + δ <
1−δ
t∗ + δ, and
according to the regularity condition (a(r) > 0), we obtain t(r)a(r)
1+δ
(
t(r)−1
) > t∗a(r)
1+δ(t∗−1) .
Hence
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δ(t−1) >
v
(
{t;o}∗,c
(
r•{t;o}∗
))
1+δ(t∗−1) . This is a contradiction because {t;o}∗ is
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a maximizer of
v
(
{t;o},c
(
r•{t;o}
))
1+δ(t−1) . Once we have {t;o}, then obviously by definition,
t′ is uniquely defined by t′(r) = K
(
c
(
r • {t;o}))−K(c(r)). 
Lemma 6. Consider the stage k of the game such that a collection of coalitions λ
has formed. Let (xl)l∈A denote a collection of equilibrium expected payoffs as defined
in the general cover function game. Suppose that for each {t;o}, the representative
coalition structure following r • {t;o} is given by c(r • {t;o}).
Then if i ∈ Pk makes an acceptable proposal to coalition S with a positive probability :
(i) (j ∈ S, j 6= i and xl < xj) =⇒ l ∈ S
(ii) xi ≤ xl for all l ∈ Pk
Proof.
Player i makes an acceptable proposal to S of size s and overlapping status o(S).
Let c
(
r • {s;o(S)}) denote the resulting representative coalition structure. Then,
xi ≥ v
({s;o(S)}, c(r • {s;o(S)}))− δ∑j∈S,j 6=i xj, and this is not less than
MaxT∈Γ(λ),i∈T
{
v
({|T |;o(T )}, c(r • {|T |;o(T )}))− δ∑j∈T,j 6=i xj}. This result holds
because S is the best offer that i can make at this stage.
Then l 6∈ S implies that xl ≥ xj because i can propose a set T 3 l such that T has
the same size and the same overlapping status as S. Thus, l can gain at least xj.
Therefore (i) obtains.
Suppose (ii) false, then xi > xl for some l in Pk .
If l 6∈ S then l (or any other player player in Pk and not in S) can form a coalition
of the same size as S and the same overlapping status, by replacing player i by
herself. 23 By doing so, she will receive the same payoff xi because of the symmetric
cover function. This is a contradiction.
Now suppose that l ∈ S. Thus,
xl ≥ v
({s;o(S)}, c(r • {s;o(S)})) − δ∑j∈S,j 6=l xj = v({s;o(S)}, c(r • {s;o(S)})) −
δ
∑
j∈S,j 6=i xj + δxl − δxi.
23. Remember that in the symmetric case, what matters for the coalitional worth if the cover is
given, is the size of a coalition and its overlapping status.
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Then using the previous inequality
v
({s;o(S)}, c(r • {s;o(S)}))− δ∑j∈S,j 6=i xj ≥
MaxT∈Γ(λ),i∈T
{
v
({|T |;o(T )}, c(r • {|T |;o(T )}))− δ∑j∈T,j 6=i xj},
we have
xl ≥ xi and then (ii). 
Remaining proof of the theorem.
Fix an equilibrium as described in the theorem and let δ lies in (δ∗, 1) with δ∗ defined
as in the Lemma 5. We proceed by induction on the size of Pk, following the departure
of a collection of coalitions λ. Consider a stage k of the game.
If Pk = {i}, then there is nothing to prove because i will make an acceptable
proposal to the players that insure him the highest payoff.
Suppose by induction that the theorem holds at any stage where K
(
r(λ)
)
=
m+ 1, . . . , n− 1 for some m ≥ 0.
Consider now a stage where k
(
r(λ)
)
= m. Let (xl)l∈A denote a collection of equi-
librium expected payoffs as defined in the general cover function game. We will prove
that if S is the coalition to form at this stage and o(S) its overlapping status, then
s = t
(
r(λ)
)
where s = |S|. Since each player in Pk makes an acceptable proposal to
some coalition with positive probability, it comes from induction hypothesis and (ii)
of the lemma 6 that xi = xj = x for all i, j ∈ Pk .
It follows from the induction and the optimality of the proposal that
x = v
({s;o(S)}, c(r(λ)•{s;o(S)}))−δ(s−1)x ≥ v({|T |;o(T )}, c(r(λ)•{|T |;o(T )}))−
δ(|T | − 1)x
for all T 3 i. This implies that {s;o(S)} ∈ µ(r, δ). By the Lemma 5 we conclude that
s = t
(
r(λ)
)
.
Of course the payoff to a proposer is a(r, δ). 
Thus, the algorithm generates an equilibrium representative coalition structure
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for a symmetric cover function game.
1.5 Overlapping coalition structures and networks
Networks are widely studied in social sciences and received recently considerable
attention in economics. Many economic situations fit the network framework : 24 infor-
mation about job opportunities (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson , 2004), trade of goods
in non-centralized markets (Wang and Watts, 2006), provision of mutual insurance
in developing countries (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), research and development col-
lusive alliance among corporations (De Weerdt, 2002), international alliances trading
agreements (Furusawa and Konishi, 2007) are some among others.
A network is a collection of pairs of linked agents. The sets of directly linked agents
may overlap in all the described economic situations above. In this section, we point
out the link between undirected networks and overlapping coalition structures. More
importantly, this link is in both directions. The intuition is the following :
– First, in a given population, an undirected network of individuals can be viewed
as a collection of coalitions. Each coalition represents the collection of directly
linked individuals. Since some of these coalitions may overlap, one can view the
resulting structure of the population as a cover.
– Secondly, for a coalition to form, it needs the consent of all the coalitional
members. Therefore, each pair of individual in a coalition is linked by this
agreement. As this holds for each coalition in a cover, then the collection of
such pairs induces an undirected network.
In the following we recall the basic settings of network formation theory.
24. For a survey on network formation, see Jackson (2003).
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1.5.1 Networks
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a set of players. A network g is a list of unordered
pairs of players {i, j}, ij for simplicity. Let gN denote the set of all subsets of N of
size 2. Let G ≡ {g | g ⊆ gN} denote the set of all possible networks on N . Let
N(g) ≡ {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N, ij ∈ g} denote the set of connected players in the network
g.
A path between players i and j in a network g ∈ G is a sequence i1, . . . , iK such that
ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, with i1 = i and iK = j.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g′ of g such that :
(i) if i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′) where j 6= i, then there exists a path in g′ between
i and j, and
(ii) if i ∈ N(g′) and ij ∈ g, then ij ∈ g′
Let C(g) denote the set of all components of a network g. Notice that for all component
g′ in C(g), and all pair of players (i, j) ∈ N(g′), the link between i and j may be
direct or indirect. A component is then a set of completely connected players in g
(some may be directly connected, others indirectly). For some purposes, people prefer
to interact with directly linked partners. In a friendship network for example, a friend
of my friend is not necessarily my friend. Thus, it is useful to study separately the
direct links. Components fail to give an account of direct links. Therefore, we focus
on the counterpart of components which only collects direct links, the cliques. These
are the sets of completely directly connected players.
1.5.2 Link with covers
For each network g in G, define :
– D(g) as the set of all directly connected elements of N(g). Formally,
D(g) ≡ {S ⊆ N(g) | ∀i, j ∈ S, ij ∈ g}.
– Cl(g) ≡ {S ∈ D(g) | @S ′ ∈ D(g) s.t. S ⊂ S ′} as the set of completely directly
connected elements of N(g). Cl(g) is the set of cliques of g.
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– I(g) ≡ N \N(g) as the set of all singletons that have no link according to the
network g.
– γg ≡ I(g) ∪ Cl(g).
Proposition 3. For all g ∈ G, γg ∈ Γ and is unique.
Proof.
For the proof it is sufficient to notice that
⋃
S∈γg S = N . Furthermore, for a fixed g,
Cl(g) is unique by definition, the same for I(g). Thus γg is unique for any g 
Example 4. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the set of all players. Consider the following
5-person networks A, B, C. Table 1.5 verifies the proposition.
Figure 1.1 – 5-person networks
g Cl(g) I(g) γg
A {12, 15, 234, 345} ∅ {12, 15, 234, 345}
B {123, 134} {5} {123, 134, 5}
C {12, 13, 14, 15} ∅ {12, 13, 14, 15}
Table 1.5 – A cover of g : γg
Notice that γA, γB, γC are all covers of N .
We name this decomposition from a network to a cover, the cover representation. The
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extreme cases of γ∅ and γN are respectively the coalition structures of singletons sets
and the grand coalition.
Proposition 3 states that given a network g, the cover representation γg lies in Γ.
But, is the converse also true ? To answer the question, we need additional definitions.
A cycle in a network g ∈ G is path i1, . . . , iK where i1 = iK . A circle is a network
that has a single cycle and is such that each node has exactly two neighbors. A
network is said to be composed of circles if it is a circle or each of its components is
a circle.
Let Γ0 ⊂ Γ denote the set of all covers γ0 such that for all S ∈ γ0, |S| = 2, and for
all i ∈ N there exists a unique couple S, S ′ ∈ γ0 such that S ∩ S ′ = {i}.
Proposition 4. A network g ∈ G is composed of circles if and only if γg ∈ Γ0.
Proof.
Let g˜ ∈ G be a network composed of circles. Let g denote a typical component of g˜. By
definition, g is a circle. The circle g has a single path i1, i2, ..., im, im+1, with im+1 = i1.
Let Sj ≡ {ij, ij+1}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The cover representation of g is γg ≡ {S1, S2, ..., Sm}.
For all j < m, |Sj| = 2, Sj ∩ Sj+1 = {ij}, |Sm| = 2, and Sm ∩ S1 = {i1}. The same
properties obtains for all components of g˜. Since components are disjoint networks,
then γg˜ ≡
⋃
g∈C(g˜) γg. Thus, γg˜ ∈ Γ0.
Let γ0 ∈ Γ0 such that γ0 6= ∅. The set γ0 is a cover of N of size n. By the uniqueness
requirement in the definition of Γ0, we obtain that γ0 contains n distinct coalitions of
size two each. The proof proceeds in rounds.
At the first round, choose S1 ≡ {i1, i2} ∈ γ0. Set S2 as the coalition in γ0 such that
S2 ≡ {i2, i3} with i3 6= i1. Continue step by step, choosing at step k, Sk ≡ {ik, ik+1}
such that ik+1 6∈ {i2, i3, . . . , ik−1}. As N is finite, there exists a step m such that
im+1 = i1. The path i1, i2, ..., im, im+1 is a cycle and the induced network is a circle.
If m = n, then the proof is over. Else, m < n and move to round two, with the set
N \ {i1, i2, . . . , im} and proceed exactly as the first round.
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SinceN is finite, we construct step by step, the sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn, with Sn ≡ {in, in+1}
and in+1 = ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus, the the path i1, i2, ..., in, in+1 defines either a cycle,
or a succession of cycles. Thus, the network g˜ obtained from this path is composed
of circles and γg˜ = γ0. 
Definition 6. A cover γ ∈ Γ is parsimonious if γ = {N} or :
(i) S * S ′ for all distinct pairs of coalitions S, S ′ ∈ γ, and
(ii) there exists an ordering i1, i2, . . . , im of the indexes of coalitions in γ such
that,
Si2 \ Si1 6= ∅, Si3 \ {Si2 ∪ Si1} 6= ∅,..., Sim \ {Sim−1 ∪ Sim−2 ∪ . . . ∪ Si1} 6= ∅, and
γ = {Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Sim}.
Let ΓPars denote the set of all parsimonious covers of N .
Example 5. For N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, let γ = {123, 235, 4}, γ′ = {12, 123, 45}, and
γ′′ = {123, 234, 345, 451, 512}. According to the definition of ΓPars, γ ∈ ΓPars, γ′ 6∈
ΓPars because 12 ⊂ 123, and γ′′ 6∈ ΓPars because each coalition is included in the
union of the remaining.
Proposition 5. ΓPars = {γg : g ∈ G and no component of g is a circle }.
Proof.
First, notice that if a component g′ of g is a circle, γg′ is not parsimonious. Whate-
ver ordering of the indexes of elements of γg′ ≡ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} that we consider,
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . .∪ Sm−1 = N(g′). Therefore, Sm \ {Sm−1 ∪ Sm−2 ∪ . . .∪ S1} = ∅. Thus, γg
is not parsimonious.
Second, consider a clique S1 of g. Either S1 = N and γg is parsimonious, or there
exists i1 ∈ S1 and i2 ∈ N \ S1 such that the link i1i2 6∈ g. Let S2 be a clique of g that
contains i2. Either S2∪S1 = N , or there exists i′2 ∈ S2 and i3 ∈ N \(S2∪S1) such that
the link i3i′2 6∈ g. Let S3 be a clique of g that contains i3. Step by step, we construct
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an ordering of the indexes of the coalitions S1, S2, . . . that satisfy the parsimonious
requirement (ii). As N is finite, there exists a step m such that N \⋃1≤j≤m Sj = ∅.
Thus,
⋃
1≤j≤m Sj = N .
If γg = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}, then γg verifies the requirement (ii) of parsimonious pro-
perty. Else, suppose there exists S ∈ γg such that S 6∈ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}. We test
coalitions backward from Sm to S1. We say that Sm pass the test if there exists i ∈ S
such that i ∈ Sm and i 6∈
⋃
1≤j≤m−1 Sj. Thus, Sm \ S 6= ∅, S \
⋃
1≤j≤m−1 Sj 6= ∅, and
Sm\(S∪
⋃
1≤j≤m−1 Sj) 6= ∅. In contrary, if Sm fails the test, then S ⊂
⋃
1≤j≤m−1 Sj, and
Sm−1 takes the test. If Sm−1 also fails the test, then we proceed with Sm−2. If coalitions
in γg fail the test up to S2, then S2 can not fail the test, otherwise S ⊂ S1 and this
is not possible because S and S1 are cliques. Therefore, there exists k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}
such that Sk \ S 6= ∅, S \
⋃
1≤j≤k−1 Sj 6= ∅, and Sk \ (S ∪
⋃
1≤j≤k−1 Sj) 6= ∅. Thus,
rank the indexes of the coalitions as : for 1 ≤ j < k − 1, Sij ≡ Sj ; Sik ≡ S ; and for
k ≤ j ≤ m, Sij+1 ≡ Sj. If γg = {Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Sim+1}, then γg verifies the requirement
(ii) of parsimonious property. Otherwise we proceed the same way as we have done
previously with S until we have the ordering of all the coalitions of γg that satisfies
the requirement (ii) of parsimonious property.
Furthermore, since cliques are sets of completely directly linked players, no inclusion
is possible. Therefore, the parsimonious requirement (i) is satisfied. Thus, γg is par-
simonious if no component of g is a circle.
Hence, {γg, g ∈ G, no component of g is a circle } ⊆ ΓPars.
Third, let γ ∈ ΓPars. Consider the ordering of the indexes of the coalitions of γ,
S1, S2, . . . , Sm such that there exists i1 ∈ S2 \ S1, there exists i2 ∈ S3 \ {S2 ∪ S1},...,
there exists im−1 ∈ Sm \ {Sm−1 ∪ Sm−2 ∪ . . . ∪ S1}. None of these sets is empty.
For all l such that |Sl| ≥ 2, let g/Sl = {ij, i 6= j, i ∈ Sl, j ∈ Sl}. As γ is parsimo-
nious, il ∈ Sl and not in other Sl′ , l′ < l because of the ordering of the indexes. Let
g =
⋃m′
l=1 g/Sl. The set g is a network and no component of g is a circle because
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S2 \ S1 6= ∅, S3 \ {S2 ∪ S1} 6= ∅,...,Sm \ {Sm−1 ∪ Sm−2 ∪ . . . ∪ S1}. By parsimonious
requirement (i), there is no inclusion among such sets Sl. By construction, each such
Sl is a clique of g and γg = γ. 
Remark 5.
The set of networks composed of circles is represented by Γ0. The set of networks
that do no have a circle as component is represented by ΓPars. Between these two
categories of networks, there are networks with some components being circles. For
such networks, we can separate them into two subnetworks, g1 and g2. The subnetwork
g1 is the collection of all the components that are circles, and g2 is the collection of
remaining components. Thus, g1 has a cover representation of the form of Γ0, and
g2 has a cover representation of the form of ΓPars. Therefore, each network admits a
cover representation. In contrast, covers have much more structure than networks. For
example, covers such that there is inclusion between some coalitions do not represent
any network. Furthermore, distinct covers may have the same network representation.
For example, the complete network may represent N or the cover consisting of all
coalitions of size 2.
The following theorem shows that some networks are “equilibrium networks” in
the sense that their cover representations are equilibrium outcomes of the game that
we have defined in the third section of the chapter.
Theorem 3. If g ∈ G is a network such that none of its components is a circle,
then there exists a cover function (bargaining) game that admits γg as an equilibrium
outcome.
Proof.
For the proof, we need a triple (N, v, ρ) as defined in Section 3.
First, let N be a set of n players and g be a network on g such that g is not a circle.
By Proposition 5, γg is parsimonious. Consider the ordering of γg ≡ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm},
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such that there exists i1 ∈ S2 \ S1, there exists i2 ∈ S3 \ {S2 ∪ S1},...,there exists
im−1 ∈ Sm \ {Sm−1 ∪ Sm−2 ∪ . . . ∪ S1}.
Second, define ρ by ρp(N) = i0 where i0 is the lowest indexed individual in S1 ;
ρp(N \S1) = i1 ; ρp(N \{S2∪S1}) = i2 ; ... ; ρp(N \{Sm−1∪Sm−2∪ . . .∪S1}) = im−1 ;
and ρp(S) = iS where iS is the lowest indexed individual in S for any other subset
S ⊆ N . Let ρr(S) be the increasing ordering of indexed individuals in S \ {ρp(S)} for
all S ⊆ N .
Third, define the value function by v(S, γ) = 0 for each embedded coalition (S, γ)
such that S 6∈ γg or γ 6= γg ; v(Sj, γg) = (m− j + 1)n, for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Now we show that γg is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium with no delay for
the game defined by (N, v, ρ). An equilibrium action sequence is :
At stage k = 1 of the game, ρp(N) = i0 makes the first proposal. She can no
do better than proposing S1. Suppose that i0 proposes S 6∈ γg, this proposal
will be rejected and the rejector will make another proposal in γg. Suppose that
i0 proposes another set in γg containing i0 but not S1, by proposing S1, the
expected payoff is the highest. Following i0, all the responders in S1 accept the
proposal. In case of rejection, S1 will not form or will form with a delay, and this
strategy is strictly dominated by accepting. Thus, S1 forms and the updated
set of proposers is N \ S1.
At stage k = 2 of the game, ρp(N \ S1) = i1. Notice that i1 ∈ S2 \ S1. For the
same reasons as at stage k = 1, i1 can not do better than making an acceptable
proposal S2.
The game continue the same way up to stage k = m and Sm forms.
Therefore no deviation from the previous strategy is profitable for the deviator. Thus
the equilibrium outcome of the game is γg. 
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By Theorem 3, each network such that none of its component is a circle can be
obtained as equilibrium outcome of a bargaining process. This result is essential to
explain network formation as a strategic process.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the formation of coalitions in a general framework where
each player can belong to more than one coalition. We provide a model of bargaining
game, namely cover function bargaining game, which allows the formation of over-
lapping coalitions. After showing the existence of an equilibrium with mild degree of
mixing, we provide an algorithm to compute a no delay equilibrium in the symmetric
case. Finally, we show that there exists a one-to-one link between network structures
and overlapping coalitions structures. As a consequence, we show that each network
such that none of its components is a circle is an equilibrium outcome of a bargaining
process.
Chapitre 2
Games with overlapping coalitions
and their cores
2.1 Introduction
Forming coalitions is a common behavior in politics, environmental issues, provi-
sion of public goods, customs unions, and many other economic, social, and political
situations. Some coalitions are disjoint and others are overlapping. However, most of
the economics literature on coalition formation, both applied and theoretical, is res-
tricted to models where coalitions cannot overlap. Yet coalitions formed in Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs), risk sharing, and environmental agreements are overlapping. For
example, Norway is signatory to the European Free Trade Association but also has an
FTA with the European Union and the Baltic states. In developing countries, infor-
mal risk sharing groups known as Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
are overlapping. Also on environmental issues, the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on
clean development and climate is signed by Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan,
South Korea and the United States of America. At the same time, the United States
of America and Canada are signatories of the Convention on Long-Range Transboun-
dary Air Pollution (LRTAP). These examples and many others show the importance
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of agreements involving overlapping coalitions in economic and social interactions.
The aim of this chapter is to develop a cooperative game that accommodates over-
lapping coalitions.
Myerson, in 1980, introduced the idea of overlapping coalitions in the economics
literature. However, the expression overlapping coalition has been well known in other
disciplines like computer science and robotics. 1 The problems addressed there, howe-
ver, are different from those of economic interest. In game theory, there are very few
models where coalitions are allowed to overlap and there remains more to be done
on that issue (D. Ray, 2007). Modeling coalition formation follows two approaches :
the blocking approach and the bargaining approach. If attention is focused on non-
cooperation, then individuals are treated as the fundamental behavioral units and
the bargaining approach is taken [Rubinstein (1982), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Okada
(1996), Ray and Vohra (1999) and so on]. To the best of our knowledge, one of the
first papers to accommodate overlapping coalitions following the bargaining approach
is Agbaglah (2011). On the other hand if attention is focused on cooperation, then
coalitions are treated as the fundamental behavioral units and the blocking approach
is taken. Following the blocking approach, solution concepts like the core, the Shapley
value, the equilibrium binding agreement and others are developed in the literature.
However, a few of these concepts accommodate overlapping coalitions : the difficulty
resides essentially in the treatment of individuals who belong to more than one coali-
tion. Albizuri et al. (2006) develop an extension of Owen value (and therefore Shapley
value) to overlapping coalitions. In their paper, the number of distinct coalitions that
an individual can belong to is limited. We do not have these limitations in this chapter.
Chalkiadakis et al. (2008, 2010) introduce a notion of core for overlapping coalitions.
In their setting, a coalition structure is a list rather than a set. Besides, there are
coalition structures with infinite coalitions.
In this chapter we focus on the core (the most popular solution concepts) and
we develop an extension to overlapping coalitions. The core was first defined in a
1. See Kraus et al. 1998, Hu et al. 2007, and Dang 2006 for more details.
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characteristic function game, and thereafter extended (Thrall and Lucas, 1963) to
partition function game. Several notions of core have been proposed in the literature.
The α− and β−core (Aumann and Peleg, 1960), the ω−core (Shenoy, 1979), the
δ−core (d’Aspremont et Al., 1983), the coalition structure core (Greenberg, 1994),
the γ−core (Tulkens and Chander, 1997), the r−core (Huang and Sjostrom, 2003) are
some of the most popular. The difference in these notions of core resides essentially
in the way deviation and the reaction to deviation (residual players’ behavior) are
modeled.
To be more precise, we follow the spirit of the coalition structure core defined by
Greenberg (1994), and specifically its extension to partition function games by Koczy
(2007). This is the recursive core. It models reaction to deviation without imposing
any behavioral assumption (optimism or pessimism). Following a deviation, the resi-
dual players choose any of their most preferred partitions. In that setting, how does
the recursive core behave in a setting where coalitions are allowed to overlap ? What
concept of dominance is relevant in that setting ?What is the behavior of residual
players ; especially those who belong to more than one coalition ?
We answer these questions by organizing the chapter as follows. In Section 2.2
we present basic definitions. In Section 2.3 we allow coalitions to overlap, we define
cover function games, and we develop an extension of the recursive core. In Section
2.4 we introduce a new notion of deviation and investigate its implications. Finally
we conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Some definitions
Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all players. A coalition S is a non-empty
subset of N . A cover γ of N is a collection of coalitions, S1, S2, . . . , Sm, such that⋃m
k=1 Sk = N : thus γ ≡ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}. Let γS denote a cover of a coalition S.
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We denote by Γ the set of all covers of N and by ΓS be the set of all covers of a
coalition S. For a collection of coalitions λ, we denote by Γ(λ) the subset of Γ such
that ∀γ ∈ Γ(λ), λ ⊆ γ.
An embedded coalition 2 is a pair (S, γ) such that S ∈ γ and γ ∈ Γ. The set of all
embedded coalitions is denoted by Σ and defined by Σ ≡ {(S, γ) | S ∈ γ, γ ∈ Γ}.
In the remainder, we use the expression overlapping coalition structure to designate
a cover whenever we want to emphasize on its structure. For simplicity of notation,
we write a coalition explicitly S = ijk... instead of S = {i, j, k, ...}.
Definition 7. A cover function v : Σ→ < is such that for all (S, γ) ∈ Σ, v(S, γ) ≥ 0.
A cover function game is the pair (N, v), where N is the set of players and v a cor-
responding cover function.
In this definition, the cover function is nonnegative. This normalization is for
simplicity and permits to have a minimum value of 0. After all what is needed is only
a value function that is bounded below. Notice that v is defined only on embedded
sets. Therefore, if (S, γ) is such that S 6∈ γ , then v(S, γ) ≡ 0.
Consider a cover function game (N, v), and a cover γ ∈ Γ.
An attribution x˜ ≡ (xSi )i∈S, S∈γ is a collection of nonnegative real numbers. Each such
xSi represents the payoff that player i receives from coalition S. Given an attribution
x˜, the (overall) payoff awarded to player i is xi ≡
∑
S3i x
S
i .
An outcome is an ordered pair (x, γ) where x ∈ <N , x ≡ (xi)i∈N , such that xi is the
payoff to player i . Notice that two attributions x˜ and x˜′ such that for all i, xi = x′i
yield the same payoff vector. Therefore, we focus in the remainder more on outcomes
than attributions. 3 For all coalition S, let xS ≡ (xi)i∈S.
An outcome (x, γ) is feasible if for all S ∈ γ, ∑i∈S xSi = v(S, γ) . We denote by
2. We borrow this definition from Macho-Stadler et al. (2007).
3. Attributions have detailed information about the composition of payoffs. However, we decide
(for simplicity) to mention payoffs only because, after all, players base their decisions on payoffs
which are aggregated information.
47
Ω(N, v) the set of all the feasible outcomes in the game (N, v).
In this chapter, we aim to develop a cooperative game that accommodates overlapping
coalitions. For this purpose, outcomes of the game should be such that some players
may belong to more than one coalition. Formally, given a cover function game (N, v),
a player i ∈ N is an overlapping player if the cover function v is such that v(S, γ) >
0 and v(S ′, γ) > 0 for at least two distinct coalitions S and S ′ containing i and a least
one cover γ ∈ Γ. 4 We denote by OS the set of all overlapping players in a coalition S.
For x, x′ ∈ <N (x = (xi)i∈N , x′ = (x′i)i∈N) and S ⊆ N , x >S x′ if xi ≥ x′i for all i ∈ S,
and xi > x′i for some i ∈ S.
2.2.1 Deviation
For a better definition of a core in a setting where coalitions may overlap, we need
first to clearly define what “deviation” means. The literature on coalition formation
admits that given a coalition structure, players deviate with the intention to form new
coalitions that yield them better payoffs (for at least one player or for all depending
on the approach). The consequence of any deviation is the formation of a new coali-
tion structure. On the other hand, there cannot be a new coalition structure without
deviations. Thus, deviation and formation of a new coalition structure are equivalent
notions. With that spirit, given an overlapping coalition structure, we define deviation
as equivalent to the formation of a new overlapping coalition structure. We allow in-
dividual as well as set deviations. A set D ⊆ N of players deviates with the intention
to form a cover γD of D 5. This deviation induces the formation of a new overlapping
coalition structure. In our setting we introduce two notions of deviation to accommo-
date overlapping coalitions : total deviation and partial deviation. A total deviation
occurs when a deviating coalition “disappears” after the deviation ; this is possible if
the deviating coalition breaks up or merges with another one. In contrast, a partial
4. The game is non-negative by normalization and therefore the minimum possible value is 0.
5. Once we define formally a set deviation, individual deviation is obtained when the deviating
set is a singleton.
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deviation happens without dislocation of deviating coalitions ; this is possible only for
coalitions containing overlapping players. The following example will help to fix ideas.
Example 6.
Consider the following 5-person cover function game.
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, γ = {12, 34, 52}, v(12, γ) = 1, v(52, γ) = 10, and
v(S, γ) = 0 for any other (S, γ) ∈ Σ.
Player 2 is an overlapping player in the game (N, v) because, v(12, γ) > 0 and
v(52, γ) > 0.
Consider the following covers : γ′ = {12, 345} ; γ′′ = {12, 34, 5} ; γ′′′ = {12, 34, 52}.
In a deviation from γ′ to γ′′, player 5 performs a total deviation because she leaves
the coalition 345 and this coalition is no more in γ′′.
In contrast, if we consider a deviation from γ′′ to γ′′′, player 2 performs a partial
deviation. The coalition 12 that contains player 2 is maintained in the new cover γ′′′.
This partial deviation is performed by player 2 who is an overlapping player.
Formally, let γ, γ′ ∈ Γ and consider a deviation from γ to γ′.
Definition 8.
1. Total deviation : all players.
A player i ∈ N performs a total deviation if and only if :
there exists an embedded coalition (S, γ) such that i ∈ S and S 6∈ γ′. 6
2. Partial deviation : only overlapping players.
A player i ∈ N performs a partial deviation if and only if :
i is an overlapping player and for all embedded coalition (S, γ), if i ∈ S, then
S ∈ γ′.
6. All coalitions that contain some total deviating players break up in the new cover γ′. This is
the traditional notion of deviation.
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3. Set deviation.
A player set D ⊆ N deviates to form a cover γD of D if and only if :
each player i ∈ D performs a deviation (either partial or total).
Remark 6.
– The notion of set deviation is a collection of multiple deviations, some are total
and others are partial.
– In our setting, a deviation may affect the payoffs of all players, including non-
deviators. Due to these externalities, if an overlapping player partially deviates
from a single coalition to more than one coalition, the payoff of the players in the
former coalition may be affected. But, she decides to deviate only if her overall
payoff from the new cover (obtained after deviation) is higher than previously.
– In the definition, we do not specify what happens to the remaining players if
some deviate. The following section focuses on that aspect.
In the sequel, we model the behavior of residual players. These are non-deviators
who are affected by a deviation (due to externalities) and may react to it.
2.2.2 Residual game
Since a deviation may affect the payoffs of all players, if a player set D ⊆ N
deviates, the remaining players in N \D may adjust to it by reacting. For the reasons
of consistency, they will also play a game, similar to the stage game, called the residual
game. In the existing literature, the residual game concerns players in N \D following
a deviation by D. In this section we follow this traditional approach as a benchmark.
Later in this chapter, we propose another concept of residual game that is more
adapted to overlapping coalition structures.
Suppose that a player set D ⊆ N performs a deviation. Players in D form a cover
γD of D. Let R ≡ N \D be the set of residual players. Consider embedded coalitions
of the form (S, γR) where S ⊆ R and γR ∈ ΓR a cover of R. Let ΣR be the collection
of all such embedded coalitions.
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Definition 9. The residual game is the game (N, vγD) where vγD is such that for all
(S, γR) ∈ ΣR, vγD(S, γR) ≡ v(S, γR ∪ γD) .
Remark 7.
1. In this definition, γR ∪ γD is a cover of N .
2. If Q /∈ γR, vγD(Q, γR) = 0.
3. The residual game is a cover function game on its own.
4. This definition implicitly says that once players deviate and form a new cover,
they commit to this cover. There will not be further deviation performed by
these players.
5. If there are no overlapping players (if we consider only partitions instead of
covers), this definition is equivalent to the one in the partition function case,
proposed by Koczy (2007).
2.2.3 Dominance
In the following, we define dominance in two notions, the optimistic dominance
and the pessimistic dominance.
Definition 10.
Optimistic dominance :
An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition S inducing the formation of a cover γS
of S, if for at least one outcome (x′R, γR) from the residual game, with R ≡ N \ S,
there exists a feasible outcome ((x′S, x′R), γ′) , with γ′ ≡ γS ∪ γR, such that x′ >S x.
Pessimistic dominance :
An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition S inducing the formation of a cover
γS of S, if for all outcomes (x′R, γR) from the residual game, with R ≡ N \ S, there
exists a feasible outcome ((x′S, x′R), γ′), with γ′ ≡ γS ∪ γR, such that x′ >S x.
Remark 8.
According to the optimistic dominance, a coalition deviates as soon as there exists an
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outcome from the residual game that make the deviators better : even if it is not sure
residual players will allow that. Whereas from the pessimistic dominance perspective,
a coalition deviates only if whatever strategy the residuals play, the deviators will be
better off. One can see that optimistic dominance will be very easy to obtain, but
pessimistic dominance will be very hard to obtain.
2.3 Extended recursive core
To define the extended recursive core we set the grand coalition {N} as the starting
point. Discussion starts from the grand coalition. From there, a player set S may be
better off by deviating and forming a cover γS of S. Following this deviation, the
remaining players may react strategically by playing the residual game. Remember
that once γS forms, players in S commit to it. Thus, no player in S may accomplish
further deviations. This assumption is also made by Koczy (2007). We need this
assumption to build the recursion as the residual game is a game on its own, defined
on the complement of S, with a fewer number of players than the initial game. Thus,
we define the core recursively on the number of players that can perform further
deviations.
2.3.1 Optimistic, pessimistic core
Consider the game (N, v), and let n ≡ |N |.
– For a game with only one player, say {1}, the core is C({1}, v) ≡ {v({1}, {1}); {1}}.
– Assume that the core C(Rk, vk) is defined for every k-person game, k = 1, 2, . . . , n−
1. If the core is empty, defineA(Rk, vk) ≡ Ω(Rk, vk), 7 otherwise, defineA(R, v) ≡
C(Rk, vk).
– Now consider the game (N, v). An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition
S inducing the formation of a cover γS of S, if for at least one outcome (resp.
7. Remember that Ω(Rk, vk) is the set of all feasible outcomes of the game (Rk, vk).
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all outcomes) (x′R, γR) ∈ A(R, vγS), with R ≡ N \ S, there exists a feasible
outcome
(
(x′S, x
′
R), γ
)
, with γ ∈ Γ(γS), such that x′ >S x.
– The optimistic (resp. pessimistic) core of an n-person game, C+(N, v)
(
resp.
C−(N, v)
)
, is the set of non-dominated outcomes by optimistic dominance (resp.
by pessimistic dominance).
Example 7. We denote by (N, v) the following 5-person cover function game, with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
For simplicity of the notation we write v(γ), instead of v(S, γ).
v(1, 2, 3, 4, 5) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
v(12345) = (5)
v(12, 3, 45) = (2, 2, 2)
v(14, 3, 25) = v(15, 3, 24) = (1, 2, 1)
v(123, 45) = (9, 3)
v(12, 345) = (3, 9)
v(123, 345) = (8, 8)
v(1245, 3) = (2, 2)
v(γ) = 0, for any other cover γ.
From our computations 8 the optimistic and pessimistic core coincide in this example.
We have :
C+(N, v) = C−(N, v) = {((x1, x2, x3, x4, x5); (123, 345)) such that
8. Details are available upon request to the author.
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
x4 + x5 ≥ 3
x1 + x2 ≥ 3
x3 ≥ 2
x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 9
x3 + x4 + x5 ≥ 9
x1 + x2 + x
123
3 = 8
x3453 + x4 + x5 = 8
x1233 + x
345
3 = x3
Even if it seems very normative, the cover function game in the example describes
the situation of an informal insurance group. 9 Players have random income in village
economies (in developing countries). If players are on their own, they do not get any
insurance. If they come all together, they get few insurance due to heterogeneities
(conflicts for example). If they form homogenous groups, 10 they get better insurance :
for instance (12) and (45). Suppose that player 3 is an “elder” in the village with high
social privileges and every informal insurance group is better off having 3. Notice that
in this example, player 3 as “elder” has the ability to be an overlapping player.
The game exhibits externalities. For example if coalition (12) forms, her value depends
on the remaining players. Consider a deviation from the cover {12, 345} to {12, 3, 45}
(we have v(12, 345) = (3, 9) and v(12, 3, 45) = (2, 2, 2) ). Even if coalition (12) does
not participate to the deviation, her total payoff of 3 decreases to 2. Therefore, players
1 and 2 may react to this deviation.
Remark 9.
1. Only player 3 in an “overlapping player” in this game.
2. The core is not empty in this example. For example ((3, 3, 4, 3, 3); {123, 345}) is
an outcome in the core.
9. It is empirically proved that risk sharing groups in agrarian villages are overlapping coalitions.
For example, De Weerdt and Dercon (2005) observe on data from Tanzanian villages that insurance
networks of villagers mostly overlap.
10. The homogenous groups may be religion, friendship, kinship, ethnicity, social class and so on.
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3. An equilibrium overlapping coalition structure is (123, 345).
2.3.2 Properties
In this section we derive properties of this new notion of core that accommodates
overlapping coalitions as we see from the previous example.
Proposition 6. The optimistic and pessimistic cores coincide with these notions on
partition function games. 11
Proof.
Consider a cover function game (N, v) such that for all cover γ ∈ Γ, and all pairs of
distinct embedded coalitions (S, γ) and (S ′, γ),
S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅ ⇒ v(S, γ) = v(S ′, γ) = 0.
For all cover γ = {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, let Sγ ≡ {Sj ∈ γ such that Sj ∩ Sk 6= ∅ for j 6= k}.
Let γ\Sγ = {S ′1, S ′2, ..., S ′l}, l ≤ m. Let S ′l+1 ≡
⋃
Sj∈Sγ Sj and Πγ = {S ′1, S ′2, ..., S ′l, S ′l+1}).
Thus, Πγ is a partition of N . Define for all S ∈ Πγ, v′γ(S,Πγ) = v(S, γ). Let (N, v′)
denote the obtained partition function game. If an outcome (x, γ) is non dominated in
the cover function game (N, v), the corresponding outcome (x′,Πγ) is non dominated
in the partition function game (N, v′). Thus, our core is exactly the recursive core
as in partition function game. By Lemma 10 (Koczy, 2007), 12 we conclude that our
notion is a generalization of the coalition structure core. 
Theorem 4. For a cover function game (N, v), C+(N, v) ⊆ C−(N, v)
Proof.
This is obvious because {mboxoptinisticdeviations} ⊇ { pessimistic deviations } 
11. The coalition structure core is defined for characteristic function games whereas the core here
is defined for cover function games.
12. Koczy (2007) Lemma 10 : Consider a partition function game (N,V ) and a characteristic
function game (N, v). If for all partition P and all coalition S ∈ P , V (S, P ) = v(S), then the
recursive core and the coalition structure core coincide
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From Theorem 4, we obtain a set interval of outcomes where the lower bound is
C+(N, v) and upper bound C−(N, v). We define the extended recursive core as the
set of outcomes lying between C+(N, v) and C−(N, v).
2.4 The overlapping coalition structure core
In this section we develop a notion of residual game that is more consistent with the
stage game than the previous notion. The consistent residual game consists of a game
played by residual players not restricted to the complement of the set of deviators.
Instead, the set of residual players in this section intersects the set of deviators via
overlapping players. Following a deviation by a player set D, we allow overlapping
players in D to still play a role in the residual game. Even if they commit to their
previous coalitions, they may write agreements with players in the complement of D.
For this purpose, we introduce two kinds of players : active and passive players.
Definition 11. Suppose that a player set D, performs a deviation and forms a cover
γD of D.
The set N \D consists of active players in the consistent residual game.
The set of overlapping players in D, OD, consists of passive players in the consistent
residual game. 13
Suppose that a player set D ⊆ N performs a deviation that yields the formation of
a cover γD ofD. LetR ≡ (N\D)∪OD, and ΛR ≡ {λR, collection of coalitions of R, such that λR∪
γD ∈ Γ}. Consider embedded coalitions (S, λR) where S ⊆ R and λR ∈ ΛR. Let ΣR
be the collection of such embedded coalitions.
13. We use the expression passive because of the fact that even if they can write an agreement
with active players, passive players do not initiate this agreement since they cannot write agreements
on their own within OD. They need at least one active player to do so.
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Definition 12. The consistent residual game is the game (N, vγD) where vγD is such
that for all (S, λR) ∈ ΣR, v(S, λR) ≡ v(S, λR ∪ γD).
Remark 10.
1. In this definition, λR ∪ γD is a cover of N .
2. If Q /∈ λ, vγD(Q, λ) = 0.
3. This definition of residual game is consistent with the fact that even if over-
lapping players perform passive deviations, the cover γD that forms during the
deviation of D remains unchanged in the following cover of N that will form.
This definition is consistent because it allows overlapping individuals to conti-
nue using strategically their ability. Thus, we define the residual game on a
larger set than the complement of D because some of the players that react to
a deviation, can strategically conclude further agreements with some deviating
overlapping players. This assumption holds because the cover function game is
a TU game, and side payments are possible.
Proposition 7. The consistent residual game is a cover function game on its own,
defined on the set of active and passive players.
Proof.
Suppose that a player set D deviates and form γD. Define the prolongation of the
consistent residual game on 2R × ΓR where ΓR is a cover of R. Consider λR ∈ ΛR.
Let λR ≡ {S1, S2, ..., Sk}.
If
⋃k
i=1 S1 = N \ D, then there is no passive player. Let Sk+1 ≡ OD. Thus, γR ≡
{S1, S2, ..., Sk, Sk+1} is a cover of R. Let v˜γD(Sk+1, γR) ≡ 0.
If N \ D ⊂ ⋃ki=1 S1, then there are some passive players. In this case let Sk+1 ≡
R \⋃ki=1 S1. Thus, γR = {S1, S2, ..., Sk, Sk+1} is a cover of R. Let v˜γD(Sk+1, γR) ≡ 0.
For any other embedded coalition (S, λR) ∈ ΣR, v˜γD(S, γR) ≡ vγD(S, λR).
The game (R, v˜γD) is a cover function game. 
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2.4.1 Dominance
With the new definition of a residual game, we need to redefine the concept of
dominance. The difference resides essentially in the sets of interest.
Definition 13.
Optimistic dominance
An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition S inducing the formation of a cover γS
of S, if for at least one outcome ((x′N\S, x
′
OS
), λR) from the consistent residual game,
there exists a feasible outcome ((x′S, x′N\S), γ
′), γ′ ≡ γS ∪ γR, such that x′ >S x.
Pessimistic dominance
An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition S inducing the formation of a cover
γS of S, if for all outcomes ((x′N\S, x
′
OS
)λR) from the consistent residual game, there
exists a feasible outcome ((x′S, x′N\S), γ
′), with γ′ ≡ γS ∪ γR, such that x′ >S x.
Remark 11. The idea behind optimistic and pessimistic dominance here is the same
as previously. What is different here is that an outcome from a residual game for
overlapping players in S is not sufficient to determine their overall payoff. One need
to add their payoff from the coalitions in γS.
As in section 2.3, once a cover γS of S forms, players may commit to it. Therefore,
all further total deviation is prohibited (since total deviations break up already formed
coalition in γS). But passive players in S may strategically perform further partial
deviations. The core will be defined recursively on the number of active players as
passive players can not deviate without active players.
2.4.2 Optimistic, pessimistic core
Consider the game (N, v), and let n ≡ |N |.
– For a game with only one player, say {1}, the core is C∗({1}, v) = {v({1}, {1}); {1}}.
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– Assume that the core C∗(Rk, vk) is define for every game with k active players,
k = 1, 2, . . . , n−1. If the core is empty, define A∗(Rk, vk) ≡ Ω(Rk, vk), otherwise,
define A∗(R, v) ≡ C∗(Rk, vk).
– An outcome (x, γ) is dominated via a coalition S inducing the formation of a
cover γS of S, if for at least one outcome (resp. all outcomes)
(
(x′N\S, x
′
OS
), λR
)
from A∗(R, vγS), with R ≡ (N \ S) ∪ OD, there exists a feasible outcome(
(x′S, x
′
N\S), γ
′) , with γ′ ∈ Γ(γS) such that x′ >S x.
– The optimistic (resp. pessimistic) core of an n-person game, C∗+(N, v)
(
resp.
C∗−(N, v)
)
, is the set of non-dominated outcomes by optimistic dominance (resp.
by pessimistic dominance).
2.4.3 Properties
Previous results as the generalization result or the comparison between the opti-
mistic and the pessimistic core hold. Furthermore, we compare the two concepts of
core at the end of this section.
Remark 12. The optimistic and pessimistic cores coincide with these notions on
partition function games.
Theorem 5. For a cover function game (N, v), C∗+(N, v) ⊆ C∗−(N, v).
Proof.
The theorem holds for the same reasons as for Theorem 4. 
Once again Theorem 5 induces a set interval for outcomes, with the lower bound
being C∗+(N, v) and the upper bound C∗−(N, v) in the inclusion sense. Therefore,
we define a new concept of core that is more adapted to the setting of overlapping
coalitions.
Definition 14. The overlapping coalition structure core is the set of outcomes laying
between C∗+(N, v) and C∗−(N, v).
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So far, we firstly define naively the residual game as a benchmark. Thereafter, we
develop a more consistent notion of residual game. In the sequel we compare the two
concepts of core that obtain under the two notions of residual games.
Theorem 6. For a cover function game (N, v),
C+(N, v) ⊆ C∗+(N, v) ⊆ C∗−(N, v) ⊆ C−(N, v)
Remark 13. With this consistent concept of core we obtain a refinement of the exten-
ded recursive core. As players become more sophisticated, the set of non-dominated
outcomes shrinks.
Lemma 7. C+(N, v) ⊆ C∗+(N, v)
Proof Lemma 7.
Let us make the proof by contraposition. We will show that for all outcome (x, γ)
such that (x, γ) 6∈ C∗+(N, v), then (x, γ) 6∈ C+(N, v). If (x, γ) 6∈ C∗+(N, v), then there
exists S ⊆ N and a payoff vector (yN−S) for active players from A∗+(R, vγS);R =
(N − S) ∪ OS, and a feasible outcome (yS, yN−S, γ′) ; such that y >S x. Notice that
(yN−S) comes from some (yR, γR) ∈ A∗+(R, vγS). Two cases are possible :
Case 1 : No overlapping player in the set {i ∈ S|y >S x}
Then (yN−S) is a payoff vector fromA+(N−S, vγS) (becauseOS = ∅). Thus (yS, yN−S, γ′)
is a feasible outcome and y >S x. So (x, γ) 6∈ C+(N, v).
Case 2 : At least one overlapping player in the set {i ∈ S|y >S x}
Decompose λ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} in two sets : λ1∪λ2 such that : λ1 = {Si ∈ λ such that Si∩
OS 6= ∅}; and λ2 = {Si ∈ λ such that Si ∩OS = ∅}. Note O, the union of all the sets
in λ1, and D the set N \ (S ∪O).
In the following we show that the set S∪O may deviate by forming the specific cover
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γS ∪ λ1 of S ∪O.
Considering that (yN−S) is a payoff vector from A∗+(R, vγS) (non dominated in a
game with active players belonging to N \ S) and D ⊂ N \ S, we have (yD, λ2) ∈
A+
(
N − (S ∪ O), vγS∪O
)
. Furthermore, consider a payoff distribution where an over-
lapping player i ∈ S gets xi and the difference di = yi − xi (which is nonnegative).
Consider the sets Sl ∈ λ1 that player i belongs to. For each player j ∈ Sl ∩ (O \ OS)
(active players belonging to Sl) give a fraction (for example equal fraction α ; but any
distribution of nonnegative weights that sum to one will work) of di plus xj. Do this
for all overlapping players in OS and all for all the active players in O. We have a
distribution of payoffs y′ with the following characteristics :
for all player i ∈ S \OS, y′i = yi
for all player i ∈ OS, y′i = xi
for all player i ∈ D, y′i = yi
for the active players in O, y′i = xi + αdi
Thus, (y′, γ′) is feasible and y′ >S∪O x. Hence (x, γ) 6∈ C+(N, v). 
Lemma 8. C∗−(N, v) ⊆ C−(N, v).
Proof Lemma 8.
We proceed by contraposition. We will show that for all outcome (x, γ) such that
(x, γ) 6∈ C−(N, v), then (x, γ) 6∈ C∗−(N, v).
If (x, γ) 6∈ C−(N, v), then there exists S ⊆ N such that for all payoff vector (yN−S)
from A−(R, vγS), we have y >S x. Consider one of these payoff vectors , (y0N−S),
for active players from A∗−(R, vγS) : notice that (y0N−S) comes from some (y0R, γR) ∈
A∗−(R, vγS) with R ≡ (N − S) ∪OS. Two cases are possible :
Case 1 : No overlapping player in the set {i ∈ S|y0 >S x}
Then (y0N−S) is a payoff vector from A−(N − S, vγS). Thus (y0S, y0N−S, γ′) is a fea-
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sible outcome and y0 >S x. So (x, γ) 6∈ C∗−(N, v).
Case 2 : At least one overlapping player in the set {i ∈ S|y0 >S x}
Decompose λ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} in two sets : λ1∪λ2 such that : λ1 = {Si ∈ λ such that Si∩
OS 6= ∅}; and λ2 = {Si ∈ λ such that Si ∩ OS = ∅. Note O, the union of all
the sets in λ1, and D the union of all the sets in λ2. Consider the deviation by
S ∪ O forming a cover γS ∪ λ1. Because of the fact that (y0R, γR) ∈ A∗−(R, vγS), then
(y0D, γD) ∈ A−
(
N − (S ∪O), vγS∪O
)
. Furthermore consider the corresponding feasible
outcome (y0, γ′) . We have : (y0, γ′) = (y0S∪O, y0D, γ′) is feasible and y0 >S∪O x. Hence,
(x, γ) 6∈ C∗−(N, v). 
Proof Theorem 6.
From Lemmata 7 and 8, the proof of the theorem is straightforward. 
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we develop an extension of the recursive core to cover function
games. These are coalition formation games with externalities and overlapping coali-
tion structures. We firstly follow the traditional view by defining residual players as
separated from deviators. We show that the induced extended recursive core is a ge-
neralization of Greenberg’s coalition structure core. Furthermore, we take an eclectic
view by introducing a consistent concept of residual game where deviating overlapping
players may set additional agreements (if they pleased) with residual players without
reneging on their previous agreements. We show that the induced overlapping coa-
lition structure core is not only a generalization of the coalition structure core, but
also stands as a refinement of the extended recursive core.
Chapitre 3
Informal insurance : an approach by
overlapping coalitions
3.1 Introduction
The need for insurance is tremendous in agrarian economies 1 because individual
incomes are random. Outputs are precarious. They are subject to climate (farmers,
breeders), to chance (fishers, hunters, workers in informal sector), to diseases, to wild
animal invasions, and to destruction by fire. However, access to formal credit and
insurance markets is almost non-existent. In that environment, individuals develop
informal insurance 2 as a coping strategy. This is a reciprocal transfer agreement built
to avoid negative consequences of idiosyncratic income shocks on personal consump-
tion. Insurance is said to be informal because there is no signed paper, no collateral,
and no legal court.
The economics literature, either theoretical or empirical, models informal insurance
from two perspectives : the group approach and the network approach. The group
approach models informal insurance as an arrangement at village level where indivi-
duals are organized as “clubs” [Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Ligon et al
1. See Postner (1980) for characteristics of these economies.
2. See for instance Rosenzweig (1989), Udry (1990,1994), Townsend (1994)
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(2002), Genicot and Ray (2003), and so on]. However, empirical findings are puzzling.
Contrary to the predictions of this approach, there is no evidence for full risk sharing
at village level. 3 Instead, informal insurance is organized between homogenous groups
of individuals in the same village. These are kinship, neighborhood, friends, relatives,
clans, castes, and families. These findings suggest to study informal insurance, using
an approach based on networks. 4 This is known as the network approach. Transfers
occur via social networks, modeled as a collection of pairs of individuals [De Weerdt
and Dercon (2006), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007),
Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008), Ambrus et al. (2010) and so on].
Based on empirical findings, we state in this chapter that these two approaches should
be neither studied separately, nor viewed as opposite. Even if agreements may be nego-
tiated one to one in homogenous networks, people neither live nor act alone. Decisions
involve groups. In this respect, informal insurance is much more multilateral arran-
gements within homogenous and overlapping (de Weerdt and Dercon, 2006) groups.
Thus, this chapter introduces two levels of rigidity to large insurance group sizes. At
first level, we state that there exists a network prior to any insurance negotiation. In-
surance can only take place between linked partners. Most of the time, this exogenous
preexisting network reflects trust relationships. The second level consists of strategic
reasons. For example, in some villages in developing countries, farmers are perpetually
in conflict with breeders. In this context, risk sharing groups are organized within the
community of farmers and also within the community of breeders. However, some few
households belong to risk sharing groups in both communities : these are overlapping
individuals. The multilateral approach to model informal insurance is at the best of
our knowledge, the first attempt to merge the two approaches and to introduce the
possibility for risk sharing groups to overlap.
3. See for example, Deaton (1992) with data from Ghana and Thaïland, Grimard (1997) with
data from Côte d’Ivoire, Lund and Fafchamps (2003) with data from Philippines. The only exception
at our knowledge is the paper by Townsend (1994) who shows the existence of almost full insurance
with data from Indian villages
4. Some authors argue that the limited size of insurance groups is due to the cost of links ; Murgai
et al. (2002)
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As preexisting networks are basis of insurance negotiations 5, a question comes to
mind : under what conditions this preexisting network perpetually conveys transfers
without any defection ? If each individual commits to the agreement, the network will
be viable. Thus, our research question posits the problem of commitment and this
chapter can be viewed as a contribution to the literature on self-enforcing insurance
arrangement, pointed out since 1980 by Postner and established at first in Kimball
(1988). Commitment is enforced by a punishment following any defection. Thus, a
viable agreement needs not only to be stable, but also self-enforcing : if an individual
defaults, the punishment following her action should be so severe that she is discoura-
ged to do so. The literature is not unanimous on how to model punishment. According
to the group approach, punishment should be total exclusion of the deviator. This is
a very strong punishment. In contrary the network approach proposes the severance
of only the link between the deviator and the victim. This is a very weak punishment.
Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008) departs from these two extreme punishment schemes
by proposing the “level-q” punishment. This punishment depends on the number of
links but the extent “q” of the punishment is exogenous.
Without exposing here the model, we propose to fix ideas by introducing the following
illustration (Figure 3.1) of a 7-person village. Suppose that trust relationships within
the village depicts the following network g.
The basic structure of risk sharing groups is defined from g and consists of the sets
of completely directly connected individuals 6. Coalitions that represent risk sharing
groups are S1 = {1}, S2 = {2, 3, 4}, S3 = {4, 5, 6}, S4 = {4, 5, 7}. Thus, informal
insurance groups consist of the overlapping coalition structure γ ≡ {S1, S2, S3, S4}.
Suppose that for some reason, 5 contemplates to deviate to 6.
5. In most of the papers, negotiation is supposed to commence at the village level, meaning that
every individual can build an agreement with any other one if there is an economic advantage to
do so. We take an opposite view here by stating that only individuals who trust each other can
negotiate risk sharing agreements.
6. See Agbaglah (2011) for details about this overlapping coalition structure.
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Figure 3.1 – An example of a 7-person trust relationship network
According to the group approach, 5 should be excluded from the groups S3 and S4.
Thus, 4 and 7 also sever their links with 5. Therefore, the coalition structure that will
form if the deviation occurs is γ′ ≡ {S1, S2, S13 , S14 , S5} where S13 = {4, 6}, S14 = {4, 7},
and S5 = {5}.
According to the network approach (level-1 punishment), only individual 6 will sever
her link with 5. Therefore, the coalition structure that will form if the deviation oc-
curs is γ′′ ≡ {S1, S2, S13 , S4} where S13 = {4, 6}.
In real life, each individual who is linked to 5 and is aware of 5’s decision to deviate,
takes strategically her own decision to sever the link with 5 or not. It can be optimal
for 4 or 7 to keep the link with 5. For example, if 4 is highly pessimistic about the
future, she may decide to sever the link with 5. In contrary, if 7 is highly optimistic,
she may decide to keep the link with 5. This decision may also depend on the relative
wealth of 5. This strategic decision is the idea behind the endogenous punishment
that we introduce in this chapter.
We proceed by defining the endogenous punishment and we show that this punish-
ment scheme can replicate, the weak, the strong and even the level-q punishment
schemes. We show that the decision to sever a link with a deviator depends indeed
on the wealth of this deviator and also on the perception of future by the person
who is aware of a deviation. We characterize endogenously stable overlapping coali-
tion structures as a result of two effects : the gain in terms of consumption and the
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loss in terms of links. We also derive comparative statics for consumption under two
well-known sharing norms.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we develop the settings of the
multilateral insurance. In Section 3.3, we characterize endogenously stable informal
insurance groups and we conclude in Section 3.4.
3.2 Networks and transfer norms
3.2.1 Endowment
Consider a population N of n individuals. At any date, a state of the nature
θ ∈ Θ, Θ finite, is realized with a probability p(θ). As a result, there obtains a vector
of income realization y(θ) = (yi(θ))i∈N . We assume that given θ ∈ Θ, realized incomes
yi(θ) are positive and not perfectly correlated 7 across individuals. 8
In the remainder, if there is no confusion, we will use variables without their argument
θ.
3.2.2 Network based group formation
To set the formation of risk sharing groups, we need some definitions.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all individuals. A coalition S is a non-empty
subset of N . A cover γ of N is a collection of coalitions, S1, S2, . . . , Sm, such that⋃m
k=1 Sk = N : thus, γ ≡ {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}. We use the expression overlapping coalition
structure to designate a cover whenever we want to address its structure.
A network g is a list of unordered pairs of individuals (i, j) ∈ N×N , ij for simplicity,
and i 6= j. Let G be the set of all the networks g.
For all g ∈ G, define :
7. Not perfectly correlated is used here in the sense that knowing the realized income of one
individual is not sufficient to predict the one of others. This is a key difference between this chapter
and the following chapter because in this setting, the set of accessible endowments is larger.
8. It is sufficient for outputs to be not perfectly correlated to have some insurance. Otherwise,
no insurance can take place.
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– N(g) ≡ {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N, ij ∈ g}
– D(g) as the set of all directly connected elements of N(g). Formally,
D(g) ≡ {S ⊆ N(g) | ∀i, j ∈ S, ij ∈ g}.
– Cl(g) ≡ {S ∈ D(g) | @S ′ ∈ D(g) s.t. S ⊂ S ′} as the set of cliques (completely
directly connected elements) of N(g).
– I(g) ≡ N \ N(g) as the set of all singletons that have no link with any other
members according to the network g.
– a component C as a set of completely connected elements of N(g).
– a subnetwork of g as a network of N with at most all the links of G.
Definition 15. The set γg ≡ I(g) ∪ Cl(g) is the cover representation of g.
Remark 14. For all g, g′ ∈ G, g 6= g′ ⇒ γg 6= γg′ (Agbaglah, 2011). Therefore, γg
can be used to represent a network g. This structure is useful in our setting because
it suggests how coalitions can be formed based upon direct links inherited from the
preexisting trust relationship network.
We use the overlapping coalition structure to account for the following empirical
findings. Informal insurance groups are homogenous groups (Grimard, 1997, with
data from Côte d’Ivoire) and they are overlapping (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2005,
with data from Tanzania). These groups are formed given an important requirement :
trust (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003, with data from Philippines). Trust is fundamental
before any insurance arrangement. Only individuals who trust each other can build
reciprocal transfers agreements. The reason is simply that, because of the absence of
formal institutions, trust reduces information cost and solves enforceability problems.
3.2.3 Multilateral norms
In a population N , individuals are directly linked by trust relationships. These
links induce a trust relationship network g on N . Therefore we use the overlapping
coalition structure γg to represent the repartition of coalitions as risk sharing groups
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where insurance negotiations commence.
A multilateral norm is a specification of individuals, transfers, incomes, and consump-
tions for all the individuals in each coalition S ∈ γg.
When θ ∈ Θ is drawn and yi(θ) is known for each i ∈ N , each individual dispatches
her realized income into coalitions she belongs to. For each individual i ∈ N , we
denote by yiγg the collection of her allocated incomes. Thus, y
i
γg = (y
i
S)S∈γg where yiS
is the nonnegative portion of yi that individual i allocates to the coalition S. Notice
that, yiS = 0 if i 6∈ S and yiS > 0 if i ∈ S. Therefore, we have yi =
∑
S∈γg y
i
S. The
intuition is that if an individual does not belong to a coalition, she does not contri-
bute to it. But, if she belongs to several coalitions, her income will be allocated to
all of them according to some rule (either a personal rule or a common rule). We are
interested in the rules that guide this allocation. If the rule is individual and strategic,
then it may be the consequence of some utility maximization problem. It may be the
allocation that maximizes risk sharing. We do not intend to follow that pattern in
this chapter. Instead, we follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2006, with Philippines data)
who find no evidence for networks built to maximize risk sharing. Therefore, we state
that allocation rules are common. These rules are secular norms that guide income
allocation within coalitions.
One way to think of the norm is to state that each individual i is characterized by
a vector of weights βiγg = (β
i
S)S∈γg such that
∑
i∈S∈γg β
i
S = 1 and yiS = βiSyi. The
weight, βiS is nothing but the fraction of her income that individual i allocates to the
coalition S. Since we state that the allocation rules are common rules, we take the
weights exogenous to our model. Notice that if i belongs to only one coalition S, then
βiS = 1 and βiS′ = 0 for S ′ 6= S. Hence if γg is a partition, then βiS = 1 for all i and S
and all S ∈ γg.
Let ciS(θ) (ciS if no confusion) denote the fraction of individual i’s consumption, that
comes from the coalition S, and ziS(θ) (ziS if no confusion) the net transfer from i
within the coalition S.
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Thus, given a coalition S, a multilateral norm is a mappingM, such that (ziS)i∈S =
M(S, (yiS)i∈S) subject to the following constraint yiS−ziS = ciS. The overall consump-
tion for an individual i ∈ N is ci = ∑i∈S∈γg ciS which is the summation of all coali-
tional consumptions from the whole informal insurance organization.
The research question that we investigate here is : how can we characterize overlap-
ping coalition structures where every individual abide by the norms ? Such coalition
structure is denoted stable.
3.2.4 Transfers
We model informal insurance as arrangements between homogenous groups of
individuals. Transfers occur only between directly linked individuals. If a state of
nature is realized, and the consumption of each individual in a coalition is determined
according to the norm, the overall transfer of each individual is known. However, there
are multiple ways to specify bilateral transfers. Here we propose the proportional
transfer based on empirical findings. Three possible situations arise within a coalition.
– If an individual i has an amount of allocated income equal to the consumption
designated by the norm, then i keeps her income. Her net transfer is null.
– If an individual i has an amount of allocated income greater than the consump-
tion designated by the norm, then i shares her excess of income proportionally
with individuals who gain less than the designated amount of consumption. Her
net transfer is positive and equals the amount of excessive consumption good.
– If an individual i has an allocated income less than the consumption designated
by the norm, then i receives her lack of income proportionally from individuals
who gain more than the designated amount of consumption. Her net transfer is
negative and equals the amount of lack of consumption good.
For illustration, we consider the following 3-person network. In brackets are the in-
comes.
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Figure 3.2 – An example of a 3-person network with realized incomes
If for example the multilateral sharing norm is equal sharing, the total income
(4.5) is equally shared and individual consumption is equally fixed to 1.5. To obtain
this consumption distribution, 1 has to make a net transfer of 0 ; 2 a net transfer of
−0.5 ; and 3 a net transfer of 0.5.
Definition 16. Consider a coalition S ∈ γg, a realized income y, and a multilateral
normM such that (ziS)i∈S =M
(
S, (yiS)i∈S
)
. Let EiS denote the “excess” of consump-
tion for individuals i ∈ S defined by EiS ≡ yiS − ciS. The proportional transfer scheme
is such that :
– If EiS = 0, then ziS = 0 and zilS = 0 for all l ∈ S \ {i}.
– If EiS > 0, then ziS =
∑
{l/ElS<0} z
il
S (where zilS is the transfer by i to l in the
coalition S) with zilS =
ElS∑
{k/Ek
S
<0} E
k
S
EiS, and zilS = 0 for all l ∈ S with ElS ≥ 0 .
– If EiS < 0, then ziS =
∑
{l/ElS>0} z
il
S , with zilS = −zliS .
If i 6∈ S, then ziS = 0 . 9
3.2.5 Externalities
Valuable people in agrarian economies are not only the wealthiest, but also people
with high social privileges (number of friends, respect, power in common decisions,
favor received and so on). 10 These social privileges may not be convertible into
9. This last part of the definition formally states that there is no transfer between disjoint coali-
tions
10. Sometimes wealthiest people are also high social privilege ones.
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consumption good. In our setting, we characterize social privileges by the amount
of links in the trust relationship network. Notice that the network exists prior to
insurance arrangements but trough social privileges, it affects the wellbeing of in-
dividuals. For this reason, we address this social privileges as externalities. These
externalities can be positive or negative. When individuals with a big amount of
links (in the trust relationship network) have a bad harvest, they will benefit from
more favor from their linked partners : that pattern exhibits positive externalities.
In contrast, if time is more valuable and that one needs to spend an amount of time
with each of her linked partners, a big amount of link is more costly : that pattern
exhibits negative externalities.
Formally, we endow each individual with an utility function that depends not
only on the consumption good, but also on the architecture of the trust relationship
network.
Definition 17. Let g be a network on N , and let g′ be a subnetwork of g.
The utility function exhibits positive externalities if U(ci, g) ≥ U(ci, g′) and the
inequality is strict for at least one individual.
The utility function exhibits negative externalities if U(ci, g) ≤ U(ci, g′) and the
inequality is strict for at least one individual.
The utility function exhibits no externalities if U(ci, g) = U(ci, g′) for all g′ and all
i.
Following Ambrus et al. (2010), we state that these externalities arise not at the
village level, but at the level of homogenous islands. At the coalition level, say local
externalities and at the component level, say global externalities. We borrow here
from Ambrus et al. (2010), the fact that the external effect is a substitute to the
consumption good. But, the difference resides in the fact that we do not allow here
external effect to be necessary convertible into consumption. We postulate instead an
additive separable functional form. Thus, U(c, g) = u(c) + f(g) where u is a smooth
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function in consumption, strictly concave and increasing. The functional f is a smooth
function, increasing (respectively decreasing) in the number of directs links of i in the
case of positive (respectively negative) local externalities, and increasing (respectively
decreasing) in the number of links (either directs or indirects) of i in the case of
positive (respectively negative) global externalities. If there are no externalities, then
f ≡ 0. Furthermore, we set that f(∅) = 0. An isolated individual (singleton) is not
subject to any external effect.
3.2.6 Enforcement constraints
This chapter is all about informal insurance. This is a reciprocal transfer agree-
ment that is not formally regulated : no collateral is required, no legal court to com-
plain, and no signed paper as testimony. In some situations, individuals may find it
suboptimal to comply. Therefore, to survive, such agreement needs to be self-enforcing
in order to discourage opportunist behaviors. One who reneges on her prescribed duty
needs to be “punished”. If the literature is unanimous on such punishments, its seve-
rity depends on the approach. According to the group approach, in case of default,
the guilty individual will be pushed out of the group. All the links with her will be
severed. This is quite a strong punishment. According to the network approach, only
direct victims will sever their links with the deviator. This is quite a weak punish-
ment. The range between the weak and the strong punishment is due to the modeling
of the reaction of third parties. These are individuals who are not directly victims
of the deviation, but are linked to the victim and therefore aware of this deviation.
As an alternative to these extreme punishments, an intermediary case is developed
by Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008), the level-q punishment. According to this punish-
ment, following a deviation, all agents who are connected to a victim by a path not
exceeding length q (but not via deviator) sever direct links (if any) with the deviator.
This intermediary punishment, though it is very interesting, presents two limits : q is
exogenous, and is the same for all the individuals.
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In this chapter we take an eclectic view by designing a punishment scheme that re-
flects reality. In real life what happens if an individual in a population reneges on her
duty ? Surely, the direct victims will sever their links with the deviator. However, the
reaction of the third parties is far from being obvious. Their decision is individual and
strategic. All individuals who are informed about a deviation become more cautious.
Nevertheless, their reaction follow a cost-benefit computation about keeping or seve-
ring the link with the deviator. The reason is that it is not granted that a deviating
partner will do the same thing to them in the future.
Formally, suppose that each individual can still trust (but only up to some level) her
linked partner who comes to deviate to another one. Depending of her type or the
history, she can decide if the current deviator remains reliable or not. Since we restrict
ourselves to stationary behaviors, we will focus on type alone to define our punish-
ment scheme. An individual i is of type ti ∈ [0, 1] if she believes with probability ti
that a current deviator will deviate to her also in the future. The type ti is nothing
but the trust probability over future reciprocity. For example, if all individuals are of
type ti = 1, then the population is pessimistic and the strong punishment obtains.
If all individuals are of type ti = 0, then the population is optimistic and the weak
punishment obtains.
Deviation
If it happens that according to the agreement an individual i should make trans-
fers but she reneges on her duty, we say that i deviates. Each individual i can only
deviate to directly linked partners. Formally, each individual i can only deviate to
individuals in a set D ⊆ (∪i∈S∈γg {S})\{i} from the coalitions she belongs to. Given
a network g ∈ G, a deviation will induce some further deviations up to some “sta-
ble” network g′ (g′ can be the empty network). In case of multiplicity, take g′ as the
one which generates the most positive (least negative) external effect. We denote by
ciD individual i’s current consumption if she deviates to others in the set D. Thus,
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ciD ≡ ci +
∑
l∈D
∑
S∈γg :i,l∈S z
il
S . From the next period on, i will face two types of
punishment, one direct and the other one indirect. The direct punishment is the se-
verance of the links by all individuals in D (direct victims of deviation). The indirect
punishment is the severance of the links by third parties. The link severance will
induce a residual network g′ ⊂ g, and a residual consumption ciR. 11 Thus, i decides
to deviate if the gain from the pair (ci, g) is less than the gain from the pair (ciD, g′).
Endogenous punishment
The behavior of third parties determines the severity of the punishment (weak or
strong). In the case of weak punishment, third parties are passive. In contrast, they
are active in case of strong punishment since they also punish the deviator (if they are
linked to her). In this chapter we explore another view : why if third parties behave
strategically. A third party individual severs the link with a deviator if and only if it
worth less for her to keep this link than to sever it : this is the endogenous punishment.
Suppose that an individual j is a deviator and i a third party. Before deciding to sever
her link with j, a third party i, cautious of future possible deviations by j, compares
her per period payoff from link severance denoted V iSj to the one denoted V iKj from
link keeping. Information is complete so everybody in the same component 12 knows
the residual network following each action (severing the link with the deviator, gSj,
or keeping it, gKj).
Definition 18.
Suppose that an individual j deviates. The endogenous punishment scheme consists
of a series of simultaneous actions :
– If an individual i is a direct victim of the deviation, then she severs her link
with j.
11. We use the letters D for default and R for reaction.
12. Empirical papers show that information is shared in islands of individuals represented here by
components.
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– If an individual i is a third party of the deviation, i severs her link with j if and
only if V iKj ≤ V iSj
We already show that the endogenous punishment replicates the strong and the
weak punishments. What about the level-q punishment ?
Proposition 8.
Let q be a an integer. Suppose that individual i’s type is such that :
 If the lengh of the path connecting i to a direct victim is not greater than q, t
i = 0
Otherwise , ti = 1
then the endogenous punishment is the level-q punishment.
The proof is straightforward since the link severance from the endogenous punish-
ment is equivalent to the one from the level-q punishment.
Lemma 9. A third party i severs her link with a deviator j if and only if
∑
θ
p(θ)[tiU(ciKj, gKj) + (1− ti)U(ciSj, gKj)] ≤
∑
θ
p(θ)U(ciSj, gSj),
where ciKj(θ) is the amount of consumption for i if she keeps the link with j, and
ciSj(θ), the amount of consumption for i if she severs the link with j.
Proof.
Notice that, V iSj is the expected per period utility of severing the link with j, and V iKj
is the expected per period utility of keeping this link. Thus, V iSj ≡
∑
θ p(θ)U(c
i
Sj, gSj),
and V iKj ≡
∑
θ p(θ)[t
iU(ciKj, gKj) + (1− ti)U(ciSj, gKj)]; and a third party i severs her
link with a deviating j if and only if V iSj ≥ V iKj. 
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Notice that in the LHS of the inequality, we have gKj which is the subnetwork obtained
if i decides to keep j. At the period of decision (harvest for example), if i decides to
keep j, the external effects take place up to the next period.
For an individual third party i, the indirect punishment against the deviator j
follows a rational computation. There is a positive effect to keep the deviator, espe-
cially if she is wealthy. But the consequence can be dramatic if this deviator comes
to renege on her transfer to i. For this reason, each individual third party i evaluates
the relative value of the indirect external loss and the direct consumption coverage
loss following individual j’s deviation to a third party i. To evaluate this relative
value, let kij ≡ f(gSj)−f(gKj)∑
θ p(θ){u(ciKj)−u(ciSj)}
. Each individual third party i’s evaluation of this
value determines her decision to sever a link or not. Notice that kij is endogenous and
results from a cost-benefit analysis.
Proposition 9. For an individual third party i and a deviator j,
– If the deviator j’s icome is high enough then :
– If there are no externalities, or in case of positive externalities, then i never
severs the link with j. This decision is independent of ti.
– If there are negative externalities, then i severs the link with j only if kij ≥ ti.
– If the deviator j’s income is low enough then :
– If there are no externalities, or in case of negative externalities, then i always
severs the link with j.
– If there are positive externalities, then i severs the link with j if and only if
kij ≤ ti.
Remark 15.
– First, if the number of links increases social privileges (positive externalities),
nobody severs a link with a wealthy deviator. For a poor deviator, her links are
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needed but she is a burden in the sense that she is poor. Therefore only poor
deviators with low relative external contribution are severed.
– Second, if the number of links decreases social privileges (negative externalities),
the link with a poor deviator is systematically severed. however, if a rich de-
viates, her income is needed but she is a burden in terms of link. Therefore, link
severance occurs if and only the loss in terms of social privilege is relatively high.
– It is crucial to notice that the threshold for the decision to sever or not a link
is the trust probability ti. The confrontation between an exogenous parameter
ti and an endogenous one kij determines the decision to keep a deviator or not.
Proof.
V iKj ≤ V iSj ⇔
∑
θ p(θ){[tiU(ciKj, gKj) + (1− ti)U(ciSj, gKj)]− U(ciSj, gSj)} ≤ 0
⇔∑θ p(θ){[tiu(ciKj)+tif(gKj)+(1−ti)u(ciSj)+(1−ti)f(gKj)]−[u(ciSj)+f(gSj)]} ≤ 0
⇔ ti∑θ p(θ)[u(ciKj)−u(ciSj)] ≤ f(gSj)−f(gKj) because gSj, gKj, ti are independent of θ
Case 1 : No externalities
In case of no externalities, f(gSj)− f(gKj) = 0
Hence, V iKj ≤ V iSj ⇔
∑
θ p(θ)[u(c
i
Kj)− u(ciSj)] ≤ 0
Case 2 : Positive externalities
In case of positive externalities, f(gSj)− f(gKj) ≤ 0
Hence, V iKj ≤ V iSj ⇔ ti
∑
θ p(θ)[u(c
i
Kj)− u(ciSj)] ≤ f(gSj)− f(gKj) ≤ 0
Case 3 : Negative externalities
In case of negative externalities, f(gSj)− f(gKj) ≥ 0
Hence, V iKj ≤ V iSj ⇔ ti
∑
θ p(θ)[u(c
i
Kj)− u(ciSj)] ≤ f(gSj)− f(gKj) ≥ 0
Furthermore, if j is more wealthy than others whatever the realized state is, then
keeping j is more worthy, in terms of consumption, than severing the link with her.
Therefore,u(ciKj)−u(ciSj) > 0. On the other hand, if j is poor enough, u(ciKj)−u(ciSj) <
0. The results of the proposition obtain from this observation and the three cases. 
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The proposition shows that the decision to sever a link depends indeed on the income
of the deviator. If the deviator is rich enough, one can still keep the link with her,
even with the fear that she can deviate in the future. These results match perfectly
what we observe in real life. It is easier to forgive the rich. The fact that we obtain
this result with a very general setting (not specifying neither a functional form for the
utility function (over consumption), nor a functional expression of the externalities
function) shows that our model behaves well.
3.3 Endogenous stability
In the sequel, we consider stationary strategies only. These are strategies such that
the decision to keep or sever a link by a third party or the decision to deviate by an
individual does not depend on the history. Following a deviation, at least one link is
severed. Therefore, we define recursively endogenous stability on the number of links.
• For an isolated individual (no link), V ∗i(∅) ≡∑ p(θ)U(yi(θ), ∅). This is the average
per period expected utility, normalized by (1−δ). Obviously, a component of size one
is stable.
• Recursively, suppose that the endogenous stability is defined for any network g′,
subnetwork of some network g of m individuals, m = 1, . . . , n− 1.
• Consider a network g of n individuals, a consumption allocation ci for i, and a vector
of per period expected payoffs V i . Consider a realization θ of the state of nature. We
have two possible situations :
- If there is no deviation, an individual i’s expected utility normalized by (1− δ) is
(1− δ)U(ci(θ), g) + δV i.
- If i deviates to individuals in a set D, her expected utility utility is
(1− δ)U(ciD(θ), g) + δV iR(g′), where g′ is the resulting residual stable subnetwork of g
obtained from the severance of links by individuals in R who react to the defection
of i.
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Thus, an individual i deviates if and only if (1 − δ)U(ci(θ), g) + δV i(g) ≤ (1 −
δ)U(ciD(θ), g)+δV
i
R(g
′). If there are multiple such g′, the inequality should be verified
for all.
Definition 19. An overlapping coalition structure γg is endogenously stable if and
only if
(1− δ)U(ci(θ0), g) + δV i(g) > (1− δ)U(ciD(θ0), g) + δV iR(g′)
for all D ⊆ ( ∪i∈S∈γg {S}) \ {i}, for all i ∈ N , and for all realized states θ0 ∈ Θ.
From this definition, the following characterization of endogenous stability obtains.
Lemma 10. An overlapping coalition structure γg is endogenously stable if and only
if
U(ciD(θ), g)− U(ci(θ), g) <
δ
(1− δ) [V
i(g)− V iR(g′)]
for all D ⊆ ( ∪i∈S∈γg {S}) \ {i}, for all i ∈ N , and for all realized states θ0 ∈ Θ.
Remark 16. The Lemma is a direct consequence of the definition. The gain of
cheating today is less than the actual value of the punishment from the next day
on. The same result is obtained in different contexts by Coate and Ravallion (1993),
and Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008). The difference resides in the construction of V iR
that depends deeply on the punishment scheme. After all, an insurance organization
is endogenously stable if and only if respecting the agreement is more worthy than
cheating.
3.3.1 Characterization of endogenous stability
For each individual i ∈ N , let Si ≡
(⋃
S∈γg :i∈S S
) \ {i} denote the set of all
individuals linked to i. Let ciD denote i’s current consumption if she deviates to a set
D ⊆ Si. Let ciR denote i’s consumption from the next day on, due to the residual
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stable network gR following the endogenous punishment. Suppose that we recursively
define stability for networks of less than n individuals.
Theorem 7. An overlapping coalition structure γg is endogenously stable if and only
if for all individual i, for all set D ⊆ Si, and for all realized states θ0 ∈ Θ,
u(ciD(θ0))− u(ci(θ0)) <
δ
1− δ
{∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ)
(
u(ci(θ))− u(ciR(θ))
)
+ f(g)− f(gR)
}
.
Interpretation.
This theorem shows the existence of two effects. The first effect is direct and consists
of the lack of consumption smoothing coverage following a punishment. The second
effect is indirect and concerns external losses following links severance. Thus, an over-
lapping coalition structure is endogenously stable if and only if the gain from defection
today is less than the actual value of the resultant of the direct and the indirect ef-
fects.
Proof.
If an individual i deviates to a setD, her current consumption is ciD = ci+
∑
l∈D
∑
S∈γg :i,l∈S z
il
S .
Stability of γg ⇔ ∀θ0 ∈ Θ,∀i ∈ N, ∀D ⊆ Si, U(ciD(θ0), g)−U(ci(θ0), g) < δ(1−δ) [V i(g)−
V iR(gR)].
From :
1. U(ciD(θ0), g)− U(ci(θ0), g) = u(ciD(θ0)) + f(g)− u(ci(θ0))− f(g)
2. V i(g) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)
(
u(ci(θ)) + f(g)
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)u(c
i(θ)) + f(g) because f(g) is
independent from θ and
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) = 1
3. V iR(gR) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)
(
u(ciR(θ)) + f(gR)
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)u(c
i
R(θ)) + f(gR) because
f(gR) is independent from θ and
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) = 1
we have the following :
Stability of γg ⇔ ∀θ0 ∈ Θ,∀i ∈ N,∀D ⊆ Si, u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0)) < δ1−δ{
∑
θ p(θ)
(
u(ci(θ))−
u(ciR(θ))
)
+ f(g)− f(gR)}. 
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It is granted in the literature that only an individual with high realized income can
renege on her transfer. But we observe also in real life that some situations may
force an individual with low realized income (with negative excess of consumption as
in Definition 17) to refuse a transfer. The following result investigates these situations.
Corollary 1. With negative externalities, an individual may deviate with a low in-
come realization. She never deviates in other cases.
Interpretation.
All the economics literature on this matter claims intuitively that deviation occurs
only with high realized income. For example Genicot and Ray (2002) assume with a
model without externalities that deviation occurs only if the deviator has a higher
realized income. We confirm this assumption here by proving it formally and isolating
situations where this assumption may not hold.
Proof.
If i has a low realized income,
∑
l∈D
∑
S∈γg :i,l∈S z
il
S < 0, thus u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0)) < 0,
and we use the theorem to conclude. 
The following result investigates the relation between stability and discount factor.
Corollary 2. In the presence of positive externalities and in case of no externalities,
all overlapping coalition structures are endogenously stable for sufficiently patient in-
dividuals. However, in case of negative externalities, an overlapping coalition structure
is endogenously stable for sufficiently patient individuals if and only if the direct effect
of deviation dominates the indirect effect.
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Proof.
For sufficiently patient individuals, δ tends to 1 and δ
(1−δ) to infinity. Also,
∑
θ p(θ)
(
u(ci(θ))−
u(ciR(θ))
) ≥ 0 We have the following cases :
1. No externalities : f(g)− f(gR) = 0 ;
2. Positive externalities f(g)− f(gR) ≥ 0
3. Negative externalities f(g)− f(gR) ≤ 0
Hence we have the sign of the RHS of the inequality in Theorem 7 and the result of
the corollary is straightforward. 
What happens to insurance in communities where individuals are heterogenous in
terms of income ? We think of situations where some individuals have access to higher
income compared to others ? Does stability hold ?
Corollary 3. Suppose there exists at least one individual wealthier than others (in-
dependently of the realized state). In case of no externalities or positive externalities,
an overlapping coalition structure γg is endogenously stable if and only if individuals
are patient enough.
Interpretation.
With high discounting, there can exist endogenously stable informal insurance groups
with heterogeneity in income. But if we consider non-extreme discounting, endoge-
nously stable informal insurance groups exhibit homogeneity in income. These results
reinforce empirical finding of islands of homogenous individuals. They suggest to in-
vestigate homogenous group of individuals who have access to the same set of income.
Proof.
It is sufficient to notice that u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0)) > 0 for the very rich individual for all
θ0. Then we obtain from Theorem 7 that δ >
u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0))
u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0))+
∑
θ p(θ)
(
u(ci(θ))−u(ciR(θ))
)
+f(g)−f(gR)
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where the RHS is in (0, 1) because f(g)− f(gR) ≥ 0. 
3.3.2 Endogenous stability and sharing norms
For expositional perspective, we consider two distinct sharing norms : the equal
sharing norm and the norm with private domain. 13 According to the equal sharing
norm, individuals in the same coalition put their allocated incomes together and share
the total equally among themselves. According to the norm with private domain, each
individual in a coalition keeps an incompressible portion of her allocated income and
all of them put the remaining together and share it within the coalition.
Definition 20. A multilateral normM on a coalition S ∈ γg of s individuals is the
equal sharing norm if according to M, each individual i ∈ S receives an amount
ciS of consumption good such that ciS =
1
s
∑
l∈S y
l
S.
A multilateral norm M on a coalition S ∈ γg of s individuals is a norm with
private domain if according toM, each individual i ∈ S, receives an amount ciS of
consumption good, such that ciS = αiyiS +
1
s
∑
l∈S(1− αl)ylS, αi ∈ (0, 1).
In the sequel, we provide firstly results for equal sharing norm as a benchmark.
Thereafter, we investigate a norm with private domain.
Consider an income realization and an individual i contemplating a deviation. Let n
be the number of individuals with lower than the prescribed (by the norm) allocated
income, and p the number of individuals with higher than the prescribed (by the
norm) allocated income.
Theorem 8. Equal sharing norm
If an individual i contemplates deviating to a set D, then her current consumption ciD
is such that :
– in case of positive externalities, ciD increases with yi and decreases with n and
the size of D,
13. For details about sharing norms, see Genicot and Ray (2002).
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– in case of negative externalities, ciD increases with yi and with p and decreases
with the size of D.
Interpretation.
In case of positive externalities, the incentive to deviate increases with the level of
realized income. If there are rich individuals, it is more likely to see them deviate. If
deviation occurs, the best thing to do is to refuse transfers to as many as possible
individuals in N . If a very few number of individuals have a negative shock in their
incomes, the incentive to deviate increases.
In case of negative externalities, the incentive to deviate increases with the level of
realized income. If there are rich individuals, then it is more likely to see them deviate.
In case of deviation, the best thing to do is to refuse transfers to as few as possible
individuals in P . If a very few number of individuals have a positive shock in their
incomes, the incentive to deviate diminishes.
Proof.
Case1 : Consider an individual i who belongs to only one coalition S of size s in a
stable informal insurance structure γg. Consider that a state θ0 is realized, with the
income distribution in S, (yiS)i∈S. According to the equal sharing norm, i consumes
ci(θ0) =
1
s
∑
l∈S y
l
S. Let N ≡ {l ∈ S : ElS < 0}, and P ≡ {l ∈ S : ElS > 0} the sets of
respective sizes n and p.
Subcase1 : Consider an individual i such that i ∈ P then i makes positive transfers
to other individuals in N . Thus if she decides to default, she can refuse transfers to
the individual set D ⊆ N , of size d ≤ n.
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ciD = c
i +
∑
l∈D
ziSl =
1
s
∑
l∈S
ylS +
1∑
l∈N E
l
N
∑
l∈D
ElSE
i
S
=
1
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l +
1∑
l∈N β
l
Sy
l − n
s
∑
l∈S β
l
Sy
l
(
∑
l∈D
βlSy
l − d
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l)(yi − 1
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l)
Hence ciD(θ0) = f(n(θ0), d, yi(θ0)) where :
∂f
∂n
< 0; ∂f
∂d
< 0; ∂f
∂yi
> 0
We have f(n, d, yi) = a+ 1
b(n)−na(c(d)− da)(yi − a); with b(n)− na < 0; c(d)− da <
0; yi − a > 0
∂f
∂n
= − c(d)−da)(yi−a)
(b(n)−na)2 (b
′(n) − a) b′(n) is the marginal aggregate consumption good for
an individual in N ; it is the less than a. So b′(n)− a < 0⇒ ∂f
∂n
< 0
∂f
∂d
= (y
i−a)
b(n)−na(c
′(d)− a) c′(d) is the marginal aggregate consumption good for an indi-
vidual in D ; it is the less than a. So c′(d)− a < 0⇒ ∂f
∂d
> 0
∂f
∂yi
= (c(d)−da)
b(n)−na > 0
R = D ∪ T , where T is the set of third parties : T = {l ∈ S : tl∑θ p(θ)[u(clKi) −
u(clSi)] ≤ f(gSi)− f(gKi)}
Subsubcase 1 : l belongs to S only.
c0lSi =
1
s−1
∑
k∈S−{i} β
′k
S y
k where β′kS is the new repartition of income
c0lKi =
1
s−1
∑
k∈S−{i} β
′k
S y
k + 1
s−r+1
∑
k∈(S−R)∪{l} β
′k
S y
k where β′kS is the new repartition
of income
Subsubcase 2 : l belongs to multiple coalitions {S, Sj, j} .
clSi = c
0l
Si +
∑
j c
′l
j where c′lj is the new amount of consumption good from other coali-
tions
clKi = c
0l
Ki +
∑
j c
′l
j where c′lj is the new amount of consumption good from other coa-
litions
Subcase2 : Consider an individual i such that i ∈ N then i makes negative transfers to
(receive positive transfers from) other individuals in P . Thus if she decides to default,
she can refuse transfers to the individual set D ⊆ P , of size d ≤ p.
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ciD = c
i +
∑
l∈D
ziSl with z
i
Sl = −zlSi
=
1
s
∑
l∈S
ylS −
1∑
l∈N E
l
N
∑
l∈D
ElSE
i
S But
∑
l∈N
ElN = −
∑
l∈P
ElP So
ciD =
1
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l +
1∑
l∈P β
l
Sy
l − P
s
∑
l∈S β
l
Sy
l
(
∑
l∈D
βlSy
l − d
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l)(yi − 1
s
∑
l∈S
βlSy
l)
Hence ciD(θ0) = f(p(θ0), d, yi(θ0)) where :
∂f
∂p
> 0; ∂f
∂d
< 0; ∂f
∂yi
> 0
We have f(p, d, yi) = a + 1
b(p)−pa(c(d) − da)(yi − a); with b(p) − pa > 0; c(d) − da >
0; yi − a < 0
∂f
∂n
= − c(d)−da)(yi−a)
(b(p)−pa)2 (b
′(p) − a) b′(p) is the marginal aggregate consumption good for
an individual in P ; it is the greater than a. So b′(p)− a > 0⇒ ∂f
∂p
> 0
∂f
∂d
= (y
i−a)
b(p)−pa(c
′(d)− a) c′(d) is the marginal aggregate consumption good for an indi-
vidual in D ; it is the greater than a. So c′(d)− a > 0⇒ ∂f
∂d
> 0
∂f
∂yi
= (c(d)−da)
b(p)−pa > 0
The remainder is like in the subcase1
Case2 : Consider an individual i who belongs to more than one coalition Sj, j ∈M of
respective sizes sj in a stable network g. Note S = ∪j∈MSj. Consider that a state θ0
is realized, with the following income distribution in S, (y1j (θ0), y2j (θ0), . . . , y
sj
Sj
(θ0)).
According to the equal sharing norm, i consumes :
∑
j∈M c
i
j(θ0), where cij(θ0) =
1
s
∑sj
l=1 y
l
j.
Let Nj ≡ {l ∈ S : Elj < 0}, and Pj = {l ∈ S : Elj > 0} the sets of respective sizes nj
and pj, j ∈M .
Thus, ci(θ) =
∑
j∈M c
i
j(θ), c
i
D(θ) =
∑
j∈M c
i
Dj
(θ), ciR(θ) =
∑
j∈M c
i
Rj
(θ) 
The norm with private domain prescribes that each individual i in a coalition S
keeps an incompressible portion αi of her allocated income and share the remainder
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equally. Thus i consumes ciS = αiyiS +
1
s
∑
l∈S(1− αl)ylS, αi ∈ (0, 1) for all i.
Theorem 9. Norm with private domain
If an individual i contemplates deviating to a set D, then her current consumption ciD
is such that :
– ciD increases with αi,
– in case of positive externalities, ciD increases with yi and decreases with n and
the size of D,
– in case of negative externalities, ciD increases with yi and with p and decreases
with the size of D.
Proof.
With the norm with private domain, ciS = αiyiS +
1
s
∑
l∈S(1−αl)ylS, αi ∈ (0, 1) for all
i. Thus, ciS = ci1S + ci2S, where ci2S is an equal sharing norm for yi2S = (1− αi)yiS. So
the results of equal sharing norm apply to ci2S. 
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduce some important features in the economics literature
on informal insurance. First, the merging of the group approach and the network
approach permits to design a punishment scheme where the decision to severe a link
with the deviator is strategic and therefore endogenous. Second, we account for ex-
ternalities as the indirect consequence of the architecture of the trust relationship
network. Third, we allow risk sharing groups to overlap as it is observed empirically.
We characterize endogenously stable informal insurance groups under positive and
negative externalities. After deriving general properties, we provide conditions under
which deviation occurs. We show that the confrontation between the exogenous per-
ception of the future and the endogenous relative valuation of external effects over
consumption determines link severance. Finally, we derive comparative static results
under two sharing norms.
Chapitre 4
Informal insurance organizations
4.1 Introduction
We investigate the viability of informal insurance arrangements across networks of
individuals in a context where individual outputs are precarious. Such networks are
mostly present in agrarian economies (villages in developing countries for example) 1
where individual incomes are more exposed to shocks : poor weather, illness, crop
diseases, wild animals’ invasion, crops damage by fire. 2 With the absence of formal
credit and insurance markets, individuals cope with these idiosyncratic income shocks
by developing reciprocal transfer agreements without any formal contract, signed
documents, or collateral. This is known as informal insurance. 3
Within the agrarian village, individuals (or households) belong to more homoge-
nous groups (ethnic groups, families, clans, castes) 4 within which informal insurance
take place. This is due to information cost and enforceability reasons. These limited
groups within the village are institutions where transfers are regulated by norms. To
1. See Postner (1980) for characteristics of these economies.
2. Precarious outputs are mostly observed in rural areas but sometimes also in towns. See for
instance Adaman et al. (2007) with urban Istanbul data.
3. For more information about informal insurance, see Rosenzweig (1989), Udry (1990, 1994),
Townsend (1994).
4. Homogenous insurance groups are described for example by Grimarg (1997) in villages in Côte
d’Ivoire.
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account for that, we allow multilateral norms 5 to govern transfers in our model. No-
tice that if a homogenous group is composed of two individuals, the norm becomes
bilateral as developed in Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008). Theoretically, this chapter
can be viewed as a generalization of bilateral norms to more than two individuals.
In the remainder, we write BGR instead of Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008). The aim
of this chapter is to investigate how characteristics of these homogenous groups and
multilateral norms affect the viability of informal insurance arrangements in agrarian
villages.
Earlier economics literature models informal insurance organizations as “clubs” :
communities (village) where individuals make reciprocal transfers in order to smooth
consumption [Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Ligon et al (2002), Genicot
and Ray (2003)]. If this were the case in reality, one should expect full risk sharing
in villages : this prediction is not confirmed empirically 6 [Deaton (1992) with data
from Ghana and Thailand, Grimard (1997) with data from Côte d’Ivoire, Fafchamps
and Lund (2003) with data from Philippines and so on]. Instead, there is evidence of
partial risk sharing at the village level. This finding suggests that the village may not
be the proper behavioral unit to study informal insurance. When Townsend (1994)
analyzed data from three Indian villages he observed that informal insurance groups
have limited sizes within the villages. He concluded by stating that the best way
to model informal insurance is to follow an approach based on social networks. 7
Following Townsend (1994), authors have modeled informal insurance organizations
as collections of bilateral agreements in village communities [De Weerdt and Dercon
(2005), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), BGR, Ambrus
et al. (2010)].
In the village, informal insurance does not systematically take place within limited
5. De Weerdt and Dercon (2005) find empirically evidence for multilateral norms in Tanzanian
villages.
6. The only exception at our knowledge is the paper by Townsend (1994) who shows the existence
of almost full risk pooling for consumption goods with data from Indian villages.
7. Some authors argue that the limited size of insurance groups is due to the cost of links (Murgai
et al., 2002).
90
groups. Only individuals who trust each other in these groups so as to secure future
reciprocity can do so. Based on informal insurance agreements in villages in Côte
d’Ivoire, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) have highlighted two characteristics of these
homogenous groups : they are governed by trust (trust is the first requirement to par-
ticipate in an insurance group) and they are not disjoint but use to be overlapping. 8
In this chapter, we aim to build a model of informal insurance that accounts for most
empirical findings. The objective is to be as realistic as possible. Therefore, we mo-
del informal insurance as multilateral arrangements within homogenous groups that
overlap. Thus, a population (village) is modeled as an informal insurance organiza-
tion. This is an institution composed of a collections of homogenous and overlapping
groups, governed by multilateral norms. We proceed by modeling these homogenous
groups (where informal insurance take place) as originating from trust relationship
networks (that we consider exogenous to the model) that exist in the village. As these
networks may overlap, individuals who belong to distinct networks, overlapping indi-
viduals, act as bridges to spread wealth across networks. These overlapping individuals
help to share risk across homogenous groups. Notice that our multilateral approach
embodies the traditional approaches using “clubs” or bilateral links. If the pre-existing
trust relationship network is a complete network (all individuals are directly linked),
our model replicates the “clubs” approach. On the other hand, if the pre-existing trust
network is a tree (not more than two individuals are completely directly linked) our
model replicates the bilateral links approach. The multilateral approach to model
informal insurance is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to nest the two
traditional approaches and to accommodate overlapping insurance groups.
Within each homogenous group, sharing rules are defined to govern transfers.
Since insurance is informal (no signed paper, no formal collateral, no legal court),
some individuals may refuse to make transfers back. To survive (to be stable), an
informal insurance arrangement needs to be “self-enforcing.” That is, the punishment
8. Also, De Weerdt and Dercon (2005) observe on data from Tanzanian villages that insurance
networks of villagers mostly overlap
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that any person suffers for reneging on her prescribed duty discourages her from doing
so. Some authors view this punishment as severe as to isolate the deviator and leave
her in autarky. Others propose the severance of only the link between deviators and
their direct victims.
In this chapter, we investigate “stability” of informal insurance organizations under
each of these two punishment schemes and we derive results also for intermediate
punishment schemes. This chapter can be viewed as a contribution to the literature
on self-enforcing insurance arrangement, pointed out since 1980 by Postner and es-
tablished at first by Kimball (1988). Using equal sharing in homogenous groups, we
characterize stable informal insurance organizations without imposing extreme dis-
counting. 9 In the particular case where individuals discount future at a very high or
a very low rate, our model replicates existing results. For intermediate discounting,
we provide a set interval characterization with a lower and upper bound. We show
that all stable informal insurance organization lays between these bounds. We iden-
tify some network characteristics that correspond to a specific discounting. Defining
preferences not only over consumption but also over social privileges, we propose a
quantifier of individual external cost (the cost of losing social privileges). We find
that high external costs reinforce stability. Our simulations identify parameters that
reinforce stability such as : high level of output, high output variation, high risk aver-
sion, high external costs. Finally we develop a procedure that equates consumption
for linked individuals following idiosyncratic income shocks.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we set the basics of the model
and we derive stability results in Section 4.3. We derive static comparative results
for exogenous parameters of the model and we provide numerical simulations in Sec-
tion 4.4. In Section 4.5 we develop a procedure that equate consumption for linked
individuals and finally in Section 4.6 we discuss some extensions and we conclude.
9. The bulk of the literature derive stability results for informal insurance by imposing high
discounting
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4.2 The model
In this section we build the model of multilateral risk sharing and we set conditions
under which informal insurance arrangements are self-enforcing.
4.2.1 Endowment
Consider a population N of n individuals. At any date, a state of nature θ ∈ Θ
is realized with a probability p(θ). We assume that Θ is finite. In each state θ, an
income distribution y(θ) =
(
yi(θ)
)
i∈N is obtained. For each i ∈ N , yi(θ) ∈ Y , where
Y ⊆ <+ is a finite set. We assume that realized incomes are independent. 10
4.2.2 Risk sharing groups based on networks
In our model, not all possible groups that can form, can also share risk. Only
groups that originate from an existing trust relationship networks can do so. In fact,
given a village, not all individuals can be engaged in reciprocal agreements with each
other. Only individuals that trust each other in limited groups can do so. As high-
lighted by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) : “...during the interviews, many respondents
stressed the role of trust building before gifts and loans can take place”. To account for
this empirical fact, we postulate a pre-existing trust relationship in the population.
It is exogenous 11 to our model but it induces a network g. Risk sharing groups form
given only this network g. In the sequel we theorize the formation of homogenous
groups given a network.
Let N be the population (village). A coalition S is a non-empty subset of N . Two
distinct coalitions S, S ′ are overlapping if S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅. An overlapping individual is
one that belongs to at least two overlapping coalitions. A cover γ of N is a collection
10. All our results hold under the weaker condition that realized incomes are not perfectly corre-
lated.
11. We take the trust relationship network as exogenous to the model. We follow Fafchamps and
Gubert (2006, with Philippines data) who find no evidence for strategic formation of risk sharing
networks.
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of coalitions, S1, S2, . . . , Sm, such that
⋃m
k=1 Sk = N .
A network g is a list of unordered pairs (i, j) ∈ N ×N , ij for simplicity, i 6= j. Let G
be the set of all the networks. For all g ∈ G, define :
– N(g) ≡ {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N, ij ∈ g}
– D(g) ≡ {S ⊆ N(g) | ∀i, j ∈ S, ij ∈ g} as the set of all fully directly connected
subsets of N(g)
– Cl(g) ≡ {S ∈ D(g) | @S ′ ∈ D(g) s.t. S ⊂ S ′} as the set of cliques : maximal
directly connected subsets of N(g)
– I(g) ≡ N \N(g) as the set of all singletons that have no link in g
– a component C as a set of completely linked (directly or indirectly) elements of
N(g).
Definition 21. Given g ∈ G, the cover representation of g denotes the set γg ≡
I(g) ∪ Cl(g).
Remark 17. The definition of γg is indeed a representation of g. In Agbaglah (2011),
we show that for all g, g′ ∈ G, g 6= g′ ⇒ γg 6= γg′ . Thus, for all g ∈ G, we can use γg
as the cover representation of g. Since γg is a collection of coalitions formed by indi-
viduals who are directly linked, we use it to represent the collection of homogenous
overlapping groups originating from the network g. These groups are risk sharing
groups within which insurance is organized. Notice that not all covers can be repre-
sented by networks. For example covers such that some coalitions are included in
others cannot originate from networks.
In this chapter we consider only covers induced by networks. For example consider
a village with two ethnic groups G1 and G2 without common individuals (G1 ∩G2 =
∅). Suppose that all individuals in G1 are directly linked and so is the case in G2.
Furthermore, for some reason (marriage for example) one individual i ∈ G1 becomes
directly linked to all individuals in G2. Two individuals who trust each other are
directly linked. Let g denote the trust relationship network that obtains. From the
94
cover representation, γg = {G1, G′2} with G′2 = {i} ∪ G2, there are two informal
insurance groups : G1 and G′2. Individual i is an overlapping individual.
We follow the empirical findings by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) that informal
insurance homogenous groups are “institutions”. They are governed by norms. We
consider here multilateral norms unlike bilateral norms in BGR. In our setting, norms
consist of sharing rules and punishments.
4.2.3 Multilateral sharing rules
A multilateral sharing rule is an extension of a bilateral sharing rule (bilateral
norm in the setting of BGR) to more than two persons. In our setting, given g ∈ G,
a multilateral sharing rule specifies individual consumption within coalitions of γg
which are risk sharing groups originating from g. Each individual i ∈ N can only make
transfers to (or receive transfers from) a coalitional member. Notice that members of
the same coalition are all directly linked. Only overlapping individuals can make (or
receive) transfers across coalitions. Direct links from a pre-existing trust relationship
network convey transfers. As a result, there is no transfer flows across components (a
component is the set of completely linked –directly or indirectly linked– individuals).
For simplicity, we assume in the remainder that the same multilateral sharing rule
applies in coalitions belonging to the same component. We represent received transfers
by positive numbers and sent transfers by negative numbers.
Let S ∈ γg be a coalition. Let θ ∈ Θ be a state of nature. Let ziS(θ) denote the
net transfer from i within the coalition S. The overall transfer from an individual i
is denoted zi(θ) and defined by zi(θ) =
∑
i∈S, S∈γg z
i
S(θ). Notice that if i is not an
overlapping individual, zi(θ) = ziS(θ), S 3 i .
We assume that within a coalition, each individual can observe not only the realized
income but also the aggregate of transfers of all her coalitional members. 12
Let ci(θ) denote i’s consumption. Let cS(θ) ≡
(
ci(θ)
)
i∈S denote a vector of individual
12. In the village, ethnic groups or clans are so limited that it is easy to observe each one’s net
wealth. The same assumption is made in the bilateral setting by BGR.
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consumptions, yS(θ) ≡
(
yi(θ)
)
i∈S a vector of realized incomes, and zS(θ) ≡
(
zi(θ)
)
i∈S
a vector of overall transfers for all individuals in a coalition S. If there is no danger
of confusion, we will use variables without their argument θ.
Given a multilateral sharing in a coalition S ∈ γg, the distribution of individual
consumptions in S is defined by :
cS ≡
(
ci
)
i∈S =
(
yi + zi
)
i∈S .
According to the assumption below, each individual i ∈ S observes the aggregate of
transfers of all her coalitional members. We need to spend a little more time on the
special case of overlapping individuals. Overlapping individuals can make (or receive)
transfers outside of S. Therefore multilateral sharing rules need to be consistent in
the distribution of individual consumptions (see BGR for consistency conditions on
norms). In this chapter we are interested by two specific multilateral sharing rules
that we define below.
Definition 22. Let g be a network on a population N , S ∈ γg a coalition, and y a
realized income distribution.
Equal sharing rule. A multilateral sharing rule on S is the equal sharing rule
if and only if for all i ∈ S, ci = 1|S|
∑
l∈S y
l.
Equal consumption rule. A multilateral sharing rule on S is an equal consump-
tion rule if and only if there exists a level of consumption cS such that for all
i ∈ S, ci = cS.
Remark 18.
– (i) According to the equal sharing rule all individuals in S equally share their
aggregated income. Therefore, each individual in S consumes the average of the
realized incomes within S.
– (ii) According to the equal consumption rule, each individual in S consumes the
same amount of consumption good cS.
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– (iii) Given a coalition S, an equal consumption rule is not necessarily an equal
sharing rule over this coalition. Since overlapping individuals can make transfers
outside of S, cS can be different from the average of the realized incomes in S.
Therefore equal sharing rule is unique but an equal consumption rule is defined
by cS.
– (iv) The two multilateral norms in the definition verify consistency conditions
as defined in BGR.
Lemma 11. If S is a coalition such that none of its elements is overlapping, then a
consistent multilateral sharing rule on S is an equal consumption rule if and only if
it is the equal sharing rule.
Proof.
The necessary condition is straightforward because equal sharing rule is a specific
case of equal consumption rule where cS = 1s
∑
i∈S y
i, with s = |S|.
Now consider an equal consumption rule over S and the induced consumption cS. As
there is no overlapping individual in S,
∑
i∈S z
i = 0 (there is no transfer out of the
coalition). But, for each i ∈ S, we have cS = yi + zi. Therefore by summing up on all
i in S, scS =
∑
i∈S y
i. Hence, cS = 1s
∑
i∈S y
i. That shows the sufficient condition. 
Empirical works show that there is no full risk pooling at village level but only
some reduced size groups can fully share risk [Townsend (1994), Ligon et al. (2002),
Fafchamps and Lund (2003)]. Also, a desired sharing rule that minimizes the risk over
income variation in a group, equates consumption for all individuals in that group.
Thus, since no transfer is possible across components, we can consistently investigate
risk sharing only at the level of components. According to this observation, how can
we define a multilateral sharing rule on coalitions such that it equates consumption
for all individuals in components ?
Proposition 10. A consistent equal consumption rule within coalitions is equivalent
to equal sharing rule for components.
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Remark 19. A similar result is obtained by BGR in the bilateral setting and is well
expressed by DeWeerdt and Dercon (2005) : “...it can be shown that if every household
belongs to a network and all these networks overlap with each other (have some
common members), then full insurance within the confines of the separate networks
necessarily implies Pareto-efficiency at village-level”.
Proof.
Equal sharing for all linked individuals means that each individual receives the same
amount of consumption good that is the mean of the realized income. Therefore in
every coalition, each individual consumes the same amount of consumption good.
Thus, the sharing rule is an equal consumption rule.
On the other hand, a component can be viewed (in terms of transfer) as big coalition
where the net transfer among no linked individuals is zero. Then according to the
previous lemma, we obtain equal sharing for all the linked individuals. 
In the sequel, we consider equal sharing on components. The same assumption is used
in Genicot and Ray (2002). This is a strong assumption. However, in Section 4.5, we
develop a realistic procedure to obtain equal sharing at component level.
4.2.4 Preferences
Most of empirical papers find difficulties to explain the distribution of individual
consumption following a shock in income, even if there is evidence for risk sharing.
For example, Ligon et al. (2002) show that wealthier households tend to consume less
than what they should. One explanation of that is the functional form of the utility
function that is used. Unlike a bulk of the literature, we state that individuals may
not only prefer consumption goods, but also have preferences over other goods that
are not necessarily convertible into consumption. The example we have in mind is
social privileges. In rural communities, people enjoy social privileges like : respect,
visits, helps in one’s farm, high influence on decision making, high audience in village
assembly. It may be the case that wealthier individuals, even if they consume less by
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sharing goods with others, gain in return social privileges that they value. Therefore,
their overall outcome is higher. Thus using preferences defined only over consump-
tion may underestimate outcomes. We will generally denote these social privileges (or
everything similar) as externalities. 13
We endow each individual with a utility function that depends not only on the
consumption good, but also on the architecture of the network. For example, the
more the direct links, the more the social influence in the community (BGR address
this as monotonicity with the idea that this is convertible into consumption good.
Here we state that individuals value these social privileges but not as consumption).
That pattern exhibits positive externalities. Following Ambrus et al. (2010), we state
that these externalities arise not at the village level, but at the level of homogenous
“islands” which are represented by coalitions in our setting. We borrow from Ambrus
et al. (2010) that external effects are substitutes to the consumption good. The dif-
ference in our model resides in the fact that we do not allow here the external good
to be convertible in consumption. Thus, we endow each individual with a separable
additive function Ui(c, g) = ui(c) + fi(g) where ui is a smooth function, 14 strictly
concave and increasing. For simplicity, in the sequel ui ≡ u for all i. The second part
fi is a smooth function, increasing in the number of directs links of i. For simplicity,
fi(g) ≡ f(di(g)), where di(g) is the number of direct links of i. Furthermore, we set
that fi(∅) = f(0) = 0 : an isolated individual (singleton) is not subject to external
effects.
Introducing externalities is not only motivated by descriptive perspectives. Later in
the chapter, we show that externalities stand as compensation to overlapping indivi-
duals for their effort to spread wealth towards coalitions.
13. We use the word externalities in our model because we have in mind that trust relationships
are not built strategically to share risk (also empirically found by Fafchamps and Gubert, 2006, with
Philippines villages). Therefore, the side effects of social privileges (for example) come as externalities
because insurance addresses initially consumption only.
14. We have in mind f defined over the continuous set of real numbers
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Remark 20. Since transfers and externalities across components are no allowed in
our model, in the remainder we limit ourselves to networks such that all individuals
are directly or indirectly linked. 15 These are networks with only one component.
4.2.5 Enforcement constraints
Insurance is said to be informal because it is not formally regulated : no signed
paper, no effective collateral, no court. Thus, in some realized states, some indivi-
duals who benefit from positive transfers in the past may find it suboptimal to make
transfers back when they are called for that. Therefore they may renege on their pres-
cribed duty. If that happens, we say that these individuals deviate. For an informal
insurance arrangement to survive, we need some self-enforcement constraints in order
to discourage such an opportunist behavior. The literature is not unanimous on the
appropriate reaction following a deviation. The most common punishment schemes
that exist in the literature are what BGR denote as the strong punishment and the
weak punishment. 16
Definition 23. If an individual i deviates :
– The strong punishment consists of the severance of all links with i in all coali-
tions that victims belong to.
– The weak punishment consists of the severance of only the links between the
deviator and the victims.
Notice that in the sense of link severance, any other possible punishment stands
between the strong punishment (the strongest possible) and the weak punishment
(the weakest possible).
Formally, for all i ∈ N , let S i ≡ (⋃S3i,S∈γg S) \ {i}. An individual i can only deviate
15. This limitation is made for simplicity. For networks that admit more than one components,
risk sharing will be studied component by component. Remember that there is neither transfers, nor
externalities across components. After all this assumption is not unrealistic. In Tanzanian villages for
example, De Weerdt and Dercon (2005) noticed that there is no isolated subnetwork of households.
16. BGR explore also intermediate punishment schemes that we will discuss at the end of the
chapter.
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to a set D ⊆ S i. Let ciD denote i’s current consumption if she deviates to a set D.
Depending on the punishment, severance of links will induce a residual network gR,
and a residual consumption ciR. Thus, i decides to deviate if the gain from the pair
(ci, g) is less than the gain from the pair (ciD, gR). Let V i(g) be the expected per period
payoff of i from the next period on if she abides by the sharing rule, and V i(gR) the
expected per period payoff of i from the next period on if she deviates.
To discourage individuals to systematically deviate, the gain of deviating today should
be less than the actual value of the loss following the punishment from the next day
on.
Definition 24. Given g ∈ G, an informal insurance organization (IIOg in the re-
mainder) is the institution defined by γg and a multilateral norm (multilateral sharing
rule and punishment scheme) that governs behavior in the coalitions of γg.
– IIOg is stable if and only if it is immune to individual deviations. Formally,
IIOg is stable if and only if
(1− δ)Ui
(
ci(θ0), g
)
+ δV i(g) > (1− δ)Ui
(
ciD(θ0), g
)
+ δV i(gR)
for all θ0 ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , D ⊆ S i, and gR ⊂ g.
– IIOg is weak-stable if it is stable and the punishment scheme is the strong pu-
nishment.
– IIOg is strong-stable if it is stable and the punishment scheme is the weak pu-
nishment.
In the remainder, we denote by β the tuple β ≡ (θ0, i, D, gR), and B the collection
of all such tuples.
4.3 Stability
Stability of an informal insurance organization, in the sense of no deviation, de-
pends on the punishment scheme. In this section we investigate stability under weak
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punishment and also under strong punishment. Remember that any other punishment
scheme is in between these two. Specifically we provide conditions for either stability
and we investigate how this stability is affected by some factors : discounting, network
architecture, preferences.
Lemma 12. For all g ∈ G, IIOg is stable if and only if
Ui
(
ciD(θ), g
)− Ui(ci(θ), g) < δ
(1− δ) [V
i(g)− V i(gR)]
The same result is obtained in different contexts by Coate and Ravallion (1993),
and by BGR. The clue is that, an IIO is stable if and only if following the prescribed
sharing rule is more worthy than cheating. This is nothing but the conditions for a
self enforcing stable agreement.
4.3.1 Characteristics of stable IIOs
In this section we provide general conditions for stability. When contemplating
deviation, an individual takes into account not only the loss of future coverage due
to punishments that will follow her action, but also losses in terms of external effects
(social privileges).
Proposition 11. IIOg is stable if and only if for all β ∈ B,
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)−u(ci(θ0)) < δ
1− δ
{∑
θ
p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)−u(ciR(θ))]}+ δ1− δ{f(di(g))−f(di(gR))}
(4.1)
Interpretation.
This proposition shows indeed the existence of two consequences following devia-
tion. The first direct consequence is the loss of consumption smoothing coverage.
The second indirect consequence is the loss of social privileges as external effects.
For example an individual who values more social privileges will be less tempted to
deviate, even if in terms of consumption, deviation will not harm him as much as
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making his prescribed transfer. After all, Proposition 12 shows that IIOg is stable if
and only if the gain from defection today in term of consumption is less than the
actual value of the combined effect of both direct and indirect consequences.
Proof.
IIOg is stable ⇔ ∀β ∈ B,
Ui
(
ciD(θ), g
)− Ui(ci(θ), g) < δ(1−δ) [V i(g)− V i(gR)]
⇔ u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0)) < δ1−δ{∑θ p(θ)[u(ci(θ))−u(ciR(θ))]+f(di(g))−f(di(gR))},
obtained from Ui(c, g) = u(c) + f
(
di(g)
)
. 
Let g be a network and γg the cover representation of g. We denote by SS the set of
all networks g such that IIOg is strong-stable and by WS the set of all networks g
such that IIOg is weak-stable.
Proposition 12. For all g ∈ G, if γg is strong-stable, then γg is weak-stable. The
converse is not true. This is SS ⊆ WS.
Proof.
The proof is by contraposition. Suppose that IIOg is not weak-stable. There exists
β = (θ0, i, D, gR) ∈ B, such that
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)−u(ci(θ0)) ≥ δ
1− δ
{∑
θ
p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)−u(ciR(θ))]}+ δ1− δ{fi(g)−fi(gR)},
where gR is the network obtained after the strong punishment following i’s devia-
tion to D. Let gR′ denote the network that obtains in the same context with the
weak punishment. Obviously, gR ⊆ gR′ , and the expected residual consumption
for i following the weak punishment,
∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ciR′(θ)
)
, is obviously not less than
what obtains in the strong punishment case. Therefore, f
(
di(gR)
) ≤ f(di(gR′)),
and
∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ciR(θ)
) ≤∑θ p(θ)u(ciR′(θ)) since incomes realizations are independent.
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Thus,
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)−u(ci(θ0)) ≥ δ
1− δ
{∑
θ
p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)−u(ciR′(θ))]}+ δ1− δ{f(di(g))−f(di(gR′))}.
Hence, IIOg is not strong-stable.
Counterexample
The counterexample is obtained for g as the complete network of 3 individuals, f(x) =
x , two possible income realizations 0 and 1 with equal probability, u(c) = c − λc2,
λ = 0.4, δ = 0.2 . 
It is interesting to know the conditions under which the converse is true. Even if it is
no obvious to specify these condition, the following corollary identifies some networks
where the equivalence holds. A tree is a network with no cycles. If g is a tree, the
highest completely connected sets are of size 2.
Corollary 4. If g is a tree, then IIOg is strong-stable if and only if it is weak-stable.
Proof.
The proof relies on the fact that if g is a tree, then strong and weak punishments
result in the same residual network gR. The conclusion comes from the previous proof.

Let PS denote the set of networks g such that IIOg is stable under any other inter-
mediate punishment scheme P . How can we compare PS to SS and WS.
Corollary 5. SS ⊆ PS ⊆ WS
Proof.
Following the proof of Proposition 13, for any punishment scheme P and the residual
network gR”, we have gR ⊆ gR′′ ⊆ gR′ . Thus the results follows from the same steps
as in the proof of Proposition 13. 
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From this result above, we obtain a set interval of networks that induce stable
IIOs. The lower bound is SS and the upper bound is WS.
Discounting is a key factor in the evaluation of deviation gain versus punishment
loss when an individual contemplates deviation. As this is an intertemporal arbitrage,
the discount factor matters for stability. Most of the economics literature on infor-
mal insurance studies stability only under extreme values of δ. Most of the time δ
is assumed close to unity. This is very restrictive since experimental studies show
that δ varies widely among individuals and geographical regions. To accommodate all
possible economies, we investigate stability without imposing restrictions on δ.
First, we make the following observations.
Observation 1. Extreme values of discounting
Everything equal,
 If δ is high enough, then for all g ∈ G, each IIOg is stable (Kimball, 1988, Ligon et
al., 2002, BGR weak stability for all networks and strong stability for trees).
 If δ is low enough, then no IIO is stable. 17
Proof.
Fix β ∈ B, and let
Fβ(δ) ≡ (1−δ)
[
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)−u(ci(θ0))]−δ{∑θ p(θ)[u(ci(θ))−u(ciR(θ))]+f(di(g))−
f
(
di(gR)
)}
.
Notice that u
(
ciD(θ0)
)− u(ci(θ0)) > 0 because if i deviates, she consumes more than
the prescribed amount of consumption. Also,
∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
) − u(ciR(θ))] > 0 be-
cause the residual expected utility over consumption is less than the expected utility
corresponding to the whole set N . Finally, f
(
di(g)
) − f(di(gR)) > 0 because f is
decreasing. From Proposition 13, IIOg is stable iff for all β ∈ B, Fβ(δ) < 0.
For a fixed β, Fβ is differentiable and decreasing. Furthermore, use the continuity of
Fβ in the interval [0, 1] and the fact that Fβ(0) > 0 and Fβ(1) < 0 to obtain that
17. This observation is not common in economics literature on informal insurance because attention
is rather focused on highest values of δ.
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there exists δβ and δ′β respectively such that Fβ(δβ) > 0 and Fβ(δ′β) < 0. As B is
finite, take respectively the lowest δ′β for the second part of Observation 1, and the
highest δ′β for the first part of Observation 1. 
As it is mostly the case in the literature, the two results in Observation 1 are
obtained under the strong assumptions of δ → 1 or δ → 0. However, for intermediate
values of δ stability is not obvious. This depends mostly on the characteristics of the
preferences, and the characteristics of g. Since discounting is an individual behavior,
one need to derive stability results without assumptions on the value of δ.
4.3.2 Non-extreme values of the discount factor
Given a punishment scheme, Proposition 12 suggests that stability depends on
some other factors including discounting, the architecture of the network g, and pre-
ferences (utility over consumption, externalities).
Stability and discount factor
In Observation 1, we show that for lower values of δ, SS = WS = ∅ whereas
for higher values of δ, SS = WS = G. We can guess from this result a positive
relationship between discounting and the size of stable IIOs. The following shows
formally this monotonic result and also the existence of a threshold value of δ from
where IIOg is stable for all g ∈ G.
Corollary 6. The number of networks that induce stable IIOs increases with δ. Fur-
thermore, for all g ∈ G, there exists δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ0, 1), IIOg is
stable.
Proof.
We prove first the second part of the corollary.
From the previous proof, for a fixed β, Fβ is continuous and decreasing on [0, 1],
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Fβ(0) > 0, and Fβ(1) < 0. By the intermediate value theorem there exists δβ ∈ [0, 1]
such that Fβ(δβ) = 0. As B is finite, let δ0 be the maximum value of such δβ’s. Fβ
being decreasing, for all δ > δ0, Fβ(δ) < 0 and this holds for all β. Therefore, IIOg is
stable for all g ∈ G.
The first part of the corollary is due to the fact that for a fixed β, Fβ is decreasing.
Let IIOkg be the IIOg of a community which discounts the future at the rate δk,
k = 1, 2 with δ2 > δ1. We have IIO1g is stable iff for all β ∈ B, Fβ(δ1) < 0. As δ2 > δ1,
Fβ(δ
2) < 0. Thus IIO2g is stable. 
Notice that the threshold value δ0 defined in Corollary 6 depends on the network g.
It is interesting to identify networks that correspond to some specific values of this
threshold value.
Theorem 10. Stability is obtained with the lowest δ0 if and only if g is the complete
network.
Proof.
From the proof of Observations 1, given a network g, δ0 = Maxβ
{
δβ
}
.
First, let g be the complete network and g′ 6= g. For all i ∈ N , di(g) ≥ di(g′). As
f is decreasing, for all i ∈ N , f(di(g)) ≥ f(di(g′)). Since D defines ciR, and di(gR),
everything equal,
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
+
∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)
−u
(
ciR(θ)
)]
+f
(
di(g)
)
−f
(
di(gR)
) ≤
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
+
∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)
−u
(
ciR(θ)
)]
+f
(
di(g′)
)
−f
(
di(gR)
) . Therefore by maximizing
over all β ∈ B, we obtain a lower δ0 with g. As g′ is arbitrary, then δ0 is the lowest
possible.
Second, δβ =
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
+
∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)
−u
(
ciR(θ)
)]
+f
(
di(g)
)
−f
(
di(gR)
) .
Let A ≡ u(ciD(θ0))−u(ci(θ0)), B ≡∑θ p(θ)[u(ci(θ))−u(ciR(θ))], and C ≡ f(di(g))−
f
(
di(g
′)
)
. Therefore the candidate g is such that A is minimal and B+C is maximal
because δβ is increasing in A and decreasing in B +C. As D defines CiR, and di(gR),
if we maximize over θ0 and D, we obtain ciD = yh, the highest income in Y , for θ0
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such that only i gets yh and all others get yl, the lowest income in Y . Thus di(gR) = 0
and the residual set is the singleton set. Therefore, the lowest value of δ0 is obtained
for the network g such that for all i, di(g) is maximal. This is di(g) = n− 1 and this
is nothing but the complete network where each individual has exactly n − 1 direct
links. 
In the theorem, we identify a relation between complete networks and δ0. As similar
result is found by BGR in the bilateral setting. It is interesting to generally investi-
gate possible correlations between the architecture of the network g and δ0. We start
this investigation by the following observation.
Observation 2.
 For weak stability, the following characteristics of the preexisting network g influence
δ0 :
(i) the number of individual links in g is decreasing in δ0 ;
(ii) the number of overlapping individuals in g is increasing in δ0 ;
(iii) the number of overlapping individuals in g is decreasing in δ0.
 For strong stability, apart from the previous characteristics of the preexisting net-
work g that influence δ0, the number of distinct overlapping individuals in the same
clique in g is positively correlated to δ0.
Proof.
From Fβ(δ) defined in the proof of the observations, we obtain
F (δ∗) = 0⇔ δ∗ = u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)
−u
(
ci(θ0)
)
+
∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)
−u
(
ciR(θ)
)]
+f
(
di(g)
)
−f
(
di(gR)
) .
For a fixed β, the solution δ∗ exists and is in (0, 1) because the denominator is
positive and is greater than the positive numerator. Take δ0 ≡ Maxβ
{
δ∗
}
. As B
is finite, δ0 exists. This value δ0 depends on g. Let A ≡ u
(
ciD(θ0)
) − u(ci(θ0)),
B ≡ ∑θ p(θ)[u(ci(θ)) − u(ciR(θ))], and C ≡ f(di(g)) − f(di(g′)). Therefore the
108
candidate g is such that A is minimal and B +C is maximal because δ∗ is increasing
in A and decreasing in B + C.
• Weak stability.
If i ∈ N is a non-overlapping individual, A, B and di(gR) are constant for all g.
Therefore the candidate g is such that di(g) is the highest for all non-overlapping
individuals.
If i ∈ N is an overlapping individual, the result is not straightforward. Networks
that minimize A, maximize B if and only if there are several cliques and few other
overlapping individuals.
• Strong stability.
Apart from the previous conditions for weak stability, add that networks that mi-
nimize A are with few links. If we fix B + C to be maximal, then each individual
deviates to all the linked parterres in case of deviation. Therefore, the networks with
highest di(g) for all is are the candidates. 
The combined effect of characteristics enumerated in Observation 2 is unknown.
This combined effect depends on the parameters of the functionals u and f . To fix
ideas on this combined effect, we simulate stability conditions for six distinct 8-person
networks (Figure 4.1). 18 We select three network characterizations that embody the
influential factors. These are sparseness, clustering and density. The sparseness co-
efficient of a network quantifies how sparse it is. 19 The density keeps track of the
relative fraction of links that are present in the network. The clustering is a measure
of cliquishness, that accounts for the number and size of cliques of a networks. 20
As we can see from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, sparseness seems to be irrelevant for
18. The first five networks are obtained thank to BGR
19. See BGR for details on Sparseness.
20. Details of these measures can be found in Jackson (2008).
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stability.
For weak stability, apart from the circle, number of links and density characterize
tend to be negatively correlated to δ0. The combined effect of these characteristics
places the circle (8 overlapping individuals and 8 links) below the star (1 overlapping
individual and 7 links) and the simple tree (7 overlapping individual and 7 links).
For strong stability, apart from the bridge (2 overlapping individuals and 13 links) and
the circle, number of links, density, and clustering tend to be negatively correlated to
δ0.
Figure 4.1 – Examples of 8-person networks : (1) Simple tree, (2) Circle, (3) Two-
neighbors, (4) Complete, (5) Bridge, (6) Star
Network Characteristics δ0
Sparseness Links Clustering Density
Complete 1 28 1 1.00 0.18
Two-neighbors 2 16 0.5 0.57 0.28
Bridge 1 13 0.8 0.46 0.53
Star 0 7 0 0.25 0.56
Simple tree 0 7 0 0.25 0.58
Circle 6 8 0 0.29 0.62
Table 4.1 – Weak stability, network characteristics, and discount factor
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Network Characteristics δ0
Sparseness Links Clustering Density
Complete 1 28 1 1.00 0.26
Two-neighbors 2 16 0.5 0.57 0.54
Star 0 7 0 0.25 0.56
Simple tree 0 7 0 0.25 0.58
Bridge 1 13 0.8 0.46 0.58
Circle 6 8 0 0.29 0.62
Table 4.2 – Strong stability, network characteristics, and discount factor
To conclude, the simulation results confirm what we formally show, that the com-
plete network corresponds to the lowest δ0. Furthermore, the reversion of the Bridge
and the Star in the ordering of δ0 from the weak-stability and the strong-stability sug-
gests that there is no obvious monotonic relationship between network architecture
and stability.
Network architecture, preference, and stability
In the previous section, we observe that the relationship between the architecture
of the network and stability, depends on the punishment scheme. In the following
theorem we provide comparative statics for weak stability.
Theorem 11. Consider a network g ∈ G. Let g1 be a network obtained from g by
adding links such that the number of overlapping individuals is not greater than in g.
If IIOg is weak-stable, then IIOg1 is also weak-stable.
Proof.
First, let i be a non-overlapping individual. We write the stability condition as fol-
lows. Let θ0 be a state where the incentive to deviate is the highest,
− δ
1−δf
(
di(g)
)
< u
(
ci(θ0)
)
+ δ
1−δ
∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ci(θ)
)−[u(ciD(θ0))+ δ1−δ∑θ p(θ)u(ciR(θ))+
δ
1−δf
(
di(gR)
)]
.
In case of deviation, i lives in autarky from the next period on according to the
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strong punishment. For this reason, she deviates to all possible linked partners. Thus,
the RHS of the inequation is constant. From the facts that f is increasing and that
di(g
1) ≥ di(g) , the stability condition obtains for all such i with g1.
Second, let i be an overlapping individual. Individual i faces the same conditions
as for g. Furthermore her incentive to deviate is less because f is increasing and
di(g
1) ≥ di(g). 
Corollary 7. If g is a circle and IIOg is weak-stable, then each IIOg′ such that g is
a subnetwork of g′ is also weak-stable. Especially the IIO obtained from the complete
network is also weak-stable.
Proof.
It is sufficient to notice that the number of overlapping individuals in g′ is not greater
than g. Furthermore, g′ = Maxg′′
{
g′′ ⊇ g} is the complete network. 
In the following we investigate how preferences over consumption affect stability. To
begin, we make the following observations.
Observation 3 : preferences over consumption
 Individuals in weak-stable IIOs are characterized by individuals with high aversion
to risk and low marginal utility over consumption.
 Apart from the previous characteristics, individuals in strong-stable IIOs are cha-
racterized by high valuations of social privileges (external effects).
Remark 21. Observation 3 is a natural result. In fact, highly risk averse individuals
value more smooth consumption. Therefore, their incentive to deviate is low as the
punishment becomes more and more severe. On the other hand, if the punishment is
weak, according to equal consumption, an individual can sever enough links without
damaging consumption smoothing coverage. Therefore stability is reinforced by the
external effects only.
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Proof.
• Weak stability : strong punishment
If i is a non-overlapping individual, δ
1−δ
{∑
θ p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)− u(ciR(θ))]+ f(di(g))−
f
(
di(gR)
)} ≡ Constant. Therefore the stability condition is equivalent to u(yi(θ0))−
u
(
c(θ0)
)
< Constant. Because according to the strong punishment, in case of devia-
tion, i deviates to all. The second order Taylor expansion yields
u(yi) − u(c) ' (yi − c)u′(c) + 1
2
(yi − c)2u′′(c). This implies that u(yi) − u(c) '
(yi − c)u′(c)[1 − 1
2
(yi − c)u′′(c)
u′(c)
]
. The quotient u
′′(c)
u′(c) is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk
aversion coefficient.
If i is a overlapping individual, the stability condition is equivalent to
[
u
(
ciD(θ0)
) −
u
(
c(θ0)
)]
+ δ
1−δ
[∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ciR(θ)
)
+ f
(
di(gR)
)]
< Constant. For the same level of ciR
and di(gR), the LHS is low if u
(
ciD(θ0)
)− u(c(θ0)) is low.
• Strong stability : weak punishment
In this case,
[
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)−u(c(θ0))]+ δ1−δ [∑θ p(θ)u(ciR(θ))+f(di(gR))−f(di(g))] <
Constant. Apart from what we describe in the weak stability case, the key element
for stability here is −f(di(g). For a given level of di(g), high f(·) yields low LHS and
therefore, strong stability. 
In our setting, individual preferences are defined not only on consumption but also
on social privileges. Therefore, we investigate in the next section the impact of exter-
nalities on stability.
Stability and externalities
Consider a benchmark model with no externalities. Given g ∈ G, IIOg is stable if
and only if for all θ0 ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , and D ⊆ S i,
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)− u(ci(θ0)) < δ
1− δ
{∑
θ
p(θ)
[
u
(
ci(θ)
)− u(ciR(θ))]}, (4.2)
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First, if we consider weak punishment, the incentive to deviate is very high in a model
without externalities. As far as a the residual network following a deviation indirectly
connect an individual to others, she will deviate whenever she has a high realized in-
come : the punishment will not harm her in terms of future consumption. The reason
is that it is sufficient to have only one link to be indirectly connected to the whole
community and benefit from smooth consumption coverage. Thus, the only possible
stable IIOs are such that the preexisting network is a tree. This result is also obtained
by BGR and Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). But in real life, not only tree-based IIOs
are stable ! In a model with externalities, if an individual breaks a link, even if she
has the same average consumption in the future, she will suffer from the lack of social
privileges (external effects).
Secondly, if we consider strong punishment, each individual who belongs to only one
coalition will hardly deviate. In fact when contemplating deviation, she finds that not
only will she lose consumption smoothing, but also social privileges (external effects).
Furthermore, overlapping individuals are key actors of risk pooling. For example in a
model without externalities, an overlapping individual who is the only one to convey
transfers from one coalition to another has a high incentive to deviate. He can collect
transfers from one collection and keep them instead of giving them back to another
coalition. If overlapping individuals keep playing their role of wealth spreading across
coalitions, it may be because they find compensations for that. One way to deal with
that is to impose exogenously that overlapping individuals must not deviate. But,
since we want a model that is completely self-enforcing, imposing externality solves
the case. With externalities, an individual who belongs to several coalitions has se-
veral direct links and somehow she values these links. If the external effect is high
enough, no overlapping individual has the incentive to deviate.
We quantify externalities by the utility loss following a link severance. The idea is
that if an individual values direct links, she suffers from losing them. In practice,
whenever an individual lose a link, she lose part of her social privileges. Formally, let
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C ≡Maxx∈{1,2,...,n}
{
f(x)−f(x−1)} be the maximal utility cost of losing one link for
the same amount of consumption. We denote C by external cost. Since f is increasing,
C is positive. Notice that if f is concave, C = f(1) because f(0) = 0.
To view the importance of the external cost, Figure 3 below shows an illustration ob-
tained from an IIO {S1, S2}, with S1∩S2 = {i}. It turns out that in a model without
externalities, the overlapping individual i has a high incentive to deviate in the coa-
lition with the lowest per-capita income realization. By introducing externalities and
increasing the external cost, there is a level of externalities where everything equal,
no individual can afford consequences of a deviation. From this threshold on, the
IIO is stable. Parameters of the illustration are : Y {0, 1}, u(c) = c − λc2, λ = 0.49,
δ = 0.8,|S1| = 10, |S2| = 2. There are two levels of income, h=1 with probability
p=0.5 and l=0. The external part is obtained by f(di) = α× di. Thus, C = α.
As we can see on Figure 4.2, there is no stability for small values of C until C reaches
a threshold. The Figure 4.2 suggests a positive relationship between external cost and
stability.
Figure 4.2 – Stability and external effects
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In the following we show that the positive relationship between the external cost and
stability that we observe on Figure 4.2 is a general result.
Theorem 12. If the external cost C is high enough, then all IIOg is stable for all
g ∈ G.
Proof.
The stability condition
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)− u(ci(θ0)) < δ1−δ{∑θ p(θ)[u(ci(θ))− u(ciR(θ))]+ f(di(g))− f(di(gR))}
implies that
u
(
ciD(θ0)
) − u(ci(θ0)) + δ1−δ∑θ p(θ)u(ciR(θ)) < δ1−δ{∑θ p(θ)u(ci(θ)) + f(di(g)) −
f
(
di(gR)
)}
.
The LHS is a functional of the realized state of the nature. Since the number of
states is finite, let M ≡ Maxθ0
{
u
(
ciD(θ0)
)− u(ci(θ0))+ δ1−δ∑θ p(θ)u(ciR(θ))}. Also
notice that L =
∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ci(θ)
)
is constant. Thus, the stability condition becomes
f
(
di(g)
) − f(di(gR)) > K where K = δ1−δ (M − L). If there is a deviation by i,
di(gR) ≤ di(g)−1. Thus, f
(
di(g)
)−f(di(gR)) ≥ f(di(g))−f(di(g)−1). The RHS of
this inequality is constant if f is a linear functional. Otherwise, let the external effect
be determined by the maximum value of the RHS computed over 1, . . . , n. This is C.
It is sufficient to have C > K to obtain stability. 
The theorem above shows that introducing externalities in the model is an impor-
tant feature and can explain the puzzling effect obtained by Ligon et al. (2002) that
wealthier households tend to consume less. As far as wealthier households also have
higher external cost, the puzzle is solved.
4.4 Application
In this section we investigate the role of exogenous parameters of the model re-
garding stability. Specifically, we study the impacts on stability of : income level,
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probability of income realizations, risk aversion, and external cost. In order to iso-
late these impacts, we consider a specific preexisting network. The architecture of
this network is designed to summarize as simply as possible all the key features of
multiple overlapping networks.
We borrow from De Weerdt and Dercon (2005) a specification of the preexisting
network g that is composed of two complete subnetworks connected by one over-
lapping individual. The corresponding cover representation is γg ≡ {N1, N2} with
|Nj| = nj and N1 ∩ N2 = {o}. Individual o is the only overlapping individual. We
consider two levels of income, yh realized with probability p, and yl with probability
1−p such that yh > yl > 0. The utility function is by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007),
u(c) = c− λc2. The coefficient λ increases with the risk aversion. For u to be strictly
increasing and concave, we need 0 < λ < 1
2yh
. We consider a linear function to model
externalities : f(x) = αx, with α > 0. Thus the external cost is C = α. For simplicity,
we set yl ≡ y and yh ≡ y + d, with d > 0.
The set of parameters we examine in the sequel is P ≡ {y, d, p, λ, α, n1, n2}.
4.4.1 Comparative static properties
The following lemma establishes the stability condition for the application.
Lemma 13.
Given g ∈ G, IIOg is stable if and only if for all k ∈ {n, n1, n2} :
For weak-stability,
(i) d( k
n
− 1
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+d( k
n
+ 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λ( 1
n−k+1− 1n)d2p(1−p)+α(nj−1)
}
.
For strong-stability, (i) and the additional condition,
(ii) d( 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d( 3
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δα
This proposition per se does not mean much in terms of interpretation. However, it
induce interesting comparative static properties that we present in Proposition 14.
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Proof.
The consumption dictated by the equal consumption rule is ci(θ0) = 1n
∑
yi(θ0).
• Weak stability
Weak-stability corresponds to strong punishment.
If i ∈ Nj and i 6= o :
di(g) = nj − 1 and di(gR) = 0
R is autarky. Thus, ciR(θ) =
y + d with probability py with probability 1− p
In case of deviation, the best strategy is to deviate to all in order to keep yi.
Thus, ciD(θ0) = yi(θ0).
Notice that i deviates if and only if her income realization is y+ d. And if 0 < m < n
individuals obtain y+ d, F (m) ≡ u(y+ d)−u(m(y+d)+(n−m)y
n
)
= d(1− m
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+
d(1 + m
n
)
)]
.
F is decreasing in m and therefore is maximized for m = 1. Thus, i has high income
realization, and all the other individuals have low income realization.
Furthermore,∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ciR(θ)
)
= pu(y + d) + (1− p)u(y) = pd+ y − λ(y2 + 2pdy + pd2), and∑
θ p(θ)u
(
ci(θ)
)
= y + dp− λ(y2 + 2dpy + d2p
n
(1 + (n− 1)p)).
Thus, the stability condition for i is
d(1 − m
n
)
[
1 − λ(2y + d(1 + m
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
pd2(1 − p) + α(nj − 1)
}
for all m such
that 0 < m < n.
Hence for m = 1, d(1− 1
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+ d(1 + 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
pd2(1− p) +α(nj − 1)
}
.
For o, the overlapping individual, do(g) = n− 1. Either D ⊂ Nj and do(gR) = n−nj,
or D ⊂ N1 ∪N2 and do(gR) = 0.
If D ⊂ Nj, by deviating only to D, o still be with Nj′ . The stability condition is
d(1 − m
n
)
[
1 − λ(2y + d(1 + m
n
)
)] − j′ − λ( − 2j′(y + d) + 2j′) < δ1−δ{λ( 1n−nj+1) −
1
n)
)pd2(1 − p) + α(nj − 1)
}
for all m such that 0 < m < n. Where j′ is the transfer
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that o makes in the other coalition.
Thus for m = 1, j′ = (nj′ − 1) dn = (1− njn )d, and the stability condition for o is
d(1− 1
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+ d(1 + 1
n
)
)]− d(1− nj
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+ d(1 + nj
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λ( 1
n−nj+1) −
1
n)
)pd2(1− p) + α(nj − 1)
}
, what is equivalent to
d(
nj
n
− 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d(nj
n
+ 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λ( 1
n−nj+1 − 1n)pd2(1− p) + α(nj − 1)
}
.
If D ⊂ N1 ∪N2, the stability condition is
d(1 − m
n
)
[
1 − λ(2y + d(1 + m
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
pd2(1 − p) + α(n − 1)} for all m such
that 0 < m < n.
Thus, for m = 1, d(1− 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y+ d(1 + 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
pd2(1− p) +α(n− 1)} .
To summarize, weak-stability is equivalent to
(i) d(1− 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d(1 + 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
d2p(1− p) + α(nj − 1)
}
(ii) d(nj
n
− 1
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+d(nj
n
+ 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λ( 1
n−nj+1 − 1n)d2p(1−p) +α(nj−1)
}
(iii) d(1− 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d(1 + 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λn−1
n
d2p(1− p) + α(n− 1)
}
Notice that n > nj. Therefore, (i) implies (iii).
• Strong stability
For strong-stability, either i 6= o deviate to nj − 1 others and stays alone (correspon-
ding to strong punishment) or deviates to 0 < l < nj−1 others except o and still be in
connection the whole community (so i will not face the direct effect of punishment).
As for o, either she deviates to n−1 or to nj−1(corresponding to strong punishment),
or she deviates to 0 < l < n− 1 (with D ⊂ N1 ∪N2) and she is still linked with the
whole community.
As we pointed out earlier, the state where the deviation gain is maximal corresponds
to m = 1. Thus, strong-stability condition is
d(1− 1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d(1 + 1
n
)
)]− l − λ(− 2l(y + d) + 2l ) < δ1−δαl.
Where l is the transfer that the deviator fails to make to l individuals. In the state
where m = 1, l = n−1−ln d (because if the transfer to o is not made, i 6= o will not
benefit from the consumption smoothing) for i 6= o, and l = n−1−ln d for o.
Thus strong-stability is equivalent to the weak-stability conditions plus
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d( l
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d( l+2
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δαl. But l > 0, so d(
1
n
)
[
1− λ(2y + d( l+2
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δα.
The LHS is a decreasing function of l. For all l the condition must be verified, then it
must be the case for the maximum value of LHS. This value is obtained with the mini-
mum value of l which is l = 1. Thus, the stability condition is d( 1
n
)
[
1−λ(2y+d( 3
n
)
)]
<
δ
1−δα. 
We remind the reader that set of parameters we investigate is P ≡ {y, d, p, λ, α, n1, n2}.
In the sequel, for each x ∈ P , we use the notation (IIOg, xk) to designate the IIOg
where, everything equal, the parameter x takes the value xk.
Proposition 13. Comparative statics
a) Income
Let y ≡ y1 and y ≡ y2 be two values of the low income realization such that y2 > y1.
If (IIOg, y1) is stable, then (IIOg, y2) is also stable.
b) Externalities
Let α ≡ α1 and α ≡ α2 be two values of the externality function coefficient such that
α2 > α1.
If (IIOg, α1) is stable, then (IIOg, α2) is also stable.
c) Probability of income realization
Let p ≡ p1 and p ≡ p2 be two values of the probability of realization of the high income
such that p2 > p1.
– For 0.5 > p2 > p1, if (IIOg, p1) is stable, then (IIOg, p2) is also stable.
– For p2 > p1 > 0.5, if (IIOg, p2) is stable, then (IIOg, p1) is also stable.
d) Risk aversion
Let λ ≡ λ1 and λ ≡ λ2 be two values of the risk aversion coefficient such that λ2 > λ1.
If (IIOg, λ1) is stable, then (IIOg, λ2) is also stable.
e) Size of coalition
Let nj ≡ n1j and nj ≡ n2j be two values of the size of the coalition Nj, j = 1, 2 such
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that n2j > n1j with n constant.
If (IIOg, n1j) is stable, then (IIOg, n2j) is also stable.
Interpretation.
a) Everything equal, if an IIO with low income is stable, it remains stable if the in-
come level increases. A stable IIO does not break up if the community becomes more
wealthy, as far as the dispersion in income realization is the same.
b) Everything equal, if an IIO with low external cost, then if this cost is higher, the
IIO remains stable. An increase in the external cost of losing a link reinforce stability.
c) Everything equal, for low probabilities, an increase in the probability of realization
of the highest income preserves stability. On the other hand, a decrease in the proba-
bility of realization of the highest income preserves stability as long as this probability
is high enough.
d) Everything equal, an increase in risk aversion preserves stability. This is very in-
tuitive because as individuals become more risk averse, they will like to smooth more
future consumption and therefore not deviate today.
e) Everything equal, if the size of one of the coalition is increasing such that the
number of overall individuals is unchanged, then an increase in the coalitional size
preserves stability.
Proof.
a) All the stability conditions can be written as A[1− λ(2y +B)] < C, where A > 0,
and λ > 0. Therefore, y2 > y1 ⇒ A[1− λ(2y2 +B)] < A[1− λ(2y1 +B)]
b) All the stability conditions can be written as A < B(C + αD), where B > 0, and
D > 0. Therefore, α2 > α1 ⇒ B(C + α2D) > B(C + α1D).
c) All the stability conditions (i) can be written as A < Bp(1− p) +C, where B > 0.
But the functional F (p) = p(1−p) defined on (0, 1), increases in (0, 0.5) and decreases
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in (0.5, 1). The probability p is irrelevant for condition (ii).
d) All the stability conditions can be written as A − λB < λC + D, where B > 0,
and C ≥ 0. We can rewrite the stability conditions as −λ(B + C) < D − A, where
B + C > 0. Therefore, λ2 > λ1 ⇒ −λ2(B + C) < −λ1(B + C).
e) There are three conditions of stability. For the first conditions (i) (with k = n),
the result is straightforward because the coefficient of nj is positive. For k = nj in
condition (i),
d
n
[
1− λ(2y + d(nj
n
+ 1
n
)
)]
< δ
1−δ
{
λ( 1
n(n−nj+1))d
2p(1− p) + α
}
because nj − 1 > 0.
This result can be generalized as A
n(n−nj+1) +Bnj > C, where A > 0 and B > 0. The
result obtains because the LHS is an increasing function of nj. 
4.4.2 Numerical simulations
In the previous section we investigate how exogenous parameters affect stability.
However when combined, the magnitude of the effect of each such parameters on
stability is ambiguous. Therefore, we proceed by simulation to compute these effects.
In the following, we simulate our simple model of IIO and we compute stability
with non extreme values of the discount factor.
For each value of δ (on a grid), we verify stability conditions for several values of each
given parameter x ∈ P and we compute the proportion of stable (IIOg, x).
For weak stability, Figure 4.3 shows that two parameters tend to have no ambiguous
effects. The level of output tend to be the most pertinent parameter that reinforce
stability whereas the size of coalition tend to be the least. 21 Other parameters in
consideration have intermediate effect on stability. Ranking them from the most to
the least pertinent, we have approximately : external cost, risk aversion, and diffe-
rence in output. One effect that we identify (but not observable from Figure 4.3) is
that even if the size of coalitions tend to be less pertinent for stability, as the dis-
21. These results are obtained for the discount factor ranging from 0.4 to 0.6
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count becomes very high, weak-stable IIOs are characterized by two coalitions, with
disproportionate sizes. The same result is obtained by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
in the bilateral setting.
For the same values of parameters as for weak stability, Figure 4.4 shows that it
is more difficult to achieve strong stability. 22 This result is very intuitive because the
more severe the punishment, the less the incentive to deviate. The most pertinent
parameter for stability tend to be the difference in output. It is followed by income
level, external cost, and risk aversion.
Figure 4.3 – Weak-stability and exogenous parameters
22. Strong stability is hard to obtain for lower values of δ. We do not use the same range of δ in
Figure 4.4 because for lower values, almost all IIOs are unstable. Here we use a ranging from 0.5 to
0.7
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Figure 4.4 – Strong-stability and exogenous parameters
4.5 Example of full risk sharing
In this chapter, we use equal sharing rule at component level, obtained by equal
consumption in coalitions. Since this is a strong assumption, we develop a procedure
that can help to implement this multilateral sharing rule in reality.
The sharing rule specifies the aggregate transfers for all individuals, conditional on the
distribution of realized incomes. But, for a given distribution of aggregate transfers,
there exist multiple ways to specify the detailed transfer flow between individuals.
For example in the bilateral setting, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) show that if
pairs of individuals meet randomly and share equally their income, and if the number
of meeting rounds tends to infinity, then equal consumption obtains for all linked
individuals. This is a very interesting result. However, it is difficult to implement
because of the infinite number of rounds needed. Suppose that a policy maker intends
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to attain full risk pooling in a community of linked individuals. It is not obvious how
to implement infinite rounds of meetings between two harvests. Furthermore in our
setting, as transfers across networks can only be performed by overlapping individuals,
the implementation of infinite round meetings is much more complicated.
In this section, we develop a finite rounds transfer scheme that equates consump-
tion for linked individuals. We call this transfer scheme the ordered proportional trans-
fer scheme. It has both descriptive and normative aspects. First, this transfer scheme
is based on observations made in rural communities in developing countries. If there
is a shock in the net income of an individual i, groups which are directly linked to i
make transfers to her according to their own wealth such that at the end of the day
i receives the needed transfer. Due to this procedure, individual income shocks does
not hardly affect consumption. For example that pattern is observed in Tanzanian
villages for income shocks due to illness or ceremonies (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2005).
Second, this transfer scheme induces full risk pooling for all linked individuals.
Consider a population N of n individuals, a preexisting network g, the induced
IIOg, a coalition S ∈ γg, and a vector of realized income y for all individuals in
N . According to Proposition 11, the equal consumption rule prescribes that each
individual in N consumes c ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N y
i. 23 Thus for all i ∈ S, the overall transfers
is zi = c − yi. If furthermore i is an overlapping individual, then ziS denotes i’s net
transfer within the coalition S. For all i ∈ S, let zilS denote the detailed transfer that
individual i makes to a coalitional fellow l ∈ S. Thus, ∑l∈S zilS = ziS. Let ES ≡ {i ∈
S| ziS < 0} denote the set of individuals who have an excess of income in S compared
to c.
Definition 25. The proportional transfer scheme is such that :
(i) If i ∈ ES, then zilS = − z
i
S∑
k∈ES z
k
S
zlS for all l 6∈ ES.
(ii) If i 6∈ ES, then zilS = −zliS for all l ∈ ES.
(iii) Otherwise, zilS = 0.
23. Remember that we limit ourselves to the case where all individuals are linked directly or
indirectly.
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Remark 22. The proportional transfer states that only individuals with excess in
income can make transfers. These transfers are made, proportionally to their needs (in
order to obtain the prescribed consumption c), to those who suffer a lack of income.
If the realized income of an individual is c, then she neither makes nor receives any
transfer.
If g is the complete network, then γg = {N}, and the ordered proportional transfer
coincides with the proportional transfer.
Consumption can be equalized for the whole N only because of overlapping in-
dividuals. They are the only channel through which transfers can be made across
coalition. They serve as wealth spreader from the wealthiest (highest per capita) coa-
litions to the poorest (lowest per capita) coalitions that they belong to. Therefore,
overlapping individuals are in charge not only for their own needs but also for the
needs of the poor coalitions that they belong to. This is possible because we made
the assumption that within coalitions, each individual can observe the aggregated
transfers of her coalitional fellows, especially overlapping individuals.
The ordered proportional transfer scheme consists of the following algorithm. It
begins once the distribution of the realized income is known (for example after each
harvest). At first, we need to specify the net transfer for overlapping individuals in
each coalition. A simple way to do this is to rank coalitions from the lowest per capita
to the highest per capita. In each coalition where the per capita realized income is less
than c, only the overlapping individuals can satisfy the needs. Therefore by applying
the proportional transfer within each coalition, one can consistently determine the
transfer from each overlapping. In case of tie, share equally the needed transfer among
overlapping individuals. In the following, we develop the algorithm.
At the beginning, let γ ≡ γg.
Step 1 : Rank all the coalitions in γ according to per capita income realization.
Let S∗ denote the coalition with the highest per capita income realization. 24
24. In case of ties, choose the coalition that contains the highest indexed individual.
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Step 2 : For each overlapping individual i ∈ S∗, replace yi with y′i ≡ yi + zi− ziS∗
and implement the proportional transfer scheme in S∗. The value y′i represents
the aggregated needs of i. 25 In practice, it can easily be obtained by proceeding
backwards from the poorest to the richest coalitions containing i.
Step 3 : Update the income of each overlapping individual in S∗ to yiupdated ≡
yi + ziS∗ . Update γ to γ \ {S∗} by removing S∗ and go to Step 1.
The algorithm ends if γ = ∅.
Let m∗ be the number of distinct coalitions in γg.
Theorem 13. The ordered proportional transfer algorithm is well defined and equates
consumption in γg after m∗ rounds.
Before we prove the theorem, the following example illustrates the ordered pro-
portional transfer for a 5-person IIO.
Example 8. Consider a community N = {A,B,C,D,E} of 5 individuals, and a
preexisting network g linking them. In brackets are the realized incomes.
In this example, N = {A,B,C,D,E}. The coalitions are S1 = {A,B,C}, S2 =
{C,D}, S3 = {B,E}. The IIO is γg = {S1, S2, S3}. Individual realized incomes are
yA = 10, yB = 2, yC = 2, yD = 0, yE = 1. The average consumption is c = 3. For all
i ∈ N , the aggregated transfer is zi = c − yi. Thus, zA = −7, zB = 1, zC = 1, zD =
3, zE = 2. There are two overlapping individual : B and C. From the lowest to the
highest per capita realized income, coalitions are ranked is this order : S1, S3, S2. The
coalitional aggregated transfers for overlapping individuals are : ZBS3 = −2, ZCS2 = −3.
These transfers are to be made to E and D so that they consume the prescribed
amount.
Round 1 : γ = {S1, S2, S3}
The highest per capita realized income coalition is S∗ = S1. The new income distribu-
25. This value can be negative. Furthermore, remember that each individual in S∗ can observe i’s
aggregate transfer.
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Figure 4.5 – An example of a 5-person network
tion for the overlapping individual B is y′B = yB + zB − zBS∗ = yB +ZBS3 = 2− 2 = 0,
and for individual C is y′C = yC +zC−zCS∗ = yC +ZCS2 = 2−3 = −1. According to the
proportional transfer, A ends up with 3, B receives 3 and C receives 4. The updated
γ = {S2, S3}. The updated incomes are yBupdated = 2 + 3 = 5, yCupdated = 2 + 4 = 6
Round 2 : γ = {S2, S3} with yB = 5, yC = 6, yD = 0, Y E = 1
The highest per capita realized income coalition is S∗ = S3. There is no overlapping
individual. The income distribution is yB = 5, yE = 1. According to the proportional
transfer, B ends up with 3, and E with 3. The updated γ = {S2}.
Round 3 : γ = {S2} with yC = 6, yD = 0
The highest per capita realized income coalition is S∗ = S2. The new income distri-
bution is yC = 6, yD = 0. According to the proportional transfer, C ends up with 3,
and D with 3. The updated γ = ∅.
The algorithm ends after 3 rounds with cA = cB = cC = cD = cE = 3.
Proof of the Theorem.
At each round, S∗ is selected and following the proportional transfer, each non-
overlapping individuals in S∗ ends up with c. The excess of realized income are trans-
ferred to the overlapping individuals proportionally to their aggregated needs.
At the first round, the total amount of available income in the economy is Y1 = nc.
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We partition S∗ into S∗ = N ′ ∪ O, where N ′ is the subset of non-overlapping
players, of size n′, and O is the subset of overlapping players, of size o. At Step
3,
∑
i∈O y
i
updated =
∑
i∈S∗ y
i − n′c, as each non-overlapping individual in S∗ consumes
c.
At round 2, the total amount of available income in the economy is Y2 =
∑
i∈N−S∗ y
i+∑
i∈S∗ y
i − n′c. Hence, Y2 =
∑
i∈N y
i − n′c = (n − n′)c. Therefore, 1
(n−n′)Y2 = c. So,
at the beginning of round 2, the problem is the same as at round 1 but with n − n′
individuals. At round m, the last one, the available overall income is, for the same
justifications, Ym = kc to be distributed among k individuals according to the pro-
portional transfer scheme. 
As also obtained by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), our transfer scheme equates
consumption for all linked individuals, but in finite steps. One difference is however,
in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) knowledge of y and z is not required. Moreover, the
algorithm is easy to implement. Besides, it is worth noting that the role of overlapping
individuals in the perpetuation of transfers across coalitions is essential for the IIO
to fully pool risk.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we take a step forward in the modeling of informal insurance. We
depart from the traditional extreme approaches using groups and the networks. As
a result, we characterize stable informal insurance arrangements without imposing
limits on discounting. This chapter is a first step in the exploration of a multilateral
approach to model informal insurance. Since the economics literature on the topic is
very rich, we discuss in this section other existing aspects in the literature that can
enrich our approach and therefore can be subject to future investigations.
First, our notion of stability implicitly models economic agents as being myopic.
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But in real life, when contemplating a deviation, the deviator may not only consider
the immediate effect of her action, but also future deviations that may follow. At
least one should require the next network to form following a deviation to be itself
immune to future deviations. This consistency notion induces a recursive definition of
stability as done by BGR. Besides, we explore only individual deviations. But a group
of individuals may also deviate in order to stay together in the future as studied by
Genicot and Ray (2002). We choose the simplest way to model economic agents in
this setting because we want to address an approach that merges groups and bilateral
links approaches as a first step in a new model of informal insurance.
Second, most of the papers in this literature answer the following questions. What
is the best transfer in order to obtain a Pareto efficient risk sharing ? If we cannot
reach Pareto efficiency, what is the transfer that guarantee Pareto frontier, conditional
on self enforcing constraints ? These questions are widely answered in the literature
and we do not intend to contribute in that direction. This chapter answers instead
the following question. Suppose that individuals in isolated islands implement the
first best with respect to their norms. 26 What are the determinants of the preexisting
network such that an IIO perpetuates transfers over time ?
Third, we investigate strong and weak punishments. It will be interesting to ex-
plore other punishment schemes. The range between the weak and the strong punish-
ment is due to the modeling of the reaction of third parties. These are individuals
who are not directly victims of a deviation, but are linked to the victim and therefore
are aware of this deviation. As an alternative to these extreme punishments, an in-
termediary case is developed by BGR, the level-q punishment. Following a deviation,
all individuals who are connected to a victim by a path not exceeding length q (but
not via deviant) sever direct links (if any) with the deviant. The problem with level-q
punishment is that the decision by a third party to severe a link or not is dictated
exogenously by the number q. In our setting, the intermediary level-q punishment
26. It is documented in empirical findings that in a community, individuals in isolated islands
implement the first best with respect to their norms.
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is either the weak or the strong punishment. 27 An intermediary punishment can be
obtained with third party individuals severing the link with the deviator with some
probability. If this probability equals 1, the strong punishment applies and if it equals
0, the weak punishment applies.
Finally, it is useful to explore other sharing norms. For example one can consider
sharing rules such that individuals keep some part of the realized income and share
the remaining with coalitional fellows. These sharing rules can be viewed as exten-
sions of equal consumption rule that we explore in this chapter.
In this chapter we develop a model of informal insurance organizations that ac-
commodates stylized facts. These are the facts that informal insurance organizations
are homogenous groups of individuals, these groups may overlap, and there exists
externalities across them. For this purpose, we use multilateral norms that merge the
group oriented and the network oriented approaches. We provide a transfer scheme
that permits to equate consumption for linked individuals in finite rounds. We charac-
terize stability under weak and strong punishments. Finally we provide characteristics
of some exogenous parameters of the model regarding stability.
27. First, the level-0 punishment is the weak punishment. Besides, within coalitions, all individuals
are directly linked. So, there is no path exceeding one that links all individuals within a coalition.
Therefore the strong punishment coincide with the level-1 punishment.
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Conclusion générale
Cette thèse est un recueil de quatre articles traitant des coalitions imbriquées. Elle
propose, non seulement des éléments de réponses aux questions relatives au processus
de formation de ces coalitions, mais aussi utilise ces réponses pour proposer des mo-
dèles d’assurance informelle (qui sont des coalitions imbriquées) dont la construction
est basée sur des faits empiriques.
Dans le premier chapitre, je propose un jeu dynamique dont l’équilibre donne une
structure de coalitions imbriquées. Je détermine ensuite les conditions d’existence
d’équilibre et je propose une procédure permettant de calculer l’équilibre dans le cas
des jeux symétriques. J’établis ensuite un lien biunivoque entre coalitions imbriquées
et réseaux interrelationnels et enfin je caractérise la plupart des structures de réseaux
comme émanant d’un équilibre du jeu dynamique proposé.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, je procède par une approche par les jeux de coopération
pour expliquer la formation des coalitions imbriquées. Il s’agit d’un processus où la
distribution du gain collectif obtenu au sein des coalitions est un élément du noyau.
Je propose donc une extension du noyau récursif au cas où les coalitions sont im-
briquées. Je propose deux cas : un premier cas où l’extension est naïve et présente
d’énormes restrictions et un deuxième cas où je tiens compte des sophistications liées
au caractère imbriqué des coalitions (notamment du caractère particulier des indivi-
dus appartenant à plusieurs coalitions). J’obtiens ainsi une structure de noyau plus
raffinée et plus en harmonie avec les coalitions imbriquées.
Dans le troisième chapitre, j’apporte des éléments nouveaux à la modélisation des
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assurances informelles : la prise en compte des externalités, les coalitions imbriquées
et un processus d’autodiscipline endogène. Sur cette base, je caractérise les groupes
d’assurance informelle stables et j’isole les paramètres clés qui peuvent inciter les
agents à faire défection. Je dérive enfin des résultats de statiques comparatives pour
ces paramètres.
Enfin dans le dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle qui inclut
les faits empiriques qui existent dans la littérature. J’observe ce qu’il advient dans les
deux cas extrêmes d’autodiscipline. Je caractérise la stabilité des groupes d’assurance
informelle sans faire de restrictions sur le facteur d’escompte. J’identifie ensuite les
caractéristiques des réseaux relationnelles qui contribuent à la stabilité des groupes
d’assurance informelle. En outre, j’isole un certain nombre de paramètres clés qui
affectent la stabilité et je fournis des résultats de statiques comparatives pour ces pa-
ramètres. Quelques simulations me permettent de classer ces paramètres suivant leur
contribution à la stabilité. Enfin, je propose une procédure plus réaliste qui permet
de lisser au mieux la consommation au sein des groupes d’assurance informelle.
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